



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

MR. ERNIE LAZAR  
APARTMENT 6  
577 SOUTH THORNHILL ROAD  
PALM SPRINGS, CA 92264 7884

April 16, 2008

Subject: FILE NUMBER 100-356092 SERIALS 1 - 85  
AND 97 - END OF FILE  
FOIPA No. 1081037- 000

Dear Requester:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

Section 552a

- |                                            |                                               |                                 |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) _____      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| _____                                      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| _____                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| _____                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6) |                                               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

256 **page(s)** were reviewed and 200 **page(s)** are being released.

- ☐ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☐ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.


☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).

If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

Material responsive to your specific request is enclosed.

Pursuant to Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.11 and/or 16.49, there is a fee of ten cents per page for duplication. No fees are assessed for the first 100 pages. You have already received 26 pages associated with the subject of this request under FOIPA request number 1049935. This release of 200 pages consists of the remaining 74 free pages and 126 billable pages. Upon receipt of these documents please make a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of \$12.60 for 200 released pages. To insure proper identification of your request, please return this letter or include the FOIPA request number(s) with your payment. Failure to pay for this release will close your current request as well as any pending FBI FOIA requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIA requests.

Page 153 ~ b1, b6, b7C  
Page 154 ~ b1  
Page 155 ~ b1  
Page 156 ~ b1  
Page 157 ~ b1  
Page 158 ~ b1  
Page 159 ~ b1  
Page 160 ~ b1  
Page 161 ~ b1  
Page 162 ~ b1  
Page 163 ~ b1  
Page 164 ~ b1

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X for this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

DATE: 12-12-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/Bis

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

12-12-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

May 7, 1948

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Director, FBI

Re: SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES;  
ANATOL GRANOVSKY, MICHA FLOVSKY, wa.  
GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAZ;  
ESPIONAGE - R

Dear Sir:

For the information of the Bureau, it is advised that under date of April 27, 1948, this office received a radiogram from [redacted]

[redacted] of the Political and Social Police of the Sao Paulo Police Department, requesting confirmation of the following data which GRANOVSKY had furnished to the police following his arrest for illegal entry to Brazil from Bolivia.

b6  
b7C

GRANOVSKY alleged to have been a Captain in the Russian Intelligence Service, to have deserted and to have established contact with the United States Intelligence Service at Stockholm, Sweden, on September 2, 1946, through [redacted]

[redacted]. He claimed to have departed from the Occupied Zone of Germany on September 15, 1947, accompanied by an American officer whom he knew as [redacted], who facilitated his entry to Belgium and departure from Antwerp, and paid him \$360.00. Under the name of GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAZ, he was provided with a Rumanian passport N<sup>o</sup> 20303 issued by the Rumanian Legation at Berne, Switzerland, on July 10, 1947, and a visa for entry to Bolivia.

b6  
b7C

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

Following his arrival at La Paz, Bolivia, [redacted] assisted him in obtaining employment which lasted only a short time, but refused him any further compensation.

b6  
b7C

RECORDED  
INDEXED

EX-61  
MAY 13 1948

52 JUN 9 1948

b1  
b6  
b7C



~~SECRET~~

Re: SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

(S)

b1  
b6  
b7C

Having traveled to São Paulo, the writer on April 30, 1948, furnished this information verbally to [ ] and indicated that complete information had not yet been received.

b1  
b6  
b7C

(S)

GRANOVSKY contended that he had been promised a settlement of \$1,000.00 over and above his passage to South America, and also had been instructed that he would be met when the vessel on which he was traveling reached Santos, Brazil, and his travel to La Paz facilitated. He alleged that he was given the name and address of an individual in La Paz who would pay the remaining \$640.00 due him and would assist him in obtaining Bolivian travel documents in view of the fact that he speaks no Rumanian and his Rumanian passport was due to expire in July of this year. He complained that he had not been met at Santos and had been unable to locate the person in La Paz whose identity was furnished to him, and he strongly contended to the São Paulo police authorities that he was convinced that his present difficulties are due to a misunderstanding between the field and Washington. He stated that he left Bolivia and entered Brazil illegally when he ran completely out of funds and found himself unable to obtain employment.

Being convinced of the general veracity of the subject's statements, [ ] treated him unusually well, housing him at a hotel rather than incarcerating him, and indicated his willingness to assist him in legalizing his status in this country. [ ] did indicate, however, his belief that the proper United States authorities should assume some responsibility in the matter [ ]

(S)

b1  
b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

Re: SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

(S)

The foregoing is being brought to the Bureau's attention as of general interest, and because of the necessity of the writer's taking some part in the matter because of recognized liaison status with the São Paulo Police Department.

Very truly yours,

*Rolf L. Larson*  
ROLF L. LARSON  
LA

RLL:jar  
65-112

-3-  
~~SECRET~~

DATE: 12-12-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
12-12-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

*JI* Date: June 10, 1948

To:

[Redacted]

(C)

b1

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted]

(C)

RECORDED  
EX-57  
JUN 11 1948  
F B I  
42 JUN 12 1948  
100-356092-1X  
100-356355-1

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
JUN 11 1948 P.M.  
cc - Foreign Service Desk  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

APC: [initials]

*Unatol*  
*transmission*  
*microwaved*  
*over*

Tolson  
E. A. Tamm  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Egan  
Gurnea  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Pennington  
Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

Legal Attache L (412) CONFIDENTIAL AIR POUCH)  
Rio de Janeiro

*Extra*  
*Spec-par Am*

DATE: 02-11-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-11-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
June 24, 1948

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Director, FBI

(S)

Dear Sir:

(S) Reference is made to a Bureau letter [redacted] and  
entitled as above, a copy of which was furnished to this  
office, and which requested information regarding the above-  
captioned individual. Further reference is made to Rio de  
Janeiro letter to the Bureau dated May 7, 1948, and entitled  
"SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES; ANATOL GRANOVSKY-MICHAILOVSKY,  
wa. GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAZ; Espionage - R."

(S) Although it is likely that the [redacted] will inform  
the Bureau fully regarding this matter, it is deemed advis-  
able for this office to clarify the fact [redacted]  
(S) [redacted] referred to in the Rio de Janeiro radio  
broadcast is identical with ANATOL GRANOVSKY MICHAILOVSKY,  
the subject of this office's letter of reference.

(S) The foregoing information was received by the writer  
from [redacted]  
[redacted] of Political Police at São Paulo. Also  
of possible interest to the Bureau is information received  
[redacted] to the effect  
that GRANOVSKY has succeeded in obtaining permission to re-  
main in Brazil and currently is writing a series of articles  
regarding his past history for the Rio de Janeiro newspaper,  
"Diario Carióca", for which he is reported to be receiving  
the sum of cruzeiros 20,000 (approximately \$1,000.00).

Very truly yours,

Rolf L. Larson  
ROLF L. LARSON  
LA

RLL:jar

100-301348

G. I. R. - 300000 - 22  
INDEXED - 22 34 JUL 2, 1948

~~SECRET~~



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-11-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/dls

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

[redacted]

FROM

[redacted]

DATE:

November 18, 1948

SUBJECT: ANATOL GRANOVSKY MICHAILOVSKY, was  
ESPIONAGE - R

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

A restricted communication to the United States Department of State (No. 336) from [redacted], dated October 7, 1948, at Sao Paulo, Brazil, makes reference to a feature article entitled, "Was Stalin's Spy" by A. M. Granovski which was currently appearing in the newspaper "Folha da Manhã." Granovski was described as a "former captain in the Espionage Service of the U.S.S.R."

RECOMMENDATION:

Inasmuch as Granovski appears identical with the subject in this case, it is suggested that this excerpt be made a part of the case file in this matter.

100-356092

EMG:lfc

RECORDED - 94

INDEXED - 94

100-356092-3  
F B I  
6 NOV 19 1948b6  
b7C





U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

MR. ERNIE LAZAR  
APARTMENT 6  
577 SOUTH THORNHILL ROAD  
PALM SPRINGS, CA 92264 7884

April 16, 2008

Subject: FILE NUMBER 100-356092 SERIALS 1 - 85  
AND 97 - END OF FILE  
FOIPA No. 1081037- 000

Dear Requester:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

Section 552a

- |                                            |                                               |                                 |
|--------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) _____      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| _____                                      | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| _____                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| _____                                      | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)            | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9)               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6) |                                               | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

256 **page(s)** were reviewed and 200 **page(s)** are being released.

- ☐ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning other Government agency(ies) [OGA]. This information has been:

- ☐ referred to the OGA for review and direct response to you.
- ☐ referred to the OGA for consultation. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is finished.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials in this release. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.


☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s).



If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

Material responsive to your specific request is enclosed.

Pursuant to Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 16.11 and/or 16.49, there is a fee of ten cents per page for duplication. No fees are assessed for the first 100 pages. You have already received 26 pages associated with the subject of this request under FOIPA request number 1049935. This release of 200 pages consists of the remaining 74 free pages and 126 billable pages. Upon receipt of these documents please make a check or money order payable to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the amount of \$12.60 for 200 released pages. To insure proper identification of your request, please return this letter or include the FOIPA request number(s) with your payment. Failure to pay for this release will close your current request as well as any pending FBI FOIA requests from you. Nonpayment will also cause an automatic denial of any future FOIA requests.



Page 153 ~ b1, b6, b7C  
Page 154 ~ b1  
Page 155 ~ b1  
Page 156 ~ b1  
Page 157 ~ b1  
Page 158 ~ b1  
Page 159 ~ b1  
Page 160 ~ b1  
Page 161 ~ b1  
Page 162 ~ b1  
Page 163 ~ b1  
Page 164 ~ b1

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  
X Deleted Page(s) X  
X No Duplication Fee X  
X for this Page X  
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

DATE: 12-12-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/Bis

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

12-12-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

May 7, 1948

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Director, FBI

Re: SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES;  
ANATOL GRANOVSKY, MICHA FLOVSKY, wa.  
GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAZ;  
ESPIONAGE - R

Dear Sir:

For the information of the Bureau, it is advised that under date of April 27, 1948, this office received a radiogram from [redacted]

[redacted] of the Political and Social Police of the Sao Paulo Police Department, requesting confirmation of the following data which GRANOVSKY had furnished to the police following his arrest for illegal entry to Brazil from Bolivia.

b6  
b7C

GRANOVSKY alleged to have been a Captain in the Russian Intelligence Service, to have deserted and to have established contact with the United States Intelligence Service at Stockholm, Sweden, on September 2, 1946, through [redacted]

[redacted]. He claimed to have departed from the Occupied Zone of Germany on September 15, 1947, accompanied by an American officer whom he knew as [redacted], who facilitated his entry to Belgium and departure from Antwerp, and paid him \$360.00. Under the name of GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAZ, he was provided with a Rumanian passport N<sup>o</sup> 20303 issued by the Rumanian Legation at Berne, Switzerland, on July 10, 1947, and a visa for entry to Bolivia.

b6  
b7C

~~DEFERRED RECORDING~~

Following his arrival at La Paz, Bolivia, [redacted] assisted him in obtaining employment which lasted only a short time, but refused him any further compensation.

b6  
b7C

RECORDED  
INDEXED

EX-61  
MAY 13 1948

52 JUN 9 1948

b1  
b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

Re: SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

(S)

b1  
b6  
b7C

Having traveled to São Paulo, the writer on April 30, 1948, furnished this information verbally to [ ] and indicated that complete information had not yet been received.

b1  
b6  
b7C

(S)

GRANOVSKY contended that he had been promised a settlement of \$1,000.00 over and above his passage to South America, and also had been instructed that he would be met when the vessel on which he was traveling reached Santos, Brazil, and his travel to La Paz facilitated. He alleged that he was given the name and address of an individual in La Paz who would pay the remaining \$640.00 due him and would assist him in obtaining Bolivian travel documents in view of the fact that he speaks no Rumanian and his Rumanian passport was due to expire in July of this year. He complained that he had not been met at Santos and had been unable to locate the person in La Paz whose identity was furnished to him, and he strongly contended to the São Paulo police authorities that he was convinced that his present difficulties are due to a misunderstanding between the field and Washington. He stated that he left Bolivia and entered Brazil illegally when he ran completely out of funds and found himself unable to obtain employment.

Being convinced of the general veracity of the subject's statements, [ ] treated him unusually well, housing him at a hotel rather than incarcerating him, and indicated his willingness to assist him in legalizing his status in this country. [ ] did indicate, however, his belief that the proper United States authorities should assume some responsibility in the matter

(S)

b1  
b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

Re: SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

(S)

The foregoing is being brought to the Bureau's attention as of general interest, and because of the necessity of the writer's taking some part in the matter because of recognized liaison status with the São Paulo Police Department.

Very truly yours,

*Rolf L. Larson*  
ROLF L. LARSON  
LA

RLL:jar  
65-112

-3-  
~~SECRET~~



DATE: 12-12-2007  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
12-12-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

*JI* Date: June 10, 1948

To:

[Redacted]

(C)

b1

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

[Redacted]

(C)

RECORDED  
EX-57  
JUN 11 1948  
F B I  
42 JUN 12 1948  
100-356092-1X  
100-356355-1

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
JUN 11 1948 P.M.  
cc - Foreign Service Desk  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

APC: [initials]

*Unatol*  
*transmission*  
*microwaved*  
*over*

Tolson  
E. A. Tamm  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Egan  
Gurnea  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Pennington  
Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy

Legal Attache L (412) CONFIDENTIAL AIR POUCH)  
Rio de Janeiro

*Extra*  
*Spec-par Am*

DATE: 02-11-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-11-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
June 24, 1948

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Director, FBI

(S)

Dear Sir:

(S) Reference is made to a Bureau letter [redacted] and  
entitled as above, a copy of which was furnished to this  
office, and which requested information regarding the above-  
captioned individual. Further reference is made to Rio de  
Janeiro letter to the Bureau dated May 7, 1948, and entitled  
"SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES; ANATOL GRANOVSKY-MICHAILOVSKY,  
wa. GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAZ; Espionage - R."

(S) Although it is likely that the [redacted] will inform  
the Bureau fully regarding this matter, it is deemed advis-  
able for this office to clarify the fact [redacted]  
(S) [redacted] referred to in the Rio de Janeiro radio  
broadcast is identical with ANATOL GRANOVSKY MICHAILOVSKY,  
the subject of this office's letter of reference.

(S) The foregoing information was received by the writer  
from [redacted]  
[redacted] of Political Police at São Paulo. Also  
of possible interest to the Bureau is information received  
[redacted] to the effect  
that GRANOVSKY has succeeded in obtaining permission to re-  
main in Brazil and currently is writing a series of articles  
regarding his past history for the Rio de Janeiro newspaper,  
"Diario Carióca", for which he is reported to be receiving  
the sum of cruzeiros 20,000 (approximately \$1,000.00).

Very truly yours,

*Rolf L. Larson*

ROLF L. LARSON  
LA

RLL:jar

100-301348

G. I. R. - 300000 - 22  
INDEXED - 22 34 JUL 2, 1948

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 11-11-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/dls

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

[redacted]

FROM

[redacted]

DATE:

November 18, 1948

SUBJECT: ANATOL GRANOVSKY MICHAILOVSKY, was  
ESPIONAGE - R

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

A restricted communication to the United States Department of State (No. 336) from [redacted], dated October 7, 1948, at Sao Paulo, Brazil, makes reference to a feature article entitled, "Was Stalin's Spy" by A. M. Granovski which was currently appearing in the newspaper "Folha da Manhã." Granovski was described as a "former captain in the Espionage Service of the U.S.S.R."

RECOMMENDATION:

Inasmuch as Granovski appears identical with the subject in this case, it is suggested that this excerpt be made a part of the case file in this matter.

100-356092

EMG:lfc

RECORDED - 94

INDEXED - 94

100-356092-3  
F B I  
6 NOV 19 1948b6  
b7C

TO THE HONORABLE MR. EDGAR HOOVER

Director of the F.B.I.

~~Down graded to Seaf  
Pen 60324 Acc 6/10/01 SIP~~

Very Respectfully,  
 Wm. J. Harrison, M.D.

۴۰۰

Q3-1

As immediately bearing you to read this fact as attention and takes the necessary steps because this factor is connected with the literature of the U.S.A.

From the Journals of the Rev. Dr. A. A. Phelps  
1845

On September 23rd, 1942, I spoke in the afternoon I presented myself to the U.S.A. Embassy in Washington and asked for an audience with the military Attache of the U.S.A.

It was surprising and the library was not working and the employees on duty gave me the address of Captain E. Asensio at the library attached to the U.S.A. in Jordan (I will await all the response for the time being for me to correspond to my American friends).

I informed the Captain X about my intentions not to return to U.S.A., and to put myself under the custody of the U.S.A. As al-  
timate I did not speak English, Captain X did not understand me well  
and called by phone the Is-Vollant, X-Hillary attorney of the U.S.  
and directed me to the latest apartment. So Colonel X spoke French so  
we could understand each other and he will go to his all say (20)  
Monsieur certain documents of the H.R.V.D., H.C.B., paid army and they as  
also 15 personal pictures, I presented to him that I will translate to the  
U.S.A. all what I knew about H.R.V., U.S., H.C.B., H.H., G.O.U.S., R.P., "GURRIN"  
as also other Soviet espionage and Communist-espionage in which I was  
working 7 years (from 1939 up to 1946).

The 36-05-1961 presented to me as the letters immediately about 1960-63 Washington, D.C. with no other name as Washington.

For the time of waiting to be transferred to Washington, the Th-Bolton had arranged for me an apartment with everything I would need. I was provided during 24 hours around by those Lovers of the Military attached to Persimov at Stockholm.

The Soviet streamer avoided by return and did not leave Stockholm, breaking away from London to leave on September 22nd.

The U.S. Air Force representative in Moscow Ilya Pukhovskiy, who reported that 25th was shot down.

They're pleased I am. The Company is interested to see a good friend like you to the U.S.A. - telling them there is already an order for this.

On Wednesday 27th., I left at 2 o'clock in the afternoon took the car to the airport saying that we are going to the airport to see the President. We went to the airport and saw the President. We went to the airport and saw the President. We went to the airport and saw the President.



Chief of the General Staff of the Swedish Army General I was also the Interior of the Swedish Government Johan K.

The Soviet Embassy made the nucleus of effort for my return. The Swedish Government representatives, according to my plan, did nothing reveal to the press about my escape.

His Majesty, The King of Sweden, Gustaf V, on His special secret council about my question, on November 28th, determined that:

- a) Not to return me to U.S.S.R., and consider me a political emigrant.
- b) Not to return me to Sweden.
- c) To get for me a visa to a country that could grant my safety and the not delivery to U.S.S.R.

(Top secret letter on November 28th 1946 by His Majesty Gustaf V) The copy of which was given to me.

It was an opening of a happy and free life for me. I dreamed to write a book and live no longer and free life on legal conditions, in the territory of the territory of Sweden asked me to visit country I would like to go. I answered that if the U.S.S.R. would give me a visa, I will continue to visit to go to U.S.S.R.

My aspirations to U.S.S.R. are based on:

- a) My wife, aunt and cousin are living in U.S.S.R. since 1905 - they are U.S.S.R. citizens.

- b) My work with the Soviet espionage and the tasks I have are mostly connected with the U.S.S.R.

As a result of the conversations between the Swedish Government representatives and the U.S.S.R. Embassy, particularly the Lt-Colonel X, Military Attache of U.S.S.R. in Sweden, the last granted my passport to U.S.S.R. as a cruiser of U.S.S.R. Navy, which about this time was to make a visit to the town of E - the Capital of an other country. The Embassy of U.S.S.R. asked the Swedish Foreign Ministry only to take me out from Sweden. The Foreign Ministry through the Secretary Mr. X delivered to me a Swedish Foreign Passport and according to the wishes of the U.S.S.R. Embassy, the officers of the Swedish General Staff and Government Police, on November 15th 1946, helped to transfer me to the town of X, the Capital of an other country, where I was met by the representatives of the General Staff and Government Police of this other country. Mr. X informed that he is acting in accordance with the policy of U.S.S.R. in this country and affirmed that in a few days I will sail on a U.S.S.R. Navy cruiser to the U.S.S.R.

Since November 15th up to December 4th I was living at the house of different officers of this country as also at the house of the Princess X of the Royal Family of this country. Everybody predicted a happy future. I worked hard for whole days on schemes, cards etc for navigation as I was assured by high rank officers of this country. By this time the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. changed the information instead to speak about the crimes it started to speak about the transportation of myself by plane. Then I was rushed on some of different embassies through the country during 10 days to confuse the Soviet espionage which was looking for me in the whole Northern Europe.

ments remained with the first Captain X.

On December 5th I arrived at the town X almost via the South of Europe where I was met by Mr. X a demobilized Lieutenant, who continued working for the Military espionage of the U.S. Army. Mr. X speaks a wonderful Russian. His first words were: "You are brought specially to me, because I am the only man in the Military espionage of the U.S. Army on the European theatre who not only knows the Russian language as also the Soviet espionage. In case you have honestly decided to help the U.S.A., you will have to work with us during 2-3 months in Europe and after that period, if your work will show real emotion, we will get from the State Department the necessary documents and visa for you to go to the U.S.A."

And so on December 5th 1946 I started my work in the interests of U.S.A. and particularly of U.S.A. Military Espionage.

December 1946, January, February and March 1947, methodically and every day I worked with Mr. X and his Secretary Mrs. X. On March 15th I concluded my work with Mr. X and he sincerely thanked me for my work and on taking leave said: "Soon you will live happy in U.S.A. and will receive the U.S.A. citizenship."

At the town X, Mr. X delivered me to Captain X on March 15th. Captain X delivered me to U.S. Navy Lieutenant X, the Lieutenant to Lt-Colonel X, the Lt-Colonel to Colonel X. Here began the period of extra supplementary work which was asked by these Officers; everything I did, was praised by them. April, May, June, July, August and September 1947 - all of them promised to send me to U.S.A. in one-two weeks, but those weeks went by up to September 15th 1947.

During the period from December 5th 1946 as I started my work under the guard of the Flag of the U.S. Army up to September 15th 1947, as I left the territory of the dislocation of the U.S. Army, my American colleagues - friends from the Military espionage granted consecutively four variants of my transfer to U.S.A.:

- 1) Direct from Europe to Washington by plane.
- 2) Through England and Canada to U.S.A.
- 3) With a Czechoslovakian passport to Chili (South America) and then with a Chilean passport to U.S.A.
- 4) With a Rumanian passport to Bolivia and then with a Bolivian passport to U.S.A.

During the period from December 5th 1946 up to September 15th 1947 the work done by me and given over to the representatives of the Military espionage of the U.S. Army on the European theatre beginning with Mr. X (a demobilized Lieutenant) and ending with the U.S. Army Colonel X, was:

1. A detailed scheme of U.S.K.R. - "Umarab" Red Army and the methods of its work.
2. A detailed scheme of U.S.G.B. and U.S.V.D. - 12 square meters and the methods of their work.

started already in the spring of 1943.  
and thousands of other smaller but not less important military details.

All I did proved to be facts, the Intelligence and U.S. Army discovered by my indications my former colleague of H.K.V.B. Major X, who was occupied in U.S.A. in "studying" the production of the atomic bomb (whose photograph was sent specially from Washington for my expertise) and were taken under observation other, about 20, Soviet spies in accordance to my indication, in U.S.A., Germany, Czechoslovakia and the U.S.A. Embassy in Moscow.

All directors of the Military Intelligence Service of the U.S. Army, denominated by me as X's, did like me, respected for my honesty and take care not only of my security but also surrounded me with the maximum of comfort. With all of them I was in friendly relations (with exception of one Lieutenant X of the U.S. Navy; the incident with this Lieutenant was without any base, except his personal dislike to me. For his attempts to frighten me without any reason, he was publicly in my presence called to attention by Colonel X the Chief of the Section of the Military Intelligence. It is interesting to observe that beginning with the Colonel X and ending with the Sergeant during this public reprehension all were on my side.)

All representatives of the Military Espionage who worked with me were not expansive boys, but solid grown men of culture. Logically, as they have during the period from December 4th 1946 up to September 15th organized a special service to help my work, to protect my safety and my personal requirements and this consisted in: a) The permanent 24 hours around service of three Sergeants X near my person which accompanied me not only during working hours, as also to the shows, promenades, to swimming and to the doctor. b) The furnishing of tens of apartments and bungalows which were changed in behalf of conspiracy. c) Special cooks, doctors, barbers, rations, clothings, make-ups cars etc. - all this, logically, the representatives of Military Intelligence did not give to me because they were enchanted by me as an angel, but because they considered that my work was worth this for the interests of U.S.A.

On September 14th 1947 was definitely confirmed the variant 3-4 i.e.:

1. I received a Rumanian passport, made by U.S. Military Intelligence with the name of THEODORE ALEXANDRU PETRAS.
2. With this passport I was to go to Bolivia.
3. The representative of the U.S. Military Intelligence, U.S. Army in Bolivia Mr. X was to exchange this passport for a Bolivian one and teach a little the Spanish language. Then he was to get me a visa at the U.S.A. Consulate at La Paz (Capital of Bolivia) for the U.S.A.

It was an excellent plan, conspirative - all my American friends of the Military Intelligence U.S. Army at the European theatre were glad for me and regarded me as friends.

On September 15th 1947 I was clad in U.S. Army uniform and together with Captain X (the same Captain who took all my documents on December 4th 1946), after crossing three States Military frontiers, we arrived at 8 o'clock in the evening to the city of X - the Capital of one of the western European States.



1. "You are going up to the Brazilian Port of Santos."
2. After arrival at Santos you will wait for our officer who will come on board and will call you by your Romanian name - the password will be my name.
3. Our officer will hand you a ticket for a trip by plane to LaPaz.
4. At the airport at LaPaz you will be met by our [redacted], in case he does not meet you, you will find him at the address: Casilla 1442.
5. Your personal documents and photos will be delivered to you at LaPaz by [redacted].
6. We had the intention to give you for expenses 1000 dollars, but now at the Embassy of U.S.A. we decided to give you only 360 dollars for whiskey etc., at Santos and LaPaz our representatives will take care of all your necessities."

This was the instruction received from Captain X. Interesting to note that Captain X lost at the restaurant 40 dollars and I gave that sum to him from the received from him previously 360 dollars, as, believing in all promises of my American friends, I felt myself on the top of happiness.

On September 21st/1947 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, exactly one year after my visit to Captain X - the Assistant to the Military Attache at Stockholm I was leaving Europe.

Up to the moment of departure on board of the ship remained Mr. X Consul General of U.S.A. and on ground was Captain X. We parted as friends as we believed in each other.

On October 15th 1947 I arrived at the Brazilian port of Santos and according to instructions received on September 20th in Europe was waiting for the arrival of Mr. X, the representative of the U.S. Army Intelligence Service, who was supposed to meet me. For 4 hours I was waiting, but nobody came and it was not more possible to wait - this waiting was already calling the attention of the Brazilian Police.

And so started my Odyssey with a Romanian passport and not knowing a single word in Romanian.

Fortunately, from the 320 dollars which I had on leaving Europe, I still had enough to be able without great troubles reach the Capital of Bolivia - LaPaz.

On October 19th 1947 I arrived by plane at LaPaz and according to instructions started to look for [redacted] at the address Casilla 1442, but this was not an address but a Post box (the word "Casilla" meaning in Spanish "box") and the n-1442 never belonged to [redacted].

All this together with [redacted] was a bad joke. And so with the last 20 dollars, which remained after the trip to LaPaz with a Romanian passport without knowledge of a single word in Romanian I was in Bolivia.

On October 21st I went to The U.S.A. Military Attache in Bolivia Colonel X and after telling him my history asked to help me to find [redacted] but nor him nor he could find this name as the name and the connection with the U.S.A. were pure phantasie.

The answer of the telegram sent by Colonel X to Washington on my behalf I do not know. To get the permission only to live in Bolivia I had to pay about 50 dollars to different establishments and police.

Thanks to the Colonel's help I remained in Bolivia up to April 1946. Since the first day of my escape from U.S.S.R., September 21st 1946 I decided to write a book, but in Bolivia this idea was an absurd. There was no work also in Bolivia. On April 1948 I arrived at São Paulo, Brazil and went to the Consul General of U.S.A. Mr. X, who advised the U.S.A. Embassy in Rio de Janeiro about me. Based on the information from the U.S.A. Embassy, the Minister of Interior of Brazil gave me a temporary permission to live in Rio de Janeiro. I started to gain some money by publishing articles about my life in the 7 years experience with the Soviet espionage. Those articles are in the Brazilian News-Papers. My articles called the attention of the greatest international publishing companies: I.N.S., U.S.A.P., F.P.,

[redacted] in his letter of January 11th 1949 to [redacted] writes: "U.S. security sources here are familiar with his story, and say that they can vouch for his identity and authenticity. They suggest that you check C.I.A. in Washington as a further backstop on determining the legitimate nature of Grenovsky's background."

The whole letter was in an satisfactory style and granted for me a sufficient remuneration to be able to change the faded Hungarian passport for an other in a language I could at least speak - Spanish, English, Czech, German or at least Portuguese and get a legitimate visa to be able to live in some country.

But somebody unknown to me at C.I.A. in Washington did not want to give an answer to I.N.S. and my contract with I.N.S. broke down.

The small circle of Brazilian Government Representatives, beginning with the Minister of Justice during my 9 months old life in Brazil said to me: "The U.S.A. Embassy says that you worked for the U.S.A. and you are ~~guaranteed~~ vouched by Washington, but why did they not take you to U.S.A.?" They all who know me are right, as U.S.A. did not help me so how they without knowing me, can help me?

On February 18th 1949 in the Ministry of Interior of Brazil I was recommended to try to get a visa through the U.S.A. Embassy or to present to Brazil my official documents and documental guarantees of U.S.A. about me. But I am unable to do this as also is unable the U.S.A. Embassy at Rio de Janeiro as somebody at Washington does not want to return my documents and to hold the promises which I received from all my U.S.A. friends in Europe about my transference to the U.S.A.

I can find only one explanation to all those doublecrossings: Some unknown to me gentleman in Washington is working not for the benefit of the interests of the U.S.A., but for the benefit of the U.S.C.I. like the newly reported Mrs. Elizabeth Bentley and Alger Hiss. In all books about the actions of F.B.I. there are forewords by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover about justice and the honest fulfillment of the duty and obligation.

I fulfilled my promises and obligations but the unknown gentleman - stole my legal liberty given to me by the decree of His Majesty the King of Sweden Gustaf V on November 8th 1946 and second stole all my Soviet and Swedish documents in other words stole my name. He broke all promises given by my U.S.A. friends in Europe.

To suspect in those many doublecrossings any of the U.S. army officers with whom I worked in Europe I have no bases - all of them are



taken away from me and all is in Washington.

I beg to pardon me for troubling you but I believe in your justice and help.

In case I will not be transferred to U.S.A. til March 1st 1949 by your order, I will be obliged for the second time to implore the protection of His Majesty the King of Sweden Gustaf V and also take revenge of my unknown doublecrosser by publishing this letter omitting the X's and with all real names in all press agencies with whom I am in connection. Will also publish all copies of my Soviet and Swedish documents the photocopies of which I received from Stockholm.

I am waiting and hope to get justice from you.  
The U.S.A. Embassy at Rio de Janeiro knows my address and how to find me to advise me about your decision.

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
February 21st 1949

Yours truly

*Anatoly Mikheevich Granovsky*  
Anatoly Mikheevich Granovsky.

P.S. In case no answer will be received up to March 1st, the original of this letter will be delivered to the Swedish Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro for transmission to His Majesty the King of Sweden.

Copies to  
The President of U.S.A.  
Mr. Harry Truman.  
The Secretary of State  
Mr. Dean Acheson.  
Attorney General  
Mr. Tom Clark.  
The Army Chief of Staff  
General Omar Bradley.  
The Director of the F.B.I.  
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.

To The Honorable  
J. EDGAR HOOVER  
Director of the FBI  
Department of Justice Building  
Washington D.C.

US547

ESTADOS UNIDOS

U.S.A.



VIA AÉREA  
PAR AVION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-01-2008 BY 60324UC/BAW/STP/LSS

EAU OF INVESTIG  
DEPARTMENT OF

CC-150

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to: February 28, 1949.

ENCODE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-11-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

ROLF L. LARSON ..... URGENT  
LEGAL ATTACHE,  
THE AMERICAN EMBASSY  
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

LETTER RECEIVED TODAY FROM ANATOLY MIKHAILOVITCH GRANOVSKY DESCRIBING HIMSELF  
AS A FORMER SOVIET ESPIONAGE AGENT, YOUR FILE, SIX FIVE DASH ONE ONE TWO. HE  
INDICATES HE HAS COOPERATED FULLY WITH AMERICAN AUTHORITIES IN EUROPE: THAT THEY  
ARRANGED FOR HIS TRANSPORTATION TO BRAZIL EN ROUTE UNITED STATES. LETTER INDICATES  
THAT HE BELIEVES HE HAS BEEN DOUBLE CROSSED AND THAT ON MARCH ONE, HE WILL REVEAL  
THE NAMES OF ALL AMERICANS WITH WHOM HE HAS COOPERATED AND WHO HAVE NOT CUT HIM  
OFF. LETTER STATES HIS ADDRESS IS KNOWN TO EMBASSY AT RIO DE JANEIRO. LOCATE,  
INTERVIEW AND ADVISE. IF POSSIBLE SECURE FROM HIM COPY OF HIS LETTER TO BUREAU  
FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE IN INTERVIEWING HIM. NO PROMISES TO BE MADE TO HIM.

HOOVER

HBF/Lc

#891

One - Mr.  
0350-0445  
Chas. M. S.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SE 14

1/00-356092

RECORDED - 108

23 MAR 2 1949

EX-152

SENT VIA

Cable 3-1-49 105/AM

Per

ma

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 02-11-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60324 UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X-3-3(1)  
02-11-2033

Mr. Peyton Ford  
The Assistant to the Attorney General

Director, FBI

①  
ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa  
ESPIONAGE - R

March 29, 1949

Reference is made to a copy of a letter purportedly prepared at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on February 21, 1949, by Anatoly Mikhailovich Granovsky. According to the copy of this letter received by the Bureau, additional copies were forwarded to the President of the United States, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Attorney General Tom Clark, and Army Chief of Staff Omar Bradley.

For your information, Granovsky was located at the Hotel Rio Negro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. On being contacted, he appeared pleased that his letter had aroused some interest and he was curious to know whether or not the other copies had been perused by any of the high officials of the United States Government to whom they were directed. Granovsky stated he had taken no action regarding revealing the nature of his contacts with and services to intelligence officials of the United States Army in Europe. He, however, affirmed that he will be forced to take some such "desperate action" in the event he is not given assistance in his present dilemma.

During the interview Granovsky was reluctant to enter into specific particulars regarding the information he allegedly had furnished United States intelligence officials. He stated he had been interrogated by a Russian language expert for approximately two months and had furnished several type-written volumes of data at that time. Granovsky speaks very inadequate, though fairly understandable, English and practically no Portuguese. Granovsky commented that he had spent ten days in typing the letter prepared under date of February 21, 1949.

Granovsky's present situation in Brazil is as follows:-

He is in Brazil illegally, having entered the country clandestinely from Bolivia. With the assistance of [redacted] of the Sao Paulo Political Police, and Inspector [redacted] of the Rio de Janeiro Political Police, he has been able to obtain unofficial permission from the Ministry of Justice to remain in the country pending a solution of his status. This unofficial permission expired, however, on February 15, 1949, and, in view of personnel changes in the Ministry, he has now been advised that this permission will not be extended unless he is able to furnish an official document from the United States Government vouching for his identity as claimed by him and for the fact that he "has been of service to the United States."

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

JJM:EFF

cc - Foreign Service Desk 1949 P.M.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6  
b7C

100-356092-8

F B I

APR 4 1949



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Granovsky's Rumanian passport in the name of Gheorghe Alexandru Filipas (allegedly furnished to him by U. S. Army Intelligence prior to his departure from Europe for Bolivia) expired on July 10, 1948, and there is no possibility of his renewing this document. He points out that he speaks no Rumanian and is unable to present any evidence of Rumanian citizenship other than the passport.

Granovsky has prepared in the Russian language a series of articles, or a manuscript, of his background in Russia, including his contacts with high Russian officials and experiences in the NAVD, the MVD and the MGB, and he has sold the Brazilian rights of a translation of this manuscript to Portuguese to a number of Brazilian newspapers, receiving therefor approximately \$2,800.00. This money has all been spent, however, and he is destitute, and he explains that he has no further possibility of earning a living in Brazil.

Granovsky points out that, aside from services already rendered by him to the United States, he is still in position to perform valuable services in the field of counterespionage and anti-Russian propaganda, and he commented that his intimate knowledge of the inner-workings of the Russian espionage and counterespionage organizations far exceeds that possessed by Gouzenko of the Canadian spy trials, and of Victor Kravchenko, the author of "I Chose Freedom."

b6  
b7C

He added further that he furnished to the Swedish Government approximately 20 per cent of the information which he furnished the United States Government, but the Swedes have treated him fairly and only a few months ago he was able to obtain from the Swedish Police, in response to a personal letter, photographic copies of his identification documents in the name of Granovsky. The originals of these documents are stated by him to have remained in the possession of United States Intelligence officials "for return to him when he reached the United States." He alleges that during his entire contact with American Intelligence officials, beginning with the United States Military Attache in Sweden, and ending with [redacted] who placed him on the boat en route to South America at Antwerp, Belgium, he repeatedly was promised that he would be sent to the United States, and he commented that, despite the fact that they know nothing of the extent of his services to the United States, the various Brazilian officials with whom he has been in contact, including [redacted] and [redacted], have intimated to him that they believe he must be receiving financial assistance from the United States Government and they are unable to understand why the United States Government has failed to take him to the United States and properly shelter him as well as take advantage of his potentialities as a propaganda instrument.

In Washington, D. C., the Bureau contacted appropriate Army authorities who advised that there was no record of Granovsky in their files.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C)



(C) In view of the information above furnished by the Army [redacted]  
[redacted] no further efforts will be made by this Bureau  
to reinterview Granovsky.

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MARCH 29, 1949

LEGAL ATTACHE  
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

AMISK. REUNLET MARCH SEVENTEEN LAST. IT IS NOT DESIRED THAT ANY FURTHER  
INTERVIEW BE HAD WITH GRANOVSKY. LETTER FOLLOWS.

HOOVER

JJM:EFF

cc - Foreign Service Desk

#895

Eure MW

0015-0020

ch. 2 X

0048-0052

G.I.R.-7

EX-118

RECORDED - 140

100-356092-9  
F B I  
4 APR 5 1949

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

sent via Cable 3/29/49 8:57 PM PXX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-11-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
11-2033

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. FLETCHER  
FROM : [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT: ANATOLE MIKHALVOICH GRANOVSKY  
ESPIONAGE - R  
*Anatole Mikhalovich Granovsky*

DATE: April 11, 1949

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that as he was departing from Brazil recently the Military Attache hurriedly told him that Granovsky was a defector, who believed that he had been roughly handled by the American services. He alleged that he had been completely interrogated and then sent to Brazil. He allegedly has claimed that he intends to publish a story on how he was treated by the American authorities. The Military Attache advised that Granovsky plans to come to the United States.

You will recall that information concerning this individual has previously been called to the attention of the Bureau by the [REDACTED] Bureau's representative in Brazil, [REDACTED]

ACTION: (C)

It is recommended that this be brought to the attention of the Espionage Section for their information.

SWR: [REDACTED]

50 MAY 9 1949

RECORDED - 20

EX-126

SE 13

100-356092-10

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-11-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 JUC/BAW/STP/BL  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X-3.3(1)  
02-11-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL AIR POUCH~~

Date: March 29, 1949

To: Legal Attache  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa  
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your letter dated March 7, 1949, concerning the above-captioned matter. On March 29, 1949, a cablegram was forwarded to you, advising that the Bureau did not desire that any further interview be had with Granovsky.

Upon receipt of your letter dated March 7, 1949, appropriate Army authorities were contacted and advised that they had no record of Granovsky in their files.


b1

100-356092-11

Although you should not make any effort to reinterview Granovsky, if he voluntarily contacts you and furnishes information, the Bureau should, of course, be advised.

cc - Foreign Service

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. FLETCHER *HSF*

FROM : *HSF*

SUBJECT: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa  
GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS;  
ESPIONAGE - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: MARCH 25, 1949

*Handled  
separately  
#100-356092-6*

b6  
b7C

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Reference is made to the attached copy of a letter purportedly written by Granovsky and addressed to the Director setting out a history of the activities of Granovsky during the time that he was being used by a United States intelligence agency in Europe and subsequently in South America for the purpose of furnishing information concerning Soviet intelligence. Further reference is made to the attached letter dated March 7, 1949 from the Legal Attache, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil setting out the results of his interview with Granovsky.

SA *14* *10* checked with the Army and ascertained that there was no record of this individual in their files. *b6 b7C*

(C)

DATE: 02-11-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-11-2033

## Attachment

RWL:mk

ADDENDUM: HBF:IGS 3-25-49

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the Legal Attache at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, be instructed that further interview with Granovsky is not necessary. It is further recommended that a memorandum be addressed to Mr. Peyton Ford advising him of the action taken with reference to the receipt of the letter from Granovsky, a copy of which was also sent to the Attorney General.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

RECORDED - 119

EX-43

100-356092-11  
32 APR 8 1949



Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
March 7, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - AIR POUCH

Director, FBI

Re: "ANMISK"  
ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa.  
GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAS;  
ESPIONAGE - R

*Ref -*  
*K-3 -*  
*LT -*  
*KB -*

Dear Sir:

Reference Bureau cable dated February 28, 1949, and Rio de Janeiro letter to the Bureau dated May 7, 1948, and entitled "Soviet Espionage Activities; ANATOL GRANOVSKY MICHAILOVSKY, wa. GHEORGHE ALEXANDRE FILIPAS; Espionage - R."

In view of the expense involved in spelling out the title of this case for cable communications, it is suggested that the code designation "ANMISK" be utilized in any future cable communications relating thereto.

In accordance with the instructions in the Bureau cable of reference, GRANOVSKY was located at the Hotel Rio Negro, Rio de Janeiro, and was interviewed at this office on the basis of his letter to the Director, copies of which were furnished to President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Attorney General Clark and Army Chief of Staff General Omar Bradley, and a copy of which he has in his possession.

GRANOVSKY was pleased that his letter had aroused some interest and was curious to know whether or not the other copies had been perused by any of the high officials of the United States Government to whom they were directed. GRANOVSKY stated that he had taken no action regarding revealing the nature of his contacts with and services to intelligence officials of the United States Army in Europe; however, he affirms that he will be forced to take some such "desperate action" in the event he is not given assistance in his present dilemma.

He furnished this office with the identities of the un-named individuals in his letter to the Director and enlarged upon many details therein; however, he was reluctant to enter into specific particulars of the information he had furnished to United States intelligence officials, stating that he had been interrogated by a Russian language expert for approximately

*Copy retained  
as to tactics*

MAY 13 1949

RECORDED - 119 EX-43

100-356092-12

22 APR 8 1949

*File 78*

*Ref*

two months and had furnished several typewritten volumes of data at that time. It should be noted in this connection that GRANOVSKY speaks very inadequate, though fairly understandable, English and almost no Portuguese, and detailed interrogation, including the spelling of names and places, is extremely tedious and slow. He commented that he had spent ten days, utilizing a U.S. Army Technical Manual Russian-English dictionary furnished to him by Intelligence in Europe, in preparing the letter which he forwarded to the Director.

GRANOVSKY's present situation in Brazil is as follows:

- 1) He is in Brazil illegally, having entered the country clandestinely from Bolivia. With the assistance of [redacted] of the São Paulo Political Police, and Inspector [redacted] of the Rio de Janeiro Political Police, he has been able to obtain unofficial permission from the Ministry of Justice to remain in the country pending a solution of his status. This unofficial permission expired, however, on February 15, 1949, and, in view of personnel changes in the Ministry, he has now been advised that this permission will not be extended unless he is able to furnish an official document from the United States Government vouching for his identity as claimed by him and for the fact that he "has been of service to the United States."
- 2) GRANOVSKY's Rumanian passport in the name of GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS (allegedly furnished to him by U. S. Army Intelligence prior to his departure from Europe for Bolivia) expired on July 10, 1948, and there is no possibility of his renewing this document. He points out that he speaks no Rumanian and is unable to present any evidence of Rumanian citizenship other than the passport. b6  
b7C
- 3) GRANOVSKY has prepared in the Russian language a series of articles, or a manuscript, of his background in Russia, including his contacts with high Russian officials and experiences in the NKVD, the MVD and the MGB, and he has sold the Brazilian rights of a translation of this manuscript to Portuguese to a number of Brazilian newspapers, receiving therefor approximately \$2,800.00. This money has all been spent, however, and he is destitute, and he explains that he has no further possibility of earning a living in Brazil.
- 4) GRANOVSKY points out that, aside from services already rendered by him to the United States, he is still in position to perform valuable services in the field of counter espionage and anti-Russian propaganda, and he commented that his intimate knowledge of the inner-workings of the Russian espionage and counter espionage organizations far exceeds that possessed by

[redacted] of the Canadian spy trials, and of VICTOR KRAVACHENKO, the author of "I Chose Freedom".

5) He added further that he furnished to the Swedish Government approximately 20 per cent of the information which he furnished the United States Government, but the Swedes have treated him fairly and only a few months ago he was able to obtain from the Swedish Police, in response to a personal letter, photographic copies of his identification documents in the name of GRANOVSKY. The originals of these documents are stated by him to have remained in the possession of U.S. Intelligence officials "for return to him when he reached the United States." He alleges that during his entire contact with American Intelligence officials, beginning with the United States Military Attache in Sweden, and ending with [redacted] who placed him on the boat en route to South America at Antwerp, Belgium, he repeatedly was promised that he would be sent to the United States, and he commented that, despite the fact that they know nothing of the extent of his services to the United States, the various Brazilian officials with whom he has been in contact, including [redacted] and [redacted], have intimated to him that they believe he must be receiving financial assistance from the United States Government and they are unable to understand why the United States Government has failed to take him to the United States and properly shelter him as well as take advantage of his potentialities as a propaganda instrument. *slp*

A more detailed report of the interview will be forwarded to the Bureau by the next pouch; meanwhile, Bureau advice is requested as to whether or not it is desired that GRANOVSKY be interrogated in detail concerning his knowledge of Russian espionage organizations and activities. In the event it is so desired, it will be necessary to provide financial assistance to him during the period of time he is under interrogation, and also give him some sort of encouragement that the Bureau will endeavor to assist him in reaching the United States. On the basis of available information, the photographs of documents in GRANOVSKY's possession, and the interrogation conducted thus far, it is believed that he is telling the truth concerning his true identity and his contacts with United States Intelligence in Germany. It is also believed that, in the event the information furnished by him to Army Intelligence has not been made available to the Bureau, this information at this late date would be invaluable in connection with the Bureau's jurisdiction and responsibilities. If it is desired that he be interrogated in detail, it is requested that the Bureau advise by cable, utilizing the code designation mentioned above in connection with the case, also authorizing the payment to him of \$150.00 per month during the period of interrogation.

Very truly yours.

[redacted]



DATE: 02-12-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60384UC/BAO/STP/bis  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-12-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
May 4, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - AIR POUCH

Director, FBI

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa.  
Gheorghe Alexandru Filipas;  
ESPIONAGE - R

Dear Sir:

(C) Reference is made to Bureau letter dated March 29, 1949 relating to the captioned individual, concerning whom there are attached two copies of a Memorandum for the Ambassador recording information furnished recently by the subject. Copies of the attached memorandum have been furnished to the Military Attaché, the Naval Attaché [redacted]

Also attached are photographs of the documents mentioned in the memorandum, which according to GRANOVSKY were obtained by him from Swedish police authorities subsequent to his arrival in Brazil. b1

For the information of the Bureau, it is advised that GRANOVSKY has informed this office that the Brazilian Ministry of Marine, together with other interested government officials and private individuals, have informally promised to pay him the sum of Cr. \$50,000.00 (approximately \$2,000.00) for the rights to publish in Brazil in book form a manuscript which he has prepared concerning his background and experiences in Russian espionage and intelligence activities. This manuscript is identical with a series of articles by GRANOVSKY which recently have been published in several newspapers in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and other leading Brazilian cities.

Very truly yours,

b6  
b7C

7 ENCL

EX-43  
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Attachments

RLL:jar

EX-43  
JUN 23 1949

LA  
RECORDED - 119

INDEXED - 119

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-356092-13  
FBI  
12 MAY 10 1949

EX-43  
JUN 23 1949

FILE  
JUN 23 1949

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-12-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/pls

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

- 100-356092-13



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
ON 02-12-2008

Copy to:  
Military Attaché  
Naval Attaché  
Office of  
Special Assistant

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
April 27, 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Attention -

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, with alias  
Gheorghe Alexandra Filipas

With reference to previous correspondence and discussions concerning the captioned individual, it is advised that he recently called at this office and announced his intention of directing follow-up letters regarding his status to President Truman and the other addressees of his lengthy letter of February 21, 1949. GRANOVSKY had in his possession a rough draft of the information he intended to incorporate in his "follow-up" letter, and after discussing this matter with him the writer dissuaded him from preparing such a letter by promising to prepare a memorandum recording his statements and attaching thereto a number of photographs which he feels serve to authenticate his allegations, and several complete sets of which he furnished to this office.

b6  
b7C

Several of GRANOVSKY's observations are completely repetitious with information recorded in his initial letter and data previously furnished to this office, but the several points outlined by him are recorded hereinafter in accordance with his request:

1) GRANOVSKY pointed out that he is a member of one of the first "thousand families" of the USSR, his father having been for many years a member of the Central Executive Committee (now Supreme Soviet) and a leading member of the Communist Party. At the age of 16 he was able to obtain employment from  (phonetic), at that time director of the largest machinery factory in Moscow and presently a Deputy Minister to STALIN. At the age of 17 he contacted the NKVD and demanded information regarding the whereabouts of his father, who had been arrested on November 6, 1937 (his father was reportedly "liquidated" secretly without trial). He was arrested on the personal orders of BERIA and after six months' investigation was released, also on BERIA's instructions, on the condition that he accept employment in the counter-intelligence service of the NKVD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GRANOVSKY cited the foregoing to illustrate his claims that from July 20, 1939 until September 21, 1946, "the day on which he deserted from a Russian vessel and delivered himself to the United States Military Attaché at Stockholm, Sweden," he had occupied important positions in the ~~NAVD~~, the ~~NEGB~~ and the ~~MGB~~. While thus employed, he became acquainted with many high officials of the government of the USSR who were opposed to STALIN and his policies but were afraid to take any overt action against the existing regime. He desired to stress the fact that, given the proper opportunity, he could establish contact with those individuals and encourage them to support the Western Allies against the Soviet regime.

He attempted to establish the corollary that in the event his "treatment at the hands of United States intelligence officials" were to become known to the Soviet Government this information could be used extensively as very effective propaganda in discouraging possible defections to the Western Powers.

2) GRANOVSKY brought out a point previously not mentioned by him by stating categorically that [redacted]

[redacted] (according to GRANOVSKY the Chief of United States intelligence activities against Russia in the northwestern European area), had definitely promised the Swedish Government that GRANOVSKY would be taken to the United States. GRANOVSKY requested that this statement be verified with officials of the Swedish Government, particularly the Intendant of the Swedish National Police. He stated that [redacted] also had advised Swedish police officials and GRANOVSKY himself that he was to be taken to the United States.

GRANOVSKY re-asserted his certainty that [redacted] and other intelligence officials in Europe had acted in good faith in assuring him that he would be taken to the United States in return for his "excellent services." He again mentioned his reluctance to seek assistance from the Swedish Embassy (since that would reveal to Swedish authorities the bad faith of the American intelligence officials), and he advised that only upon becoming convinced that there is no possibility of his securing fulfillment of the "promises made to him" will he release to the press the details of the manner in which he was "double-crossed."

GRANOVSKY asserted strongly that he has "kept faith" with American officials with whom he was in contact and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

has revealed no details of his contacts with and information furnished to them other than to clarify his illegal status in Brazil by stating to police authorities that he had "cooperated with the Americans in Europe and had been assisted by them in departing therefrom."

GRANOVSKY furnished several sets of the following photographs, which he believed would serve to authenticate certain portions of his allegations concerning his background:

- a) Photograph of a document bearing № 396, which he states to be from the Special Section of the NKVD and which records his arrest and release by that organization.
  - b) A document bearing № 581 and stated to be a pass permitting GRANOVSKY free transit in Berlin shortly after the Russian occupation thereof.
  - c) A letter of introduction from [redacted] to [redacted] of Espionage for the MGB at Odessa.
  - d) A certificate of discharge from the MGB, Ukrainian S.S.R., bearing the personal stamp of the Minister of the MGB in that republic.
- e) Three pages from Seaman's Passport № 043280 issued at Odessa on June 26, 1946, and bearing the name, photograph and fingerprint of GRANOVSKY.

b6  
b7c

GRANOVSKY repeated his assertions that the originals of the foregoing documents, as well as the originals of his military record book, two military decorations books, a certificate of military record, a copy of the decree from King Gustav of Sweden declaring him a political refugee, and the "Fremming" passport issued to him by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been delivered by him to [redacted] and later shown to him by [redacted]. He desired to emphasize once again that he never would have delivered these documents to American authorities had it not been for their promise that he would be assisted in entering the United States and that the documents would be returned to him. He pointed out that the Swedish Government was fully cognizant of his possession of all of these documents at the time of his being delivered to the custody of United States officials by the Swedish Government.

Very truly yours,

Attachment  
RLH:jar

[redacted]  
Legal Attache

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: May 6, 1949

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, WA.

ESPIONAGE - R

Bureau File #100-356092

DATE: 02-12-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

02-12-2033

PURPOSE:

To acquaint you with the developments concerning subject, Granovsky.

BACKGROUND:

Granovsky is in Brazil illegally having entered that country clandestinely from Bolivia. He has been granted permission to remain in Brazil temporarily pending a solution of his status. Under date of February 21, 1949, Granovsky directed a letter to the Bureau, with copies to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, Acheson, the Attorney General and the Army Chief of Staff, wherein he contends that while in Europe, several months ago, he furnished considerable information concerning Soviet intelligence to "the United States intelligence officials", for which services he was promised he would be taken to the United States. He now considers that he has been double-crossed by American intelligence officials in that they will not assist him in his endeavor to enter the United States.

Pursuant to the above-mentioned letter, Granovsky was interviewed by our Legal Attache at Rio de Janeiro at which time he reiterated his allegations as to his mistreatment by American intelligence authorities in Europe and declared his intention of disclosing to the press, his experiences in this regard which he believes will be seized upon by the Communist press throughout the world.

b1

(C)

The Bureau, of course, had no contact with Granovsky previous to his recent interview at Rio de Janeiro.

Our Legal Attache at Rio de Janeiro has advised that considerable concern has been expressed by officers and attaches of the Embassy in that city with regard to Granovsky's intention of disclosing his allegations of mistreatment to the press. United States Ambassador Johnson, Rio de Janeiro, has remarked "that the case is no longer an operational matter involving an intelligence agency but involves the prestige and foreign relations of the United States". Ambassador Johnson is planning to travel to the United States with Brazilian President Dutra who is scheduled to depart for the United States on May 16, 1949, and the Ambassador has indicated that he may discuss this matter personally in Washington.

THD/mp

57 MAY 24 1949

RECORDED - 30

34 MAY 17 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EX-127

12



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION:

There is attached herewith a letter to Mr. Peyton Ford which will bring him up to date concerning this matter. There is also attached herewith a letter to our Legal Attache at Rio de Janeiro which reiterates our previous instructions to him.

Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Peyton Ford  
The Assistant to the Attorney General  
Director, FBI

May 6, 1949

ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY wa.,  
ESPIONAGE - R


Reference is made to my memorandum dated March 29, 1949 wherein you were furnished background information concerning captioned subject who is endeavoring to enter the United States from Brazil.

For your further information the Bureau's liaison representative at the U. S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, has advised that considerable concern has been expressed by officers and attaches of that Embassy with regard to Granovsky's declared intention of disclosing to the press information as to his present situation and alleged treatment by U. S. intelligence officials. You will recall that Granovsky contends that he has been "double crossed" in that he has not been taken to the United States as promised by American intelligence authorities. U. S. Ambassador Johnson, Rio de Janeiro, has remarked "that the case is no longer an operational matter involving an intelligence agency but involves the prestige and foreign relations of the United States". Ambassador Johnson is planning to travel to the United States in the near future to accompany President Dutra of Brazil and has indicated that he may discuss this matter personally in Washington.

This is submitted for your information and no further action concerning Granovsky is contemplated by this Bureau.

THD:jw

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy



RECORDED - 68

100-356092-15

FBI  
MAY 10 1949

G.I.R.

MAY 9 3 21 PM '49

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR

FBI

LW

20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
March 25, 1949

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Director, FBI

Re: "ANMISK"  
ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa.  
GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS;  
ESPIONAGE - R

Dear Sir:

Reference Rio letter March 7, 1949.

There are enclosed herewith the original and two copies of a memorandum recording the results of various interviews with the captioned subject relating to his allegations that he had deserted from the Russian Espionage Service and furnished information to United States intelligence officials in Europe and considers himself to have been "double crossed" in that he has not been taken to the United States.

There are also enclosed photographs or photostatic copies of the following documents relating to this matter:

- 1) Photographic copies of the principal pages of the subject's Rumanian passport in the name of GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS.
- 2) A photostatic copy of a letter dated January 11, 1949 from [redacted] in Rio de Janeiro, to his principals in New York.
- 3) A photostatic copy of a health certificate issued to GHEORGHE FILIPAS at Antwerp on September 18, 1947, "at the request of the General Consulate of the U.S. America."
- 4) Photostatic copy of a document dated January 31, 1949, which subject states he forwarded to the French Court which has been hearing the case of VICTOR KRAVCHENKO versus "Lettres Francaises".
- 5) Photostatic copy of a translation of an affidavit from the NKVD relating to the confinement and release.

b6  
b7C

EX-127

RECORDED 972  
INDEXED 72

100-356092-16

EX-127

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy without  
enclosures  
detached - 78

20 MAR 15 1949



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

subject. (A photograph of the original of this document is in subject's possession).

- 6) Photostatic copy of a translation of the subject's Certificate of Discharge from the MGB. (A photograph of the original of this document also is in subject's possession).

With respect to the other copies of the letter which was forwarded by the subject to the Director and formed the basis of this inquiry, it is advised that the copy which was addressed to President Truman was routed to the State Department and subsequently to this Embassy "for appropriate reply".

b1

(C)

[redacted] of the Embassy, has requested that all representatives of intelligence agencies in the Embassy advise him fully concerning their knowledge and connection with the GRANOVSKY case, and this office has made available to him a copy of the attached memorandum.

b6  
b7C

Up to the present time, the writer has succeeded in dissuading GRANOVSKY from taking any steps to contact the Swedish Embassy or publicizing his displeasure toward the individuals who "robbed him of his identification documents and failed to carry out their promises to him;" however, unless the Bureau is interested in thoroughly de-briefing GRANOVSKY, or has some other interest in him, it is not believed that there is any point in the writer's attempting to assume any further responsibility for him or his actions.

The information furnished by GRANOVSKY, the documents in his possession, and his actions and demeanor during the past year bear strong evidence that his background is authentic and that promises probably were made to him in Europe and not fulfilled, either as a result of connivance by some of the individuals involved or the inability of those individuals to carry out the promises made.

The several Brazilian police officials with whom GRANOVSKY has been in contact, including [redacted] in São Paulo and Inspector [redacted] in Rio de Janeiro, have indicated that they are convinced

b6  
b7C

-2-  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GRANOVSKY's story is generally true and they have revealed to GRANOVSKY and to the writer their inability to understand the attitude which the United States representatives have taken toward GRANOVSKY. It would also appear that his going to the Swedish Embassy or contacting Swedish police or other officials directly would be embarrassing to the United States Government generally, and, unquestionably, any publicity given to GRANOVSKY's allegations would constitute very unfavorable propaganda. It has been pointed out by GRANOVSKY that United States intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in general would suffer seriously if the Communist press throughout the world were to make capital of his story, and if Russian intelligence officials were able to point to his case as an example of "what happens to deserters who sell out to the United States."

As mentioned in the letter of reference, it is requested that the Bureau advise as to whether or not it is interested in a detailed interrogation of GRANOVSKY.

Very truly yours,

[Redacted Signature]

LA

b6  
b7c

Attachments  
RLL:jar

-3-  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-

HQ-356092

Serial 16

EBF



100-HQ-356092-E16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-12-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bis

356092-16



Semnătura titularului  
(Signature du possesseur):

*G. Artilias*

Se certifica de noi  
ce fotografia și semnătura sunt ale titularului  
pasportului.  
Nous certifions que la photographie et la signature  
sont au titulaire de ce passeport.

*Ministru de Interne*  
*Reședință*  
*Brasov*

In numele  
Majestății Sale

Au nom  
de Sa Majesté

**M. H. A. I. E.**

Prin grația lui Dum-  
nezeu și voința  
națională

Par la Grâce de Dieu  
et par la volonté  
nationale

Rege  
al României

Roi  
de Roumanie

Ministerul de Interne  
eliberează

Le Ministère de l'Inté-  
rieur délivre

# PASPORT

D-lui

*Silivas Gheorghe*  
*Alexandru*

s. M.

De profesie

*comerciant*

De profesie

Calătorind

Voyageant

*Europa - America*

Nr.

*451947*

din Registrul Autorității care a eliberat pasportul

Cozmari - Romanians

[illegible]

Les personnes qui accompagnent le porteur du passeport

[illegible]



Acest pasport s'a eliberat în virtutea art. \_\_\_\_\_  
din Regulamentul pentru aplicarea  
legii Paspoartelor.

La 10 iulie 1967  
de Legaturii Reg. Roman-  
Berne  
și valabil pentru AMM AMM

S'a aplicat și anulat de noi \_\_\_\_\_ timbre.

valoare de Lei \_\_\_\_\_  
fara taxe

Loc rezervat pentru aplicarea \_\_\_\_\_ timbrelor și pentru sigilă.

Nr. de serie **020303**

Le présent passeport a été délivré en vertu de  
l'art. \_\_\_\_\_ lettre \_\_\_\_\_ du règlement pour  
l'application de la loi des passeports.

Le 10 juillet 1967  
par Legation R. R. Roumaine  
Berne  
est valable pour AMM AMM

Semnatura și sigilă autorității  
care a eliberat pasportul

Signature et sceau de l'autorité  
qui a délivré le passeport



Stahavici

Nr. de serie **020303**

WAE 2918

Mr. de Soria

Pagina rezervată pentru vize  
Page réservée pour les visas

### A Radicarse

Visto en este Consulado Co-  
ntral de Bolivia en Bélgica.

Bruselas, 17 de sept<sup>bre</sup> - 9c 1967

Consul General de Bolivia  
en Buenos Aires

Visa n° 72

Autorizado por Minimmigración  
en el N.º E-40954

Grancel 35: B. 10: 10

Pago impuestos ingreso 3.2

Total percibido: 1462 pesos  
NO SE ADHIEREN TIMBRES POR

HAUERSE AGUTADOS

PLAT GENERAL r/c-E 4095H

INSURANCE CO. OF N. Y. & N. J. The auto.

BRUCELLES



DE BOLIVIA 020303

100

\_\_\_\_\_

---

---

\_\_\_\_\_

Pagina rezervată pentru vize  
Page réservée pour les visas

Permisiunea por 30  
Nito pde exercer quibucur  
atividade remunerada no país.  
Dec. N. 7.967/45

EM TRÁNSITO

Presbi 114 1100-300

Valido por 90 dias para o embarque.  
CONSULADO GERAL DO BRASIL EM ANTWERPEN  
Visto N. 478  
Nome: *Cheraz*  
Vias para o Brasil em caráter *transito*  
De acordo com o art. 6º letra - do Dec. N. 7.967/45  
Recibos e documentos anexos:  
Antesposto 18 SETEMBRO 1947  
PELO Conselheiro *Cheraz*  
Consul. Adjunto

020303

Pagina rezervată pentru vize  
Page réservée pour les visas

Veiligheid van den Staat  
- ANTWERPEN -  
AANKOMST 21.9.47  
VERTREK  
PASPOORTEN CONTROLE

ZEEVAARTPOLITIE  
ANTWERPEN  
TOEGELATEN  
IN TE SCHIPE  
DE  
SIS *Cheraz*  
21/9/47  
DE INSPECTEUR  
*Cheraz*

VISTO DE DESEMBARQUE  
OUT 1947  
*Cheraz*

Inspetoria Federal de Imigração  
PORTO DE SANTOS  
Visto de desembarque

15 OUT 1947

*Cheraz*

020303

Pagină rezervată pentru vize  
Page réservée pour les visas

**DEPARTAMENTO DE INMIGRACION**  
**BOLIVIA**  
**A RADICARSE**  
Cedula No. 238-243  
Expte. 4-XI-H7  
Visto hasta el 11 de  
Noviembre 1948

OFICINA DEPARTAMENTAL  
DE EMBAJADAS  
DE INMIGRACION EXTRANJERA  
A PAR: BOLIVIA

Expedido bajo el No. 1529/491

Destino: Argentina  
(por via Villazon)

En fecha 21 del presente

La Pda. monseñor de 1947

Polignone  
VERS DE GEORON

Nr. de serie **020303**



rezervată pentru vize  
servée pour les visas

**DEPARTAMENTO DE INMIGRACION**  
**BOLIVIA**

No. 5082  
Autorizado el visto de Edgardo  
Pelipon  
Agustina Villazon  
el presente  
Co. 19 de Nov de 1947

Pannard

**DEPARTAMENTO DE INMIGRACION**  
**BOLIVIA**

Autorizado para REINGRESAR al país

bajo el No. 4302701

Debe presentarse al Consulado de Bolivia,  
a objeto de la renovación de su pasaporte.

La Paz, 19 de Nov de 1947

Levaquin  
Jefe Sección Inmigración

Nr. de serie **020303**



Pagină rezervată pentru vize

**VISACION DE TURISMO**

Visa en este Consulado General de la  
República Argentina para la legalización del  
pasaporte No. 020303 del señor

*George Alexander Gilpin*  
de *Berna* el *10-7-48*

para ingresar a la República

certificado de turismo No. 1212-947.  
Presenta pasaporte para ida y vuelta  
a la República de la Rca. Argentina  
La Paz (Bolivia) 19 de noviembre 1947

Nº DE ORDEN 2733

Nº DE CANCEL 242

C. DE PERIUDOS

6 meses



*Ardemio Rizzzi*  
CONSEJERO GENERAL

Nr. de serie 020303


Pagină rezervată pentru vize

Page réservée pour les visas

MINISTERIO DE INMIGRACION

Primera Oficina

Para retornar al territorio de la República, debe presentarse al Consulado de Bolivia.



Nr. de serie 020303

17/E 43020 Reingrad  
Pagina rezervata pentru vize  
Page reservee pour les visas

PASAPORTE DE George Florandes  
Filipes No. 020303

VISTO EN EL  
CONSULADO GENERAL DE BOLIVIA

REGISTRADO CON EL NO. 2314

DEL VIAJE Reingrad

A DE INGRESO Valdovinos

PERMISO NO. 6-43023 POR M.I.

TIMBROS EN Quince TASA NO. 35

CAMBIO POR RECARGO

TAL PERCIBIDO Exemptado 50%

INGRESO

28 de Noviembre

Reingrad

George Florandes

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

020303

Pagina rezervata pentru vize  
Page reservee pour les visas

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA  
**SALIDA**  
3 D.C. 1947  
DIRECCION GENERAL DE MIGRACIONES  
LA QUIACA BUENOS AIRES

BOLIVIA  
MINISTERIO DE INMIGRACION

Entrada

Escuela Villazon, de Reingrad

AGENTE QUINTERO

En el plazo de 48 horas está obligado a presentarse a la Policía de Seguridad del lugar de su destino. En La Paz, al Ministerio de Inmigración y la Policía de Seguridad, bajo pena de multa.

LA PAZ-BOLIVIA

Sección de Extranjería

Contratado bajo el No. 156147

del libro respectivo.

La Paz 5 de Septiembre de 1947

Agente Quintero

Nr. de serie 020303

Pagină rezervată pentru vize  
Page réservée pour les visas

DEPARTAMENTO I  
CONTINER  
ROZEVIA

Control No. 288-445

26-10-1945

5

No. de J. L.



En la Oficina de la Brigada de la Policía de Santa Cruz

En la Oficina de la Brigada de la Policía de Santa Cruz

En la Oficina de la Brigada de la Policía de Santa Cruz

Nr. de serie 020303

Pagină rezervată pentru vize  
Page réservée pour les visas

Nr. de serie 020303

**Pagină rezervată pentru vize**  
Page réservée pour les visas



Acest pasport conține 28 de pagini, ori  
ce adaus de file, fiind interzis.  
Ce passeport renferme 28 pages. Tout  
augmentation du nombre des pages,  
étant interdit.

Nr. de serie 020303

**Extras din codul penal**

ART. 129. Se va pedepsi cu închisoare dela  
trei luni până la doi ani oricine va plămă  
pasporturi, sau va dăruie ori va preface un  
pasport adevărat, sau va adăuga într-unul  
vreun cuvânt, sau cifră, sau literă, precum  
și cel ce cu bună știință se va servi cu ase-  
menea pasport.

ART. 130. Cine va lua pentru sine un pas-  
port pe nume închipuit, sau va fi mijloc, ca  
marior, spre a se libera un pasport pe un  
nume străin, se va pedepsi cu închisoare  
dela trei luni până la un an.

**Extras din legea asupra  
paspoartelor**

ART. VI. Se va pedepsi conform art. 129 p.  
p. acelu care cu bună știință se va servi în  
România cu un pasport sau orice document  
de călătorie înăd loc de pasport, liberat de  
o autoritate a unei țări străine, decât acelu  
pasport sau document de călătorie va fi plă-  
mut, drea ori prefăcut.

Este posibil de aceeaș pedeapsă acelu care  
într-unul altul pasportului său adevărat, ori  
plămut, drea sau prefăcut.

ART. VII. Se va pedepsi conform art. 130 p.  
p. acelu care se va servi de un pasport ro-  
mân sau străin, sau document de călătorie,  
ținând loc de pasport, care poartă alt nume  
decât al său.

**Extras din legea pentru reglemen-  
tarea migrațiunilor**

ART. II. Pasportul de emigrare nu mai e  
valabil pentru ieșirea din țară după un an  
dela data când e totu liberat.

ART. 46. Oricine, țară e fi cetățean român,  
va cere, va obține sau va folosi ca cetățean  
român, un pasport de natura acelu carel  
conform art. 11, 12 și 13 din prezenta lege, se  
pedezează numai cetățenilor români, se va  
pedepsi cu închisoare dela 6 luni.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
ON 02-12-2008

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
March 23, 1949

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, alias  
GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS

There are recorded hereinunder the results of an interview with the captioned individual, who alleges to have been an official in the NKVD-MGB of the Soviet Union, and who presently is residing in Rio de Janeiro under the name of GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS:

Background Information

ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY is the son of MIKHAIL A. GRANOVSKY, one of the early leaders of the Communist movement in Russia and a member of the Supreme Soviet until he was arrested and "liquidated" in 1937. When young GRANOVSKY attempted to inquire of the NKVD concerning the fate of his father, he, too, was arrested and was held from January to July, 1939. He claimed that he was released by the NKVD on the condition that he become an operative of the organization, to which he agreed. He claimed that he had been well acquainted with Stalin, Molotov and Beria as a youth and that he had considerable contact with the latter as an official of the NKVD and later MVD-MGB.

He related that after entering the Russian Intelligence Service he had received training at Moscow and later had served on various assignments in the Ukraine, at several posts in the Baltic Sea area and with the Russian troops on the eastern front. He entered Berlin with the first Russian occupation troops, and in July, 1945, was transferred to Prague, where he headed the Russian undercover espionage operations in Czechoslovakia, his cover being that of a civilian refugee. He stated that during this period a plan was discussed wherein he would attempt to reach the United States as a refugee, but this was abandoned and he was assigned to the MGB station at Kiev.

In April, 1946, he was instructed to go under cover as a sailor on a Soviet vessel which would be visiting various Baltic and northwestern European seaports for the purpose of collecting espionage information, and toward this end he was furnished a certificate of discharge from the MGB. The vessel to which he was assigned arrived at Stockholm, Sweden, on June 10, 1946, and on June 21 he presented himself to the Military Attaché to the United States Embassy at Stockholm.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-356092-16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Contacts with United States  
Officials at Stockholm

GRANOVSKY related that on September 19, 1946, his ship had received instructions from the Russian Ministry of Commercial Marine to proceed to the port of Libava, Lithuania, and upon learning this he determined to desert from the ship and his responsibilities to the MGB and deliver himself to United States authorities in Stockholm.

His first contact was with [redacted], with whom he had considerable difficulty in effecting understandable communications, and [redacted] referred him to the [redacted], with whom he was able to converse in the German language. He spent several days in the apartment of a member of the Military Attache's staff, and on September 25 was delivered into the custody of the Swedish National Police.

He alleged that the vessel remained in Stockholm until approximately September 29, and officials of the Russian Embassy made representations to the Swedish Foreign Office and police concerning him, believing initially that he had been the victim of an accident or foul play. The Swedish police deemed it advisable to inform the Russian Embassy of the fact that he was in their custody and did not wish to return to Russia, and embassy officials made several attempts to contact him at the police department and demanded his return.

b6  
b7C

GRANOVSKY related that his presence in Sweden had been embarrassing for the Swedish Government but that, contrary to the wishes of several cabinet ministers, the King of Sweden had signed a decree dated November 8 declaring him to be a political refugee, instructing the Swedish Foreign Office to furnish him with a "Fremming" Passport for Foreigners, and instructing the Swedish police not to deliver him to the custody of the Russian Government.

From September 30 to November 15 he remained in the custody of the Swedish police and was interrogated by several representatives of the Swedish Army, police and intelligence services.

On November 15, GRANOVSKY was taken from Stockholm to Port Malmo by train, and from Port Malmo was transported by a special speedboat to Copenhagen, where he was disembarked on the beach and was met by Danish police or army officials, who

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

carried him by automobile to the city of Copenhagen. During three or four days of the period in which he remained in that locality, he was constantly in the company or custody of a high official of the Danish police or army intelligence, who presented him to the Princess of Denmark.

Contacts with United States  
Officials in Germany

On the night of December 4, GRANOVSKY was given over to the custody of a British intelligence officer, whose identity he did not learn, but this officer transported him in the trunk of his automobile from Denmark into the British Zone of Germany. Shortly after crossing the frontier, the British officer delivered him to [ ] of "United States Army Intelligence", who took from him all of the identification documents in his possession, stating that these documents would be returned to him at Frankfort. He was instructed to speak nothing but German and was advised that he would be transported as a "German prisoner". After many hours of traveling by automobile, and three changes of automobile and custodian, he arrived in Munich, where he was placed in the hands of a "civilian official of Army Intelligence" named [ ], who spoke fluent Russian and who interrogated him daily from December 5, 1946 to March 13, 1947.

b6  
b7C

On approximately March 13, 1947, GRANOVSKY was transferred from Munich by [ ] named [ ], who transported him by automobile to a bungalow on an estate of a former German baron, which was located between Frankfort and Heidelberg. At this location, he was housed with a staff sergeant and a naval officer, [ ], who was an expert on documents, and during a period of approximately two months he was given daily instruction in English by a civilian employee named [ ] and was interrogated by [ ] and a head of Military Intelligence from Frankfort named [ ].

During September, [ ] advised that he would be leaving for the United States in a short time and issued instructions to his custodians that he should be taken to the Army PX in Heidelberg and outfitted completely with clothing.

He left the bungalow on September 15, 1947, and on the outskirts of Heidelberg the automobile in which he was traveling was met by the same [ ] as mentioned above. He was wearing the uniform of an American soldier and was instructed by [ ] that he would be passed off as an orderly if any questions were asked. [ ] drove him across the British

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and French Zones of Occupied Germany to Brussels, where they were contacted by an official of the United States Embassy or Consulate, to whom [ ] delivered a Rumanian passport in the name of GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS and a package of money, with the following comment: "Here is his passport and a thousand bucks for the Bolivian visa." GRANOVSKY stated that he had seen the passport previously when it had been shown to him by [ ] in Heidelberg; who had requested him to sign it, although it contained nothing more than his picture at that time.

b6  
b7C

#### Departure from Belgium

GRANOVSKY advised that after obtaining the Bolivian visa through a member of the United States Consulate at Brussels, [ ] drove him to Antwerp, where the United States Consul General in that city was contacted for assistance in clearing his departure with the Belgium police in view of the fact that his Rumanian passport failed to reflect any record of his having entered Belgium by legal means. (An examination of the passport by the writer failed to reveal any record therein of his entry to Belgium, although his departure therefrom was duly recorded). His steamship passage from Antwerp to Santos, Brazil, was arranged by [ ] on the "SS Cap. Bielbuck", and before he embarked [ ] handed to him the sum of \$360.00, for which he signed a receipt. At that time [ ] mentioned to him that "they had planned to give him \$1,000.00, but since the money was only for expenses until he reached Santos, Brazil, the \$360.00 would be more than sufficient." [ ] advised him that he would be met at the gangplank at Santos, and that the individual who met him there would arrange for his transportation from Santos to La Paz. [ ] also advised him that in La Paz he should contact [ ], Casilla 1442, who would assist him in obtaining a Bolivian passport and in effecting his entry to the United States from Bolivia. GRANOVSKY explained that [ ] wrote the name and address of [ ] on two cards, one of which he placed in his pocketbook and the other which he instructed GRANOVSKY to carry in another pocket "in case he should lose one or the other."

GRANOVSKY arrived at the port of Santos, Brazil, on October 15, 1947, and after waiting four hours at the gangplank of the vessel for the "individual who was supposed to meet him" and "arousing some suspicion by the maritime police on duty," he finally took a bus to São Paulo, and on October 17 departed for La Paz via Panair do Brasil. Arriving in La Paz on October 19, he went to the local police in an effort to locate [ ] and, having ascertained that "Casilla 1442" was not a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

street address but a post office box and was rented by an individual of an entirely different name than that given to him, he went to the La Paz police, who, after searching their records, assisted him in locating an Indian pottery worker by the name of [redacted].

He had arrived in La Paz with only \$20.00 in his possession (he admitted to having spent some money at Tenerife and Recife while en route to Brazil, and had paid hotel and air transportation expenses from Santos to La Paz from the \$360.00 furnished to him); so on October 21 GRANOVSKY contacted the [redacted] in La Paz.

He advised that [redacted] treated him very well, furnishing him funds at various times and assisting him in obtaining employment as the manager of the Anglo-American Club in La Paz. He stated that he had received the impression that [redacted] was sympathetic to him but had received instructions that he should take no action toward assisting him in traveling to the United States.

On November 22, GRANOVSKY traveled to Buenos Aires in an attempt to establish some sort of business enterprise between Buenos Aires and La Paz but, becoming discouraged, he returned to La Paz on December 3. His employment at the Anglo-American Club was terminated during the latter part of February, 1948, and he travelled from La Paz to Concepcion, Bolivia, where he attempted to prospect for gold without success. He was virtually starving to death when an American missionary at Concepcion took him into his residence, fed him and gave him sufficient financial assistance to allow him to travel by plane to Bauru, Bolivia, from where he traveled by train to Corumbá, Brazil.

b6  
b7C

He entered Brazil from Bolivia on the basis of a police permit which is utilized by citizens of both countries near the border to travel from one country to another for business purposes. In Corumbá, he was assisted by a Canadian missionary, who purchased passage on a river vessel from Corumbá to Porto Esperanca, from where he traveled by train (second class) to São Paulo. Having no money after purchasing his train ticket, he had no food other than a banana during the three days he was traveling by train.

Upon arriving in São Paulo, he attempted to contact an American business man with whom he had become acquainted while traveling from São Paulo to La Paz and who had been friendly to him, but since this American was out of São Paulo he went to the Hotel São Paulo, where he was known, and was afforded

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

accommodations. On the return of his American friend, he appealed to the latter for assistance but was advised to see the American Consulate. At the Consulate, he was interviewed by [redacted], to whom he stated his case briefly and advised that the \$20.00 or so which he owed the hotel might result in his being taken to the police and being forced to reveal his previous intelligence contacts with United States officials, and the fact that he had been sent to Bolivia by them with an "illegal passport". Having failed to obtain assistance at the Consulate, he was thrown out of the hotel and his one suitcase retained by the management, and after walking the streets without food for another day or so, he finally delivered himself to a local police district, the delegate of which later turned him over to the Political Police.

GRANOVSKY's case was handled by [redacted] of the Department of Political and Social Police. São Paulo, who consulted with [redacted] in São Paulo, and the Office of the Legal Attaché, Rio de Janeiro, in order to determine the veracity of GRANOVSKY's allegation that he was a Russian deserter who had "cooperated" with United States military authorities in Germany.

b6  
b7c

On the basis of information which seemed to establish GRANOVSKY's true identity, [redacted] assisted him in obtaining a document from the Ministry of Justice at Rio de Janeiro which would permit him to remain in Brazil "pending clarification of his status." GRANOVSKY made repeated attempts to contact the United States Embassy at Rio de Janeiro, and while he was interviewed briefly on several occasions he did not succeed in obtaining either material assistance or any encouragement concerning his desire to go to the United States.

Declarations Concerning Commitments Of  
Intelligence Officials in Germany Re-  
garding Travel to the United States

GRANOVSKY emphatically declared that every important official of the United States Army Intelligence Service from [redacted] in Stockholm, [redacted] to [redacted], who placed him on the boat at Antwerp, had assured him repeatedly that he would be sent to the United States. He remarked that [redacted] of Army Intelligence on the staff of [redacted] at Frankfurt, had stated to him that the information which he had furnished was worth more than "all of the information gleaned from German espionage files concerning Russia" and had remarked further that the

-6-  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States would have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in obtaining this information with considerable risk and uncertainty as to its authenticity. He related that the Russian language expert, [redacted], had made similar comments and that [redacted] and [redacted] had studied with him the manner in which they would effect his entry to the United States. He stated that, when the plan whereby he would enter the United States by the way of Bolivia with a false Rumanian passport was finally adopted, he had discussed this matter on several occasions with [redacted].

#### Declarations Concerning Payment

GRANOVSKY declared emphatically that he had not received one cent of remuneration in connection with his services other than the \$360.00 furnished to him by [redacted] at the time of his departure from Antwerp. He admitted that all of his requirements, including housing, transportation, clothing, food and recreation had been provided, but he reiterated that he had received no payment nor had he asked for any, since he considered that his reward for services rendered would be admittance to the United States, where he felt certain that he could provide amply for himself through writing magazine articles and a book. He pointed out that "banishment to Bolivia with \$20.00 in his pocket and a false Rumanian passport which would expire with no possibility of its being renewed could hardly be considered as an improvement over his earlier status as a Captain in the MGB." He claimed to be completely convinced that [redacted] and [redacted] all believed that he would be taken to the United States, and expressed his opinion that either "someone had double-crossed him or he had been the victim of incomplete coordination between Europe and Washington."

#### Identification Documents Claimed By Granovsky To Be In Possession of United States Army Intelligence

b6  
b7C

GRANOVSKY stated that one of the worst features of his present situation is the fact that he has "lost his identity" in that the following identification documents were taken from him by [redacted] and later were shown to him by [redacted] with the promise that they would be returned to him in the United States:

- 1) A "Fremming" passport in his true name issued to him by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly after his desertion.
- 2) An authenticated copy of a special decree signed by King Gustav V of Sweden recognizing him as a political

-7-  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

refugee and instructing Swedish officials not to return him to Russia and to issue to him the "Fremming" passport.

- 3) His military identification and record book.
- 4) Two books recording his decorations and medals.
- 5) A letter of recommendation from [ ] to the Chief of Russian Espionage at Odessa.
- 6) A Seaman's administrative record book.
- 7) His Seaman's identification document.
- 8) A certificate of discharge from the MGB.
- 9) An affidavit from the MGB relating to his imprisonment and release by the NKVD.
- 10) Approximately 15 photographs of GRANOVSKY in various localities.

b6  
b7c

Feeling the necessity of establishing his true identity in order to clarify his status with Brazilian police authorities and authenticate his writings concerning his Russian background, GRANOVSKY wrote a personal letter to the Intendant of National Police at Stockholm, Sweden, and obtained photographic duplicates of the following documents, which he said had been photographed by the Swedish police while he was in their custody and prior to the time these documents were delivered by him to American authorities:

- 1) Photograph of various pages of his Seaman's Passport № 043280 dated June 26, 1946, and issued by the People's Commissariat of Maritime Fleet, Odessa, in the name of GRANOVSKY, and in which there appears a photograph of himself.
- 2) Affidavit from the NKVD of the USSR reflecting arrest on January 27, 1939, and release on July 20, 1939.
- 3) A certificate of discharge from the MGB dated April 13, 1946.
- 4) A photograph of a Safe Conduct certificate № 581 dated May 22, 1945 and signed by [ ]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[ ] permitting GRANOVSKY 24 hours free transit with an automobile within the confines of Berlin.

GRANOVSKY also has in his possession a copy of an United States Technical Manual, which consisted of a Russian-English, English-Russian dictionary, and which he stated was furnished to him by [ ], his English instructor at Heidelberg. In this connection, he displayed an alphabetical list of English idiomatic expressions with their pronunciation in accordance with Russian phonetics and Russian meaning, which he said he had prepared during the course of his English instruction.

GRANOVSKY mentioned that khaki clothing which he has worn on occasions, and which is of United States military color and design, had been purchased for him at the PX at Heidelberg.

Information Furnished By GRANOVSKY  
To United States Military Intelligence

GRANOVSKY related that he had furnished detailed information to United States officials concerning the following:

- 1) A detailed organizational plan of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Soviet Army, including identities of principal personnel, addresses of offices, descriptions and background data. b6  
b7C
- 2) Complete organizational plan of the MGB-MVD, including background information concerning BERIA, [ ] and the relation of this organization to Stalin.
- 3) Detailed organizational information concerning the organization, equipment and strength of the Soviet Army.
- 4) Names, descriptions, locations and activities of approximately 200 Soviet espionage and counter-espionage agents operating within and outside Russia.
- 5) Information concerning efforts of Soviet agents to infiltrate the United States Embassy at Moscow.
- 6) Complete details of Soviet espionage activities in Czechoslovakia.
- 7) Training methods and plans for espionage operations in England and the United States.
- 8) Considerable information concerning Soviet intelligence activities in Germany.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 9) Color sketches of all uniforms utilized by the various uniformed forces within the Soviet Union.
- 10) Examination of hundreds of documents to determine whether or not they were still in use in Russia, and the preparation of various plans by which Allied Intelligence might infiltrate into Russia.
- 11) Information concerning the relationship between Soviet espionage and the communist parties abroad.
- 12) Considerable information concerning Russian heavy industry for military purposes and Soviet efforts to produce the atomic bomb.

GRANOVSKY specifically mentioned that he had identified Major URI DIMITRIEVICH MILOZOROV, a former official in the sabotage school attended by GRANOVSKY, who in 1947 was in the United States for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information concerning the atomic bomb.

#### GRANOVSKY's Status in Brazil

GRANOVSKY's unofficial permit from the Ministry of Justice to remain in Brazil expired on February 15, 1949, and he has been advised that this will not be renewed unless he is able to furnish further proof of his desertion from Russia and "services to the United States." His Rumanian passport in the name of FILIPAS expired on July 10, 1948, and cannot possibly be renewed. Not being in possession of a legal identification document, he cannot obtain permanent residence in Brazil and cannot be gainfully employed without an identification document reflecting legal permanent residence.

He believes that if he were to contact the Swedish Embassy in Rio de Janeiro he would be able to obtain the assistance of the Swedish Government in rehabilitating himself, but he points out that such action would automatically cut him off from any possibility of going to the United States, and he claims that he does not wish to take any such action except in case of extreme necessity.

He pointed out that his other alternative would be to release his complete story as recorded above to the press; however, he expressed his reluctance to take this action since he has refrained from revealing the nature of his contacts with United States Army Intelligence during eighteen months since he arrived in La Paz, and still is hopeful that "the promises made to him by United States officials in Europe will

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

be fulfilled." He commented that any publication of the foregoing story by the press would be utilized to advantage by Russian propaganda as an example of "what happens to traitors who desert to the enemy, and undoubtedly would result in the Western Powers losing the possibility of obtaining valuable intelligence information from the use of double agents and deserters like himself."

In connection with GRANOVSKY's status, it should be pointed out that he is destitute and has little or no possibility of earning a living in Brazil. Up to the present time he has been supported by handouts from various police officials who sympathized with him, and recently has been instructing an official of the Brazilian Naval Ministry in Russian, but these sources of income are known to have been exhausted within the past few weeks.

He published in Rio de Janeiro a series of articles for which he received approximately \$2,800.00 (\$800.00 of which he had to pay for translations to Portuguese), but these funds also have been spent and he has been unable to obtain any further income from this source.

There can be little question but what a considerable portion of GRANOVSKY's story is authentic, and he appears to be very intelligent and potentially dangerous as a source of unfavorable propaganda and publicity to the United States.

-11-  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-12-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/dls

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3:3(1)

02-12-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

11 January/49

[redacted]  
SIS, New York.

Dear [redacted]:

This is in reference to my cable of last Friday, concerning the story of Capt. Anatoli Granovsky, for seven years (1939-1946) an operator in the counter-espionage sections of the NKVD, internal security police; the NKGB, or external security police, and MGB, or ministry for national security.

His activities took him to Poland, Germany, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Finland, in addition to many duties inside of Russia.

Granovsky was sent on a mission to Sweden in 1946, at which time he deserted the Soviet government and became a refugee in his own organization. He arrived in Brazil six months ago. His movements and connections from the time he left Sweden until he arrived here are not publishable.

Granovsky arrived in Brazil from Bolivia, and was jailed in São Paulo by Brazilian ministry of justice operators, who considered him a Russian spy suspect. He was released after his identity had been checked through U.S. channels. During this period he prepared the document that contains his experiences, (about 100,000 words), which was translated into Portuguese and typed for the ministry of justice here.

(C) U.S. security sources here are familiar with his story, and say that they can vouch for his identity and authenticity.

[redacted]  
as a further backstop on determining the legitimate nature of Granovsky's background.

Briefly, his story is the following:

He is the son of Mikhail A. Granovsky, one of the earlier leaders of the Communist movement in Russia, a member of the Central Executive Committee, and one of the organizers of heavy industry in Russia. In 1937 the father was arrested as an "enemy of the people", and apparently liquidated.

The young Granovsky attempted to learn from the NKVD about the fate of his father, and as a result was arrested in January, 1939. He was held for six months in various prisons, during which he was subject to considerable torture in attempts to secure a confession.

In July, 1939, he was informed that he had been cleared of

(More)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the charges against him, (being a son of ~~the~~ an "enemy of the people"), and that he would be freed on the condition that he would consent to incorporate himself in the NKVD as a counter-espionage agent. This he did.

In addition to counter-espionage activities in Russia and abroad, he also was trained in anti-aircraft defense and in sabotage for operations behind enemy lines. He served for three years in charge of various special NKVD anti-aircraft units in defense of Moscow, and toward the end of the war carried out numerous sabotage operations.

Some of the highlights of his story are the following:

1) Details of the Soviet program for post-war penetration of the United States and England by trained espionage agents. (Granovsky was scheduled to enter the U.S. as a Czech immigrant, married to a Czech girl, making his first contact with an employee of the Tolstoy farm, whose name he has available now).

2) His experiences as an NKVD operator assigned to extract Allied secrets from Allied prisoners of Germany who had been freed and were passing through Soviet-controlled territory on their way to repatriation.

3) His own description of the "great panic" in Moscow on October 16, 1941, when the Germans were 40 kms from the city, and when the city was completely deserted by all government and defense forces for 14 hours. Had the German intelligence service been on the job, Granovsky claims that on that day the German troops could have occupied Moscow without firing a shot.

b6  
b7C

4) An eye-witness account of the liquidation of the Russian army corps under [redacted], (130,000 men), which had been captured and gone over to the Germans earlier in the war, and which was trapped in Breslau by advancing Russian troops and annihilated on orders of Stalin.

5) Details of Russian espionage against foreign embassies in Moscow, especially the methods used to control the U.S. embassy there.

6) Espionage activities in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia designed to prepare these nations as springboards for domination of western Europe.

7) Organization of a special section of NKGB in Prague to counter-act occupation troops under General Patton, which were headquartered in Pilsen.

8) NKVD background on the recent Hungarian arrests, including dispute between Catholic and Orthodox churches.

[redacted] Russian high command orders to NKVD to find uranium at all costs in order to get started on atomic production.

[redacted] NKVD plan prepared before Allied occupation of Berlin,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

for provocation of other occupying forces aimed at eventually squeezing Allies out of Berlin.

11) Description of Stalin, activities and illnesses, for last 15 years. (Granovsky claims he knew Stalin well as a youth, when his father was a member of the Central Executive Committee, and often went to Stalin's country place at Sochi, in the Caucasus. Granovsky claims he is a good friend of [redacted], now a major general in the Red Air Force. He also claims to be a close personal friend of [redacted] of Stalin's personal security guard).

12) Details, including considerable number of love scandals, concerning Molotov, Beria (who was Granovsky's supreme boss), [redacted] and others of the Politburo.

13) Detailed breakdown of Red Army and Red Air Force strength, dispositions and training programs.

14) Detailed description of the four principal Russian espionage organizations, with their inter-relations and overall programs and activities.

Granovsky claims that the last two items have been turned over to both U.S. and British intelligence services, and can be checked back by us if we wish. On this point, I checked with U.S. sources here who know Granovsky, and was informed that we can publish anything he wishes to say, but that extreme care must be taken to avoid any reference or indication that he has been in contact with U.S. or British officials.

b6  
b7C

There is another point, concerning Granovsky's personal security. He is living in Brazil now on a Rumanian passport and under an assumed name. Any published material would be under his real name as a former NKVD operator, but no indication should be given as to his present location.

As I reported in the cable, I have available a Portuguese translation of the manuscript of Granovsky's report, running about 100,000 words. It is not well connected for continuity, contains much matter of little interest, and lacks considerable detail on more important points that would have to be developed by further interviews. In talking with him during recent days I turned up numerous interesting details which are lacking in the manuscript.

In other words, if you want the material, it will have to be written here, and the job will require three weeks to a month of steady work.

With the material Granovsky offers photostats of ten of his former NKVD identification documents, and seven pictures of himself on various jobs. The pictures are poor quality.

[redacted] Granovsky says that all his information will be backed by facts, places and specific and details. He claims that

(More)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

both the Kravchenko and Kasenkina stories are full of rumors and misinformation.

He wants an offer for either U.S. or world rights on newspaper and magazine publication, excluding Brazil. As I reported in the cable, the material has been turned over by the Brazilian ministry of justice to the government newspaper A NOITE, which is publishing it here in its present form. This paper paid him approximately \$3000.00 for Brazilian rights, according to the contract he has.

Granovsky says that he would prefer to contract for one year all the material he has to offer, at a flat price rather than on a commission on sales basis. Please let me know.

Very sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

cc: KFS

b6  
b7C

[Redacted Box]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Antwerp.

B-9-47



At the request of the General Consulate of the U. S. America

at Antwerp. I certify that I have examined

*Mr. Leopold Filipas*

b6  
b7c

*Thussels 55 But not max.*

and may state that this subject is not suffering from any illness such  
as tuberculosis, loathsome, or dangerous contagious disease; nor mental,  
nor physical defects which would affect the ability of the subject to earn  
a living.

*last small  
w/ vaccination  
CM*

*U. S. Consul*



EX-CAPTAIN OF THE NKVD (PEOPLES COMMIS-  
SARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS), NKGB (PEOP-  
LES COMMISSARIAT FOR THE SECURITY OF THE  
STATE), MGB (THE MINISTRY FOR THE SECURI-  
TY OF THE STATE - SINCE MARCH 15TH 1946)

ANATOLY MIKHAILOVITSH GRANOVSKY.

" TO THE PROCESS OF VICTOR ANDREYEVITSH KRAVCHENKO "

RIO DE JANEIRO  
JANUARY 31ST 1949  
BRAZIL.

To the process of Victor Andreyevitch Kravchenko:

1) As a man who used to work in the system of the NKVD, NKGB and MGB -USSR since July 20th 1939 up to April 13th 1946 (Am attaching two photocopies of documents as also one picture), I am fully supporting Mr.V.A.Kravchenko in his process against "Lettres Françaises" for the baseless compromettance by this periodic of Mr.V.A.Kravchenko as also his book "I chose Freedom".

2) The facts described by Mr.V.A.Kravchenko in his book are of absolute truth and are corresponding as to the former as also to the up to date Soviet actuality.

The details, names, places and denominations of the many Soviet establishments confirm that Mr.V.A.Kravchenko was really at USSR in the capacity he says.

b6  
b7C

The only "minus" of Mr.Kravchenko is that his position in USSR was not high enough to know more of the incredible situations created by the "democratic" Soviet-Stalin horrors, than are described in his book.

I take the liberty to answer some of the accusations of the French Communists to Mr.V.A.Kravchenko.

a) The former Minister of the Air, the French Communist  accused on January 25th Mr.V.A.Kravchenko of a geographical mistake in the book " I chose Freedom". Really, on page 46 of the American edition is printed that Ashkhabad - the Capital of the Turkmenian USSR, was named Stalinobad, but this is purely a typographical mistake, as a town with the name of Stalinobad really exists as a Capital but only not of the Turkmenian, but of the Tadgig USSR, about 1000 Kms to the East of Ashkhabad.

b) [ ] is accusing Mr. V.A. Kravchenko on January 25th in "diminuting the potentiality" of the Soviet industry and affirms that in the last war the USSR used 95% of the production of their own industries, and that only 5% of the materials were received from the Allies by the Lend-Lease. To this we can answer to [ ] [ ] that the question is not in the percentage but in the materials which are hidden behind this percentage. In the spring and summer of 1943 Mr. Edward R. Stettinius wrote his book "Lend-Lease Weapon for Victory". This book was published by the MacMillan Company in 1944. On page 209 is written that up to the end of June 1942 USA has sent to USSR : 20.000 jeeps, 189.000 field telephones, 670.000 miles of wire. We can add to this list thousands of Studebakers, Fords, Douglasses, Automatic rifles etc and finish the list with millions of cans of preserves "Tushonka" - a specially prepared by Russian formula pork and meat with lard, which during the war was eaten by the whole population of USSR.

b6  
b7C

~~To understand what kind of 5% of which [ ] is speaking, it is quite enough to tell that the potentiality of the total automobile industry of USSR during the war was such, that it would be necessary not less than 20 months to produce the only 20.000 jeeps and it would be required 3 years to produce the 670.000 miles of wire.~~

c) [ ] of the "L'humanité" [ ] on January 26th says: "During the fight for Stalingrad Mr. Kravchenko was with tooth-ake". We can reply to [ ]: Not Mr. Kravchenko alone, but all the population of USSR, with exception of the 800.000 who really were in the battle of Stalingrad, did not take direct part in the fight, but all of us with our work on other fronts and in the rear gave a hand to this victory. Example: During the fight for Stalingrad I was, by order of Mr. Beria, sent to a special school of the

Moscou NKVD and Moscou district to be trained for the espionage, sabotage and terroristic activities against the Germans and afterwards England and USA.

- d) [ ] on January 27th said: "I chose Freedom" could not be written by Kravchenko, because, according to my opinion, I never saw a Russian to be able to write right. - This would be truth in behalf of Stalin, Molotoff, Trotsky and similars who used cowardice and lie to defend their own and absolute "dictatorial" power. But that can not be said about L.N. Tolstoy, A.P. Tchekhoff, I.S. Gouzenko and V.A. Kravchenko, who desperately tried to flee and fled from the lie. To have a right to criticize Mr. Kravchenko, I would suggest to all of his critics to take for one or two years the Soviet citizenship, I think, that even in this short period this Stalin's protection, will give them so much satisfaction as it gave to the former "Favorite" Marechal Tito.

b6  
b7c

It is necessary to remind to the critics-Communists, that it is easy to criticize and throw words like "traitor" etc to Mr. Kravchenko being in Paris, as Paris and the whole West part of Europe was liberated from the Hitlerist burden not by the "Liberator" Stalin.

Unfortunately an other fate was given to other more educated and less biting critics, who lived in the East part of Europe, and which were "liberated" by Stalin as: [ ]

[ ] and finally [ ].

My compliments to Mr. V.A. Kravchenko for his just and based accusation as in his book "I chose Freedom" as in the actual process of Stalin and all his Paris servants (on payroll or not).

In the near future on the pages of the world's press will appear my articles about USSR and particularly about the Polit and NKVD where I used to work for 7 years.

Anatoly Mikhailovitch Granovsky.



**INFORMATION**

5

**UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALISTIC  
REPUBLICS**

**Peoples Commissariat  
For Internal Affairs  
1 - st Special Section**

**№ 396**

**July 20 tr 1939**

**Given to Gransvsky**

**Anatoly Mikhailovitch**

**Year of Birth 1922 passport no 618835  
that he was since. January 27 tr 1939  
1939 up to July 20 tr 1939.**

**Held at places of confinement of NKVD  
USSR and was freed.**

**Due to conclusion of the process.**

**This information doesnot serve as a living  
permission.**

**FIRST SPECIAL**

**SECTION**

**NKVD**

**USSR**

**Chief of the 1-st section NKVD USSR  
(signature)**

**Chief of the 3-rd section  
(signature)**

DISCHARGE CERTIFICATE

Captain Grahovsky, Anatoly Mikhailovitch 1922  
year of birth, from the city of Tshernigoff has served in the  
Red Army from August 1939 in the capacities of:

Student of the Moscow School. PWD NKD (Anti -  
aerial Defence Peoples commissariat of defense) - from au -  
gust 1939 to January 1940;

Instructor of the Same school - from February  
1940 to June 1941;

Chief of Staff of the sector and division PWD  
NKVD of the town of Moscow and Moscow District - from June 1941  
upto september 1942;

Student of the special school UNKVD (Department  
of the peoples commissariat for internal affairs) for the Moscow  
District for the preparation of personnel for partisans - from  
september 1942 up to May 1943;

From May 1943 up to december 1944 comrad Grahovsky  
was at disposition of MGB SSSR ( Ministry of the security of  
the state) from March 1945 up to March 1946 he was at disposi-  
tion of MGB USSR, USSR - Ukraine - SSR) for fulfillments of  
special designations in the rear of the enemy.

The fulfillment of the received orders comrad  
Grahovsky completed exact and consciowsly. He was condecorated  
with the medal "For the defense of Moscow" b6 b7C

Removed to military commissariat due to the end  
of works by order MGB USSR - to be taken in the military dispo-  
sition.

Chief of section of  
Department MGB USSR

[ ]

Signature

Seal)

[ ]

April 13 in 1946  
City of Kiev

Confirming the  
Signature of the comrad

[ ]

[ ] (signature)

Seal Peoples commissaria for the security  
of the state USSR. (Around the seal this sentence is in  
Russian and in the Ukrainian languages)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-12-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-12-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

RECORDED - 72

100-356092-17

EX-127

Date: May 6, 1949  
To: Legal Attache  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Subject: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY wa.,  
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your letters dated March 25, 1949 and  
April 7, 1949.

b1

(C)

United States Army authorities, Washington, advise their files contain  
no record of Granovsky. Your instructions not to reinterview Granovsky  
still prevail and no recommendations as to the manner in which this matter  
should be handled by the State Department or any governmental agency  
should be made by you.

As in the past you should keep the Bureau promptly advised  
concerning any pertinent developments in this matter.

cc: Foreign Service Desk

THD:jw

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE 02-12-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/SJP/bis  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-12-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
April 7, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - AIR POUCH

Director, FBI

Re: "ANMISK"  
ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa  
Gheorghe Alexandru Filipas;  
ESPIONAGE - R

Dear Sir:

Reference Bulet and cable, both dated March 29, and  
Rio de Janeiro letter dated March 25, 1949.

For the information of the Bureau, it is advised that  
on the basis of the copy of the memorandum forwarded to the Bureau  
with the letter of reference which was furnished to the Embassy,  
[redacted] of Embassy, introduced the  
case of GRANOVSKY for general discussion at a recent "intelli-  
gence conference." (These are held semi-weekly in the office of  
the Counselor of Embassy and are attended by the various service  
attaches and chiefs of several sections of the Embassy proper).  
It was the opinion of most of the officers present that the dis-  
closure by GRANOVSKY to the press, to which he evidently has  
some access, of his present situation and alleged treatment by  
United States intelligence officials, would be extremely damaging,  
not only in Brazil but throughout the world. There were several  
expressions of opinion that there is considerable logic in  
GRANOVSKY's allegations and that "if we are inclined to believe  
them, the reading public probably would accept them without  
question."

(C) [redacted] has requested that the Military, Naval and  
Air Attaches [redacted] this  
office furnish him a memorandum recording any recommendations or  
suggestions concerning a method of "handling the matter," and on  
the basis of these memoranda the Ambassador will be consulted  
concerning any recommendations he may wish to make to the Depart-  
ment of State with regard thereto.

Ambassador JOHNSON has read the letter by GRANOVSKY  
which stimulated this inquiry and the memorandum by this office  
completing the details with respect thereto, and he has stated  
to the writer that he feels "that the case is no longer an

Copy retained  
as tickler  
- 28

RECORDED - 100-3560925/17  
EX-127 5 11 17 1949  
CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

operational matter involving an intelligence agency but involves the prestige and foreign relations of the United States." He added that it was his desire that all information possible concerning the case should be incorporated in a secret dispatch and forwarded to the State Department for scrutiny on a "high level." He also stated that inasmuch as he is planning to travel to the United States in the near future to accompany Brazilian President DUTRA, he may wish to discuss the matter personally in Washington.

[redacted] has advised that he discussed the case briefly with [redacted] of Army Intelligence, when the latter was in Rio de Janeiro recently, and [redacted] mentioned his intention of discussing the matter with the Bureau's Liaison Agent.

The foregoing is being furnished for the Bureau's information and further developments will be transmitted to the Bureau immediately as they occur.

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

LA

b6  
b7c

RLL:jar

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERVICE UNIT  
SEARCH SLIP

F-19a

Supervisor

Room 1738

Subj: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY

☐ Exact Spelling

☒ All References

☐ Subversive Ref

☐ Main File

☐ Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_

Searchers

Initial me

Date 4-14

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-12-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

100-356092-

Granovsky Anatoly M.

NR

Granovsky Anatoly

NR

Granovsky Anatoly Mikhailovich

100-356092-

Granovsky Anatol

100-356092-

Granovsky G. M.

NR

Granovsky one

Initialed

b6  
b7c

SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor                     

Room 1938

Subj: Bransovsky, one

☐ Exact Spelling

☒ All References

☐ Subversive Ref

☐ Main File

☐ Restricted to Locality of                     

Searchers

Initial pee

Date 7-14

FILE NUMBER

SERIALS

--

Bransovsky, Anatoli M.

100-356092

-2-

Initialed

b6  
b7C

SERVICE UNIT

F-19a

SEARCH SLIP

Supervisor

Room

1738

Subj: GHEORGHE ALEXANDRU FILIPAS☐ Exact Spelling☒ All References☐ Subversive Ref☐ Main File☐ Restricted to Locality of \_\_\_\_\_

Searchers

Initial meDate 4-14FILE NUMBERSERIALS100-356092-Filipas, George A.MRFilipas, George100-356092-Filipas, G. A.MRFilipas, AlexandruMRFilipas, oneMRMR on variationsFile  
W

-3-

Initialed

b6  
b7C



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-12-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

*man*  
ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH <sup>0</sup>GRANOVSKY wa.  
ESPIONAGE - R  
Rio File 65-116  
Bufile —

CH 4 -

Insp. NAUGHTEN: This case was opened on the basis of Bureau cable of 2/28/49 concerning subject, who claimed to be a defected Soviet espionage agent. Various communications were had between this office and the Bureau concerning subject and his claims, with this office keeping the Bureau advised of subject's activities locally. By Bulet of 5/6/49, the Bureau reiterated its instructions not to reinterview subject or to take part in any negotiations concerning the handling of subject or his desire to enter the United States.

You have advised me that subject does keep in contact with you, although, in line with Bureau instructions, you are not undertaking any investigative activity. It would appear, therefore, that instant file should be closed. However, if subject contacts you in the future and furnishes any information which you feel would be of interest to the Bureau, you can furnish such in line with existing Bureau instructions.

L.A.  : The foregoing will be carried out.

b6  
b7C

100-356092-

31 JUL 22 1949

INSPECTION REPORT  
RIO DE JANEIRO OFFICE  
INSPECTOR NAUGHTEN  
JUNE 28, 1949

238

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. H. B. Fletcher *for file*  
FROM : *[Redacted]*  
SUBJECT: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa  
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: October 12, 1949

b6  
b7C  
Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: 02-12-2008

CLASSIFIED BY: 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

02-12-2033

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to acquaint you with certain facts concerning the above individual who is now in Brazil and who is admittedly a former agent of the M.G.B.

BACKGROUND:

During Special Agent *[Redacted]* recent trip in Washington he discussed this case with Supervisor *[Redacted]*. You may recall that the background of this case has previously been called to your attention but is being summarized hereinafter for your information. According to Granovsky, he was forced into the service of the N.K.V.D. in 1937. He claims that from 1939 until September 21, 1946, when he presented himself to the U. S. Military Attache at Stockholm, Sweden, he had occupied positions in the N.K.V.D., the N.K.G.B. and the M.G.B. From December, 1946 to March, 1947, he was interrogated by CIC, from April to September, 1947 *[Redacted]*

b1  
b6  
b7C

Thereafter, on February 21, 1949, he wrote to President Truman, sending copies of his letter to the Director, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and to General Bradley, outlining in detail his situation and the promises which had been made to him. Thereafter, Larson interviewed him concerning his letter and we furnished the details to the Attorney General. *[Redacted]*

b1

This is very good material. The reports, however, are not as detailed as a Bureau report would be and certainly do not appear to represent four or five months steady interrogation.

Attachment

RECORDED - 36

RJL: *[Redacted]* NOV 3 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6  
b7C

9/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We have previously advised [ ] not to make any efforts to reinterview Granovsky but to take any information he voluntarily furnishes. [ ] states that Granovsky is now in Rio de Janeiro preparing a book and is also preparing a brochure on Soviet Intelligence for the Brazilian security police who are very much interested in him as a source of information. Granovsky is personally very well disposed toward [ ] and has volunteered to furnish him information although [ ] has explained to him that he cannot help him in his efforts to enter the United States. [ ] is of the opinion that if interviewed in detail, Granovsky can furnish us with a great deal of valuable information.

b6  
b7C

OBSERVATIONS:

It is believed that Granovsky can furnish to us valuable information without necessitating our assisting him in any respect.

An example of the type of information which we can expect from Granovsky is as follows:

(C)

b1

Granovsky should also be able to identify photographs of a number of leading figures in the M.G.B. and he should be able to furnish detailed biographical sketches on them. An example of this would be Vassili Zubilin, who we know to have been the head of Soviet Intelligence in the United States for a long period up until the summer of 1944. We have heard that Zubilin occupied the rank of General in the M.G.B.

(C)

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached for your approval a memorandum to the Bureau's Legal Attache in Rio de Janerio authorizing him to undertake an interview of Granovsky if it can be carried out without making any commitments to Granovsky.

V. [signature] OK [signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-12-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-12-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~  
AIR COURIER

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE~~

Date: October 12, 1949

To: Legal Attache  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

From: J. Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa  
ESPIONAGE - R

2/23/95  
Classified by 5012 BT/SC  
Declassify on: OADR 349515

b1

(C)

In your interviews you should attempt to develop information concerning his activities in Soviet Intelligence, personages known to him in the M.G.B., individuals known to him as having been active in espionage in the United States.

(C)

We would also like to determine if Granovsky knows anything concerning the Eighth Otdel of the M.G.B., what it consists of and could it be a special section dealing with the United States or England or both. You should obtain any information Granovsky has concerning the designation of cover names by the M.G.B. and you should determine if they differ from code names such as made public in the report of the Royal Commission in Canada.

b1

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures

CC: Foreign Service Desk

RJL:mh

RECORDED - 102  
INDEXED - 102

100-356092-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

In the event that your initial interviews of Granovsky are successful and his information appears to be accurate and reliable, you will be furnished a number of photographs to exhibit to Granovsky for possible identification. You should keep the Bureau fully advised of all developments in this matter.

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

80801

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
ON 02-22-2008

Date: January 31, 1950  
To: Legal Attache,  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
From: J. Edgar Hoover, Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Subject: ALEXANDER M. GRANOVSKI, wa.  
ESPIONAGE - R

~~SECRET - AIR COURIER~~

Your attention is directed to the instructions issued to you in the Bureau's memorandum of October 12, 1949.

You are requested to immediately submit the results of your interview with Granovsky, or, in lieu thereof, a statement as to the progress effected by you in handling this matter.

You also are requested to furnish any available information regarding Granovsky's preparation of material for the Brazilian authorities.

RECORDED - 62  
FEB 2 1950  
80  
100-356092-20

RJL:hc-EX-1

CC: Foreign Service Desk

FEB 1 - 1950  
COMM - FBI

May 19, 1950

RECORDED - 16

100-356092-21

EX-124

Legal Attache  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

~~SECRET AIR POUCH~~

From: Director, FBI  
Subject: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa.  
ESPIONAGE - R

Reference is made to your letter of March 8, 1950, in this matter.

You are requested to advise if you have received a copy of the monograph being prepared by Granovsky for the Secret Service of the Brazilian Ministry of the Navy.

In addition, you are requested to interview Granovsky, if he is cooperative, regarding the following matters:

1. Can Granovsky furnish any information with respect to the location of the MGB Moscow Headquarters and the location of the various directorates or departments?
2. Why does Granovsky limit his description of the functions of the First Department of the MGB to the gathering of political intelligence? What does he think the term political intelligence covers?
3. Has Granovsky heard of a political section or foreign section under the Central Committee of the Communist Party - USSR? Does he know of representatives of such a section being stationed in foreign countries? If he knows of such a situation, what connection, if any, does this have with the MGB's espionage activities? Would a representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party make any contact with local Communist Parties and would he be in charge of the Party activities in the official establishment? In line with the above, it is to be noted that Granovsky has stated that the liaison with the Communist Parties locally is a function of the First Department agents.

RJL:cas

MAY 22 1950

cc: Foreign Service Desk COMM-FBI

Olson  
Add  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Tracy  
Harbo  
Mohr  
Tele. Room  
Nease  
Gandy



4. One source has stated that in 1939 the GUGB Second Department was called the Secret Political Department or Section. At the same time the third section was the Counterintelligence Department. What are Granovsky's comments regarding this and where were their jurisdictions? Does he know what happened to the Second Department of the GUGB in view of his statements that the Second Department of the MGB is counterintelligence?

5. Did Smersch return to the status of a department of the MGB? (Smersch was a counterintelligence organ established during World War II to replace the political commissar system in the Red Army. It had the rank of a department under the Defense Ministry, but was composed of GUGB personnel at the top. It is to be noted that [redacted] of the MGB, was [redacted] of Smersch.) What information can Granovsky provide concerning [redacted]?

6. Was Granovsky aware of a reorganization affecting officials in the MGB prior to his defection in 1946, and if so, what departments were affected? ([redacted] was [redacted] of the MGB during July, 1946, and four new Deputy Ministers were appointed shortly thereafter.)

b6  
b7C

7. What information can Granovsky furnish with respect to codes and ciphers based on his own experience; i.e., how were the messages handled in the units to which he was attached? What sections handled the receiving and what sections handled the transmission? How does the sending and receiving of messages fit into the organizational structure of the MGB?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-22-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-22-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
March 8, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - AIR POUCH

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Egan	_____
Mr. Gurnea	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Director, FBI

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa.  
ESPIONAGE - R

Dear Sir:

Rebuletts January 31, 1950 and October 12, 1949 relating to the Bureau's request that the captioned individual be interviewed.

It is advised that GRANOVSKY stated, when initially contacted concerning this matter, that he was completing the preparation of a comprehensive monograph concerning the Soviet intelligence organizations in cooperation with the Secret Service of the Brazilian Ministry of the Navy, and that he would prefer to defer additional interrogation until the foregoing report was completed. At the same time, he was destitute financially and was making every effort to secure the sale of his memoirs, which had been published in several Brazilian newspapers in serial form, to any international news agency which might handle the distribution thereof. Through an agent, [redacted], he finally was successful in marketing his memoirs through the Reuters News Agency, which agreed to pay him fifty per cent of the gross receipts from sales of his material.

He completed the monograph at the Brazilian Ministry of the Navy in collaboration with [redacted] and [redacted] and [redacted] respectively of the Navy Secret Service, both of whom are contacts of this office.

GRANOVSKY had given every assurance that he was to receive a copy of the monograph and immediately would deliver same to this office; however, [redacted] subsequently advised him that no copies of the work could be distributed until they had been submitted to the Minister of the Navy and his approval received for such distribution as might be deemed advisable. [redacted] has mentioned the matter to the

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Mr. Ladd  
BRAZIL  
510-50  
RILEY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED - 114

INDEXED - 114

EX-9

100-356092-21

MAR 20 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

writer and has stated that, in submitting the six copies of the 175-page monograph, he had made the recommendation that two or three copies thereof be transmitted to this office in the United States Embassy in order that they be forwarded to Washington "for appraisal and evaluation by the proper authorities."

Upon returning to Rio de Janeiro from his annual vacation two weeks ago, [redacted] visited this office and expressed surprise that the copies of the monograph had not been transmitted to this office. Every effort will be made to obtain a copy, or copies, of the monograph for forwarding to the Bureau; meanwhile, the information recorded in the attached memorandum was obtained from GRANOVSKY [redacted]

b1  
b6  
b7C

(C)

[redacted] it does not appear that he is in possession of a great deal of additional information.

(C)

It seems probable that through careful and detailed interrogation it would be possible to correct and amplify to some extent [redacted] that he would be able to identify photographs of the officials of the MGB with whom he came into contact in the event the Bureau is in possession of such photographs and desires to make them available for this purpose.

b1

The sources mentioned in the attached memorandum are identified as follows:

Source B

[redacted]

b7D

(C)

Source C

[redacted]

b1

Source D

[redacted]

b6  
b7C  
b7D

As of possible interest to the Bureau, there is attached a photostatic copy of a dispatch to the United States Department of State, dated January 19, 1950, which was prepared by Assistant Information Officer, [redacted], of the United States Embassy at Buenos Aires, Argentina, regarding GRANOVSKY's memoirs. A

b6  
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

copy of this dispatch, with its enclosures, was furnished to GRANOVSKY through [REDACTED]. There also is attached a photographic copy of what is reported to be a certified copy of the "Dispatch Decree" by King Gustav of Sweden, which ordered that GRANOVSKY should be "dispatched" from Sweden to a country of his choice, but should not be returned to the custody of the Soviet Government. GRANOVSKY claims to have received the original certified copy from the Swedish Government through friends in the Swedish National Police, and he has presented it on various occasions as evidence of the authenticity of his allegations.

This office will continue in its efforts to obtain a copy of the GRANOVSKY monograph from [REDACTED], and will await Bureau instructions as to whether or not further detailed interrogation of GRANOVSKY is desired.

Very truly yours,

LA

b6  
b7C

Attachments

RLL:jar

-3-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-22-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-22-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
March 8, 1950

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, was.

The following information was obtained from Source B by way of correction and supplementation of data previously received from Source C.

b1

First Department, MGB, U.S.S.R.

(C) [REDACTED]

Source B insisted that the translation from the Russian language of the division would be properly "department". He stated that, to the best of his recollection, in 1946 the First Department of the MGB, which was interested primarily in the collection of political intelligence and foreign espionage, was composed of eight geographical subsections or "Otdels" as follows:

- 1) Scandinavian countries and, prior to the annexation, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
- 2) The Balkans.
- 3) Central Europe.
- 4) England and its dominions.
- 5) Latin Southern Europe.
- 6) Asiatic countries.
- 7) Latin America.
- ✓ 8) The United States.

He explained that each Otdel was divided into four or five geographic subsections, and that the numerical designation of each Otdel within the department was changed every one or two years; for example, he was certain that in 1946 the numerical designation of the Otdel handling the United States was "5", the Balkans was "2" and Central Europe "3". He also pointed out that it was customary procedure for the heads of the departments and Otdels of the MGB to be transferred from one to another in accordance with the importance attributed to a particular section at a given time.

COPIES DESTROYED  
R446 10-13-1982

-1- ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Source B was certain that in 1946 the head of the First Department (which would include the Fifth Otdel, which at that time was responsible for intelligence within the United States) was headed by [redacted], and that the latter's assistant was [redacted].

FEDOTOV

It was advised that in 1946 a Lieutenant General FEDOTOV was Chief of the Second Department of the MGB, which was responsible for general counter-intelligence. The following description and background data was furnished concerning this official:

Name:	Lieutenant General FEDOTOV (Source was reasonably certain that the individual described is identical with General PETER VASILIEVICH FEDOTOV.)
Age:	36 or 37 in 1946
Height:	Approximately 5' 10"
Weight:	170 to 180 pounds
Build:	Athletic, robust, very broad shoulders.
Hair:	Brown fringe, bald on top
Face:	Round
Characteristics:	Was described as a "typical Siberian Russian".

b6  
b7c

FEDOTOV was described as being a "political general" who had been sponsored by BERIA, and who had accompanied STALIN at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.

Soviet Espionage in the United States

Source B admitted that he had little specific information concerning any Soviet espionage agent who had operated in the United States, but related that in 1942-43 one Major URIY DMITRIEVICH MILOVZOROV had been the chief of a sub-section of the Fourth Otdel of Department No. 1, which was charged with espionage in Germany. At that time the source was under the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

supervision of MILOVZOROV; however, at a later date the two of them came together at an isolated bungalow used for training purposes, and at that time the source was given to understand that MILOVZOROV was preparing for an assignment to either England or the United States. He advised that MILOVZOROV was graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Aviation in 1937 or 1938, was extremely intelligent, and was married to a very attractive woman who had been an actress and singer of light opera in Russia. He described this individual as being about 35 years of age, 6'2" tall, weighing 200 pounds, having brown hair and eyes, a round but handsome face, broad shoulders and a very clean-cut appearance. He believed that, being an aviation engineer, he had become a specialist on jet aviation, and possibly atomic information, and the source claimed that MILOVZOROV's photograph was shown to him by Source D and he had been given to understand that MILOVZOROV had been operating in the United States.

#### Cover Names

With regard to the foregoing topic, Source B related that each operational agent within the MGB normally selected his own cover name. He stated that this pseudonym was known only to the Chief of the Otdel who, if he chose or if called upon to do so, might communicate the cover name to a superior. He explained that his operational cover name had been [redacted] and that he also had used a different cover name in connection with his special training at a NKVD sabotage school in 1942-43, when he had used the name [redacted]. He admitted that very few actual agents ever came to know the cover names utilized by their colleagues in submitting reports and information.

b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on this envelope

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

ENCLOSURE

100-356092-21



1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

ENCLOSURE TO THE BUREAU

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa.  
Gheorghe Alexandru Filipas

(Photographs "a-e" as set out in memorandum  
prepared by Legal Attaché, Rio de Janeiro,  
and furnished to the Ambassador on 4/27/49)

VIA AÉREA  
PAR AVION

SELO



СССР

НАРОДНЫЙ КОМИССАРИАТ  
МОРСКОГО ФЛОТА

Управление Одесского морского  
торгового порта

МОРЕХОДНАЯ КНИЖКА  
№ 043280

Действительна по 26 июня 1947 г.

Настоящая мореходная книжка выдана

Грановский

Анатолий Михайлович


родившемуся в 1922 г.

г-ну Союза С.С.Р.

Занимаемая должность матрос

на Петроград

на Питер диплом №

USSR  
PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF MARITIME FLEET  
Administration of Odesa  
commercial harbour  
**SEAMAN'S PASSPORT**  
№ 043280  
To be in force until 26-6-1947  
This seaman's passport is issued to Granovskiy, O. Nikolay  
born at 1922 citizen of U.S.S.R.  
Seaman's position sailor  
on the ship Petrodromets  
state U.S.S.R. diploma certificate № 2  
Documents according to which the seaman's passport is issued  
  
Signature of seaman Granovskiy  
Harbour master Skorin  
Harbour Odesa 26-6-1946

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

СОЮЗ СОВЕТСКИХ СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ  
РЕСПУБЛИК

НАРОДНЫЙ КОМИССАРИАТ  
ВНУТРЕННИХ ДЕЛ

ПЕРВЫЙ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫЙ ОТДЕЛ

№ 396

20 июля 1939 г.

СПРАВКА

Выдана *Трановскому*  
*Анатолию Михайловичу*

год рождения *1922* паспорт № *618835* в том, что  
с *27 января* 1939 г. по *20 июля* 1939 г.  
содержался в местах заключения НКВД СССР *по постановлению*  
*Особого совещания*

Справка видом на жительство не служит

Начальник 1-го Спецотдела НКВД СССР *[подпись]*

Начальник 3-го отделения *[подпись]*

ПЕРВЫЙ СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫЙ ОТДЕЛ  
НКВД  
СССР



HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

11

Перечень документов, на основании которых вы-

дана мореходная книжка: пас. порт

№ 22385 выд. 8 мая 1946 г.

г. Одесса 27/IV 46

1 год



Оттиск большого пальца  
левой руки

М. П.

Капитан порта

Порт

Одесса

26 мая

1946 г.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

RE: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH  
GRANOVSKY, *va*

(c)

100-356092-13

**ПРОПУСК № 581**

ДАН *Опер. группе, к-му Грановскому*

В ТОМ, ЧТО ЕМУ РАЗРЕШАЕТСЯ КРУГЛОСУТОЧНЫЙ

ПРОЕЗД ПО Г. БЕРЛИНУ НА АВТОМАШИНЕ № *УЛ-266-536*

БЕЗ ПРЕДЪЯВЛЕНИЯ ПАСПОРТА НА МАШИНУ

ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЕН СРОКОМ ПО *15.11* 1945 г.

Начальник гарнизона  
Г. Берлина  
Генерал-майор

*Берлин*  
(БЕРЛИН)



RE: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH  
GRANDYSKY, wa.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

168-256-0000

Класс 29 55 46 мд.

Уважаемый г. Россыгин!

Известно, что среди животных в  
этом районе г. Ярославля.

г. Ярославля известны следующие виды  
птиц, как правило, встречающиеся  
на этих местах. Среди них: Тетерев  
и другие, которые можно встретить  
на территории. Но птицы эти не  
только в г. Ярославле.

Самым известным является тот, который  
на территории Ярославля встречается,  
известно, что он. Самым известным  
будет, конечно, тетерев, который  
на территории встречается. Но  
он не только встречается в г. Ярославле.  
Он встречается в г. Ярославле,  
известно, что он. Самый известный  
будет, конечно, тетерев, который  
на территории встречается. Но  
он не только встречается в г. Ярославле.

Здесь все известно.  
Россыгин, г. Ярославль.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

RE: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH  
GRANOVSKY, wa.

(C)

1600-00

0000

ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА

Курьяков ГРАЖДАНСКИЙ Анатолий Иванович,  
1928 года рождения, уроженец г. Черноголовки в быв-  
шей Армии в августе 1940 года в должности:

Курьяков Александр Иванович - с  
августа 1928 года по январь 1940 года;

Председатель этого же участка с января  
1940 года по июль 1941 года;

Курьяков участок в районе МЗС МЗС в районе  
и Казанской области - с июля 1941 года по август 1941  
года;

Курьяков Александр Иванович - с  
августа 1941 года по январь 1942 года - с  
января 1942 года.

С июля 1942 года Александр  
ГРАЖДАНСКИЙ участок в районе МЗС МЗС  
1942 г. по июль 1942 г. - с участка  
участка участка в виду отсутствия.

Возвращение на свое место в г. МЗС  
Курьяков Александр Иванович в район МЗС МЗС  
на работу Москва.

Отмечается в документах в связи с отсут-  
ствием работы по адресу МЗС МЗС - на работу на работу  
участка.

НАЧАЛЬНИК ОТДЕЛА УПРАВЛЕНИЯ МЗС МЗС-7  
КОРДАКОВСКИЙ /ПОДПИСЬ/

-13- август 1942 г.  
г. Москва.

RE: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH  
GRANOVSKY, wa.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

101-35608



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls

Avskrift.

HE

Justitiedepartementet  
Avskrift.

Överlämnas till *Justitiedepartementet*  
för kännedom  
STATENS UTÖNNINGSKOMMISSION

Ink. till St. utl. kom.  
den 20 MAJ 1949  
D:R

Till statens utlänningsskmission.

I skrivelse den 24 oktober 1946 har statens utlänningsskmission, jämlikt sin utlänningsskmission, till Kungl. Maj:ts utlänningsskmission förklarats inkommet från en rysk sovjetisk flygförare (som senare har blivit känd som Granovski) förtädda viktiga uppgifter om sovjetiska flygförare som varit i Sverige och som varit i Sverige under andra världskriget.

Kungl. Maj:ts utlänningsskmission har till Kungl. Maj:ts utlänningsskmission förklarats inkommet från en rysk sovjetisk flygförare (som senare har blivit känd som Granovski) förtädda viktiga uppgifter om sovjetiska flygförare som varit i Sverige och som varit i Sverige under andra världskriget.

Verkställande verkställigheten av förordningen om utlänningsskmissionen har till Kungl. Maj:ts utlänningsskmission förklarats inkommet från en rysk sovjetisk flygförare (som senare har blivit känd som Granovski) förtädda viktiga uppgifter om sovjetiska flygförare som varit i Sverige och som varit i Sverige under andra världskriget.

I avdelningen på förordningen om utlänningsskmissionen skall Granovski utlänningsskmissionen förklarats inkommet från en rysk sovjetisk flygförare (som senare har blivit känd som Granovski) förtädda viktiga uppgifter om sovjetiska flygförare som varit i Sverige och som varit i Sverige under andra världskriget.

Detta har givits på nådiga befallning, meddelat statens utlänningsskmission till kännedom och efterrättelse samt för vidare förordnades underrättande.

Angående förordning av sovjetiska medborgaren S. S. Granovski.

Rätt avskrivet bekräftar:  
Alfild Hjertqvist  
Registrator  
1  
Justitiedepartementet

Statens utlänningsskmission.

Rätt avskrivet intyga:

b6  
b7C

DECLASSIFIED

CC- [ ]

Department of State

January 19, 1950

**Transmission of synopsis of memoirs and biographical  
sketch of Russian refugee author, Anatole Granovsky**

**None**

As a matter of possible interest to the Department, the Embassy transmits copies of a synopsis of the memoirs, "I was Stalin's Spy", written by the Russian refugee author Anatole A. Granovsky, and a brief biographical sketch of the author, now living in Rio Janeiro.

These documents were brought to the Embassy by [ ] in Buenos Aires [ ] is seeking an American publisher for Granovsky's manuscript.

For the Department's information, "I was Stalin's Spy", was published in serial form in the Rio de Janeiro Newspaper A Folha. Granovsky's official documents as an intelligence officer of the NKVD, and photographs of the author in various places in Europe in his official capacity, are said to have been published in the same paper to authenticate his story. Copies of the newspaper accounts may have been forwarded to the Department by the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro.

b6  
b7C

As an additional item of information, the Department is advised that a Spanish translation of the Brazilian newspaper account of "I was Stalin's Spy" has been made, and has been sold to Reuters for world-wide serialization. The Spanish and the original Portuguese version, however, lack certain information regarding Granovsky's activities as a member of the Soviet Secret Service and as an intelligence officer. Granovsky is now working on a fuller account, which will include his intelligence work at Yalta, Potsdam, in Czechoslovakia and Berlin. This new manuscript will be in Russian.

is in this

It is this latter enlarged story for which [ ]  
[ ] in France hires is seeking an American publisher.  
The new manuscript will not be completed for another two  
or two and one half months.

[ ] has stated that he would  
greatly appreciate any suggestions the Department might  
care to advance regarding a suitable publisher for these  
memoirs, and the Embassy will be happy to transmit any  
suggestions to [ ].

b6  
b7C

**Enclosures:**

**Synopsis of memoirs and biographical sketch  
of Anatole Granovsky**

[ ] :lq  
File No. 670.2

CONFIDENTIAL

**A Summary of "I was Stalin's spy"**

**by Anatole K. Granovsky**  
**former captain of the Soviet-Russian secret police**

**I. An auto-biographical notice:**

Anatole K. Granovsky was born in 1922 in the Russian city of Tchernigov. He was the son of Michael Granovsky - a high ranking soviet official member of the VZIK (Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union). In other words, a nominal government member of the great Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (U.S.S.R.) at the time Director-General of the State Glass and Ceramic Trust.

As a boy Anatole K. Granovsky lived with his parents in the so-called Government house near the Kremlin where the top military and civil servants of the regime had their quarters.

He enjoyed a privileged education, made trips to the famous Caucasian health resort of Sochi-Stalin's favourite resting place - and accompanied his parents to the Urals where his father temporarily supervised the construction of a large chemical plant on the border of the river Lena.

At the end of 1937 Anatole's father was arrested on the charge of espionage "diversion" etc. according to the general lines of the great Stalin purge in 1935-38. After a 6 month eventful stay in the Central M.I.V.D. prisons of Moscow young Granovsky was made to take up work as an informer of the Soviet Secret Service (1939). He entered simultaneously the Moscow anti-aircraft training school where he lectured during the period 1940-41. Promoted Chief of the Staff of the M.V.D.-M.E.V.D. (M.E.V.D. - anti-aircraft section of the city and Province of Moscow) he acted in this capacity in the period June 1941-September 1942 - during the great exodus from Moscow and the subsequent return to this city of the State Services. Thereafter Granovsky became a pupil of the special M.I.V.D. school for training counter-espionage agents (September 1942-May 1943) and was assigned thereafter to the M.V.D.-M.E.V.D. (Ministry of Security; during which period he performed various important tasks described in the memoirs.

In the period March 1945-March 1946 Granovsky, working under the direct supervision of the Minister of Security of the Ukrainian Federal Republic, was entrusted with a special mission to Berlin (May-June 1945) and

subsequently

subsequently with the task to investigate public opinion in Czechoslovakia during the first year consecutive to the liberation of this country while an espionage project was being set up for him for further execution in the U.S.

But contemplating flight Granovsky asks to be relieved from his hitherto duties so that he might join the crew of a Soviet merchant ship due to sail from Sweden on a cruise around Europe. This attempt proving successful Granovsky leaves Leningrad on the 7 of July 1946 and arrives at Stockholm on the 10th of the same month.

On September 21 during the first and last week the crew was permitted to take in the streets of Stockholm. Granovsky knocked off from the group of Soviet sailors to whom he belonged and reached unnoticed the headquarters of the Stockholm Police to declare that he was determined not to return to the Soviet-Union.

He was detained in the Stockholm prison pending decision of his fate. Notwithstanding the repeated claims for extradition accompanied by threats on the part of the Soviet Ambassador to break off trade relations between the Soviet-Union and Sweden (The Ambassador called personally on Granovsky in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade him to return from his own accord to Russia) King Gustav granted Granovsky the authorization for a time-limited sojourn in Sweden.

Granovsky embarked at Malmo in November 1947 for a destination he presently refuses to disclose and after visiting 5 other countries landed in Brazil on April 1948 with a special permit delivered by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice. He now resides at Rio de Janeiro.

Granovsky's narrative is corroborated by a series of official Soviet documents one of which is an account of his M.K.V.D. career as well as by many photographs of himself in uniform together with those of leading Soviet officials.

The veracity of his narrative thus appears to be beyond doubt.

.....



## II. A comment on Gromovskiy's model.

The vivid and colorful story of Gromovskiy's life covers the period 1927-1946 - a momentous epoch both in the history of the Soviet Union and in that of the entire world. For Soviet Russia it first was a time marked by Stalin's ascent to unlimited power. This ascent has cost the country tens of thousands of human lives devoured by the "purges" which raged between 1935 and 1938. Top ranking Moscow officials disappeared in jails by the hundreds. They were mostly close neighbors or friends of the Gromovskiy family as they lived nearly all in the same government house. So young Gromovskiy mingled with the "cream" of the Soviet aristocracy from the very days of his childhood. This enabled him to fix up some life-size portraits of those privileged few including that of the famous Marshal Tukhachevskiy. Gromovskiy was in the habit of spending vacations in hotels on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus in the surroundings of Stalin, Vorshilov and others. The author recorded those stays. He also recorded the summer time spent in the vicinity of a large chemical plant in the Urals where he, although still a young boy, eagerly observed the Soviet labor conditions. Gromovskiy describes the wave of terror that swept the Moscow Government house. His narrative culminates in the dramatic arrest of his father late in 1937. By the way, the author gives a detailed list of most of the high ranking Soviet officials executed during the purge.

Nevertheless, the 15 year old Anatole devotes himself entirely to the search of his father. His undefatigable inquiries about the place of the father's detention remaining revealing, he decides to provide his own voluntary arrest by the K.G.B. in order to achieve his ends through that internal channel.

The scene where young Gromovskiy is pacing along the Red Square to deliver himself into the hands of a K.G.B. agent is of a dramaticism unrivaled in that kind of literature. A similar tension fills the subsequent description of the author's plight in the cells of the K.G.B. prison where he is kept in effect on the charge of espionage and preparation of terrorist onslaughts. Just 6 months later he is released, but offered the job of a "secret collaborator" of the K.G.B.--K.G.B.D. (Central Department of State Security) that he dares not refuse.

He now is bound to investigate into the "spliffs" of 350 young men and girls, the sons and daughters of families of the people like himself. He teaches him how to provoke

these youngsters

these youngsters and make them utter unconsidered words such as to permit the construction of "cases" which may involve for the victims hard labour or death. Granovsky remembers the feelings of despair that assailed him during his work and assures proudly that he managed to preserve every single one of his potential victims.

Being moreover a pupil of the Moscow anti-aircraft training school where he later acted as a teacher, subsequently appointed Head of the Staff of the Moscow N.K.V.D. - anti aircraft section, Granovsky eye-witnesses the Moscow episode late in the year 1941 and vividly describes it in his memoirs.

His training time in the special N.K.V.D. school for secret police agents (September 1942-May 1943) provides the reader with invaluable knowledge about the methods of investigation and provocation used by the secret police and unveils to his eyes the whole organization of the N.K.V.D. network.

During the following period up to the Spring 1945, Granovsky, assigned to the Ministry of Security of the Soviet Union (M.O.B.), performs a series of very characteristic operations and is dealing among other tasks with the French air squad "Normandie" supposed to contain some "American spies".

But the most interesting part of Granovsky's memoirs as regards their informative value pertains to his war-time activity outside the boundaries of the Soviet Union namely in Czechoslovakia.

This activity covers the period March 1945-March 1946. It was the time when the Red Army Entering Berlin and the "Satellites" was hailed as a liberator throughout the West Slavonic countries.

The second stage brought the "penetration" of these territories by the organs of the N.K.V.D.

Here for the first time an authoritative source discloses the connection between the Czech partisans in the war and the secret police quarters of Kiev, who parachuted agents on Czechoslovak territory in the rear of the German army. He possesses an account on the sweeping strategic move ordered personally by Stalin to secure Prague's occupation by the Reds before the arrival of the American Army. He learns moreover impressive details on the regular man hunt unleashed by the N.K.V.D. staff in Berlin to recruit German scientists for bomb manufacturing in Russia from the very first days of the occupation. Further the author provides fresh news on the M.O.B.-N.K.V.D. activities around the American Embassy in Moscow, the embassies of other countries

Potsdam as well as within the ranks of the Patton army in Bavaria. The author is in a position to supply such knowledge for he acts now under direct control of the Minister of State Security of the Ukraine and mixes with the best informed people of this service.

Granovsky's first mission abroad is to Lemberg (Lvov) in Galicia where he arrives on the heels of the Red Army. He visualizes a country still in the grip of the Polish insurgents but on the way to annexation by Soviet-Russia through the means of a general "purge" enacted by the agents of the M.K.V.D. The author unfolds the techniques which marks these bloody and ruinous proceedings. He further enters Carpatho-Russia which though still a part of Czechoslovakia is subject to similar operations applying to the pre-annexation program. Hence he is ordered to Berlin on a special mission to the M.K.V.D. headquarters of Seif at the time the real master of Eastern Germany. Granovsky reaches the German capital on May 1st 1945, when the Red army is marching into her burning ruins. During his one month stay in the city he visits the Hitler bastion ~~surrounding with wounded German officers, the freshly abandoned Reich Chancellery and describes the effects of the Russian occupation in this initial period.~~

Granovsky's M.K.V.D. career culminates and ends in Czechoslovakia. In this country he witnesses the retransformation of Czech partisans into regular Soviet spies, the arrival of fresh loads of M.K.V.D. men so as to cover the entire land occupied by the Red Army with a dense network of Russian agents. The informants of Granovsky's headquarters in Prague, the Russians as well as the Czechs, are entrusted with "penetration" tactics and have the major task to identify sympathizers with the Western Powers. They not always work smoothly with the Czech counter-intelligence under the Communist Minister Kopeck since Moscow claims thorough supervision of the Czechoslovak government itself.

Granovsky's mission was not supposed to terminate in Czechoslovakia. The Ukrainian Security Minister who directs him has selected his subordinate for a secret investigation task in the U.S. Supplied with a Czech national passport at the outcome of a regular naturalization procedure, accompanied by his adjunct named [redacted] who is married to a daughter of the late novelist Andreiev, Granovsky, pretending to flee Communist rule in Czechoslovakia would attempt to find abode at the Polisty Foundation near New York where [redacted]

b6  
b7c



were working. In the view of the U.K.B. services the spot mentioned above should provide the right ground for observation. But the plan failed to concretize. For the wish to escape from Soviet life was steadily maturing in Granovsky's spirit. His headquarters thronged with reports attesting a rapid deterioration of popular feeling with regard to Soviet Russia. The ecstatic enthusiasm of the first liberation days was turning to blunt hatred as a consequence of the "penetration" practiced by the N.K.V.D. The rapacious cynicism that guided the action of the Soviet agents filled Granovsky with disgust. Distrustful rivalry kept spreading between the Czech and the Soviet secret police. Moreover Granovsky's devoted agent Count Collaredo-Mannsfeld - a member of a once wealthy family belonging to the Austrian aristocracy - was being hunted down by the Czech secret service for his refusal to turn over his estates benevolently to the Czech government.

All Granovsky's desperate attempts to obtain Moscow's direct intervention in favour of the Count failed to produce their effect. Finally the N.K.V.D. ordered Collaredo-Mannsfeld to be poisoned he no longer being considered an asset by the Soviet counter-espionage.

Granovsky's first attempt to flee by joining the French Foreign Legion proved at the time a failure. So then when he was summoned back to Kiev in Spring 1946 to get relieved from his present duties - apparently for too human a conduct in the Collaredo-Mannsfeld affair - Granovsky demanded right down his demobilization in order to be incorporated with the crew of a merchant ship with the purpose to acquire a better knowledge of foreign countries during the cruise.

His demand having been granted Granovsky fled in Sweden under the circumstances described in his biography (September 1946).

Granovsky's story offers first hand information on the military and political events in the last months of the East-European campaign and the first year of Soviet Russia's "penetration" in a satellite country. They were to a large extent the result of an overall offensive launched by the Soviet N.K.V.D. whose organization, planning and acting with all its diabolical effects are revealed for the first time in an exhaustive manner. The author succeeds undoubtedly in rendering the poisoned atmosphere of the N.K.V.D.

"Milieu",

William . . . produces convincing types of these species of men who have out of their lives a monstrous career edified on the blood and the tears of countless victims.

But above all the memoirs are a fascinating record of his own human tragedy. They sound true to the least detail - and truth is the best means to persuade.

.....



DECLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
ON 02-22-2008

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil  
May 29, 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL - AIR POUCH~~

Director, FBI

Re: ANATOLY MIKHAILOVICH GRANOVSKY, wa.  
ESPIONAGE - R

Dear Sir:

Re Rio letter March 8, 1950 advising of efforts of this office to obtain a copy of the GRANOVSKY monograph from the Brazilian Ministry of the Navy.

It is advised that on May 16, 1950, SA [redacted] and the writer were invited to the offices of the Minister of the Navy by [redacted] of the Brazilian Secret Service, [redacted], and, upon our arrival there, [redacted], requested SA [redacted] to carry with him to the United States the original of the GRANOVSKY monograph, as prepared by [redacted] of the naval secret service, and his assistant, [redacted], in conjunction with GRANOVSKY.

[redacted] explained that there had been some delay in obtaining the approval of the Minister of the Navy for [redacted] recommendation that the document be forwarded to the Bureau through the Office of the Legal Attaché for its appraisal and comments as to the "degree of authenticity and accuracy of the material appearing therein." He stated that the matter had been discussed by the Minister with Brazilian President EURICO GASPAR DUTRA, who had given his approval to the recommendation that it be submitted to the Bureau for appraisal; accordingly, the document, which includes approximately 150 pages of typewritten and illustrated material, is being forwarded to the Bureau under separate cover for its perusal and for photographing or photostating, if this is deemed worthwhile.

As a gesture of cooperation with the Brazilian naval authorities, it is requested that a translation summary be prepared, if this is considered necessary for an accurate review and appraisal of the document, and that any information which

COPIES AND SPECIMENS RETAINED IN LAB.  
FOR LAB. ACTION AND REPORT.

T-8138 uel

RECEIVED 6/5/50

EX-68

RECORDED - 116

100-356092-22

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

the Bureau can furnish Brazilian naval authorities in this connection be forwarded to this office as expeditiously as possible for transmittal to them.

[redacted] and [redacted] indicated that the Brazilian Government plans to utilize the monograph for educational and possibly propaganda purposes in the event it is determined that the data recorded therein is accurate.

It is requested that the Bureau also furnish this office with two copies of any summary or translations prepared of the document, and return the original to this office.

Very truly yours,

[redacted]

LA

b6  
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 02-22-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324/UC/BAW/STP/bls  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)  
02-22-2033

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUMMARY-TRANSLATION FROM PORTUGUESE

"INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE USSR"

1949

1 - NECESSARY EXPLANATION

The note by [redacted], and [redacted] of the Brazilian Navy states that this report was prepared from a statement supplied by a former Captain of the Russian HOB, ANATOLI NIKOLAILOVICH GRABOVSKY, who is presently in Brazil.

b6  
b7C

In addition to noting that changes may have occurred in the organization of the Soviet intelligence service during the three years since GRABOVSKY left the USSR, the aforesaid lieutenant refers to the language difficulty, in securing statements from GRABOVSKY who speaks a mixture of English, and Russian.

2 - REMARKS ON THE NARRATOR

The monograph states that the narrator was born on January 25, 1922 in the city of Tchernigov, in the Ukraine. His father was NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH GRABOVSKY, a member of the Russian Communist Party from 1915 on, and who occupied many prominent positions, and received numerous Soviet honors until his liquidation subsequent to November 6, 1937.

Following the liquidation of his father, ANATOLI GRABOVSKY was imprisoned for six months in the Central Prison of the USSR. Later, however, he received special training, and took part in various intelligence operations, sabotage missions, etc., in the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. He also acted as a crew member on a merchant marine vessel. He received two Soviet decorations for his services while a member of the C.P. of the USSR from 1941 until his flight in 1946.

The monograph states that GRABOVSKY fled from Stockholm, Sweden, on September 24, of 1946, as he had completely lost confidence in the free future of his country under the leadership of STALIN. He is declared to have rendered voluntary service to the counterintelligence, political, and military intelligence of Sweden, of Denmark, of England [redacted]

b1

(C)

RECEIVED-TRANSLATED BY

July 24, 1950

das [redacted]

b6  
b7C

100-356092-22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C)

b1

GRANOVSKY has been in Brazil since April, 1948, through special permission from the Minister of Justice, and continues his friendly relations with the United States, and Swedish Embassies.

### 3 - GRAPHIC EXPLANATION OF RUSSIAN WORDS

This section consists of a note on the problem of transliteration in connection with the rendering of Russian terms in Portuguese. Reference is also made to the matter of semantics, one example being the Russian word "oblast," which is translated as "municipality" (region) although Brazilian administrative organization may not be the same as the Russian system of organization.

### 4 - GEOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL SUMMARY

This section states that the population of the USSR is 193,000,000 inhabitants. The other data is of a geographic nature, and not pertinent to this intelligence summary.

### 5 - ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL STRUCTURE

According to this monograph the USSR consists of 16 Federated Republics.

They are as follows:

1. RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federative Soviet Republic.
2. USSR - Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.
3. BSSR - Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.
4. Uz. SSR - Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.
5. KSSR - Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.
6. GSSR - Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.
7. Az. SSR - Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.
8. LSSR - Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.
9. MSSR - Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.
10. Lat. SSR - Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.
11. Kir. SSR - Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic.
12. TSSR - Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.
13. Ar. SSR - Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.
14. Tur. SSR - Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15. ESSR - Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic.
16. K-F SSR - Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic.

The following chronological synthesis of the formation of the USSR is presented in the monograph: Organized in 1922, the USSR was composed of the following Republics: RSFSR, USSR, BSSR, and ZSPSR. In 1925, the Uz. SSR, and the Tur. SSR were joined to it. In 1930, the TSSR was united to the Soviet Union. In 1936, the Kir.SSR, and the KSSR joined the Soviet Union, and in that same year the ZSPSR was divided into three other Republics: GSSR, Az.SSR, and Ar.SSR. In 1940, the last five Republics were united with the USSR: E-F.SSR, LSSR, Lat.SSR, LSSR, and the ESSR.

The monograph presents details on the aforesaid Soviet Republics which comprise the Soviet Union.

#### 6 - SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The monograph states that formally, and constitutionally the entire force of the government of the USSR resides in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, elected by the members of the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet is composed of two "Soviets": the Soviet of the Union, and the Soviet of Nationalities. A detailed presentation follows of the governmental system of the Soviet Union.

#### 7 - COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIST) OF THE USSR (VKP-B)

The Communist Party of the USSR has a total of a round six million members; in addition to the members of the VLKSM (Federated Union of Communist-Leninist Youth), which has a somewhat smaller total membership than the above organization.

Young men, and women over 16 years of age are admitted into the ranks of the VLKSM, and remain in it until they are 25 years of age. During this period, the majority, in order to guarantee their future career, take steps for their admission into the ranks of the C. P. of the USSR. In practice this takes place as follows: each member of the Communist Youth who demonstrates good will toward the work, and has made no criticism of life in Russia, receives, after 2, or 3 years of membership, a proposal, by virtue of his faithful service, to enter the ranks of the C.P. of the USSR.

#### Organization of the C.P.(B) of the USSR

Each local group with up to 50 members of the Party has its

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cell, elected by them. Each cell is formed by one secretary, and 3, or 5 members. Thus, in the hands of this group of a half dozen is the destiny of the 50 members of the party. An individual who was a mere Communist of the 50 in question, once he has been elected a member of the cell; for example, one who had been employed as a worker in a shop, on this same occasion becomes as competent to give orders as the manager of the enterprise.

In places where there are more than 50 party members, up to 500, they elect a "PARTKOM," that is, a (party) committee, with one secretary, and around 30 members. While all the components of a cell work both for the party, as well as at their regular occupations, without the receipt of any compensation, in the "PARTKOM", the secretary leaves the position, or occupation which he exercised prior to his election in order to work exclusively in the interest of the party, and for this reason he has at his disposal an office, and receives a salary for his work.

In important plants where there are over 500 members of the party, there is not only a "Partkom," but also a Party Organizer, who is the direct representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik). Details are given in the monograph about how the Party Organizer operates in the various Republics of the USSR.

The monograph declares that where there is a "Partkom" a cell does not exist.

This part of the monograph concludes with a discussion of how the C.P. of the USSR is organized, on a district, and regional level.

### 8 - ELECTION SYSTEM

This section of the monograph, as indicated by its title, deals with the method of election of Communist Party positions in the USSR, from the district units up to the Central Committee of the C.P.(B) of the USSR. Reference is also made to the election of members to the Politburo of the USSR. Although of general interest, this material is not of security interest.

### 9 - MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

The following are listed by the monograph as being the present members of the Politburo:

JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN  
VIATCHESLAV MIHAILOVICH KOLOTOV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GEORGI MIHAILOVICH MALENKOV

NIKITA SERGEEVICH KHRUSHCHEV

ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO:

NIKOLAI ALEXANDROVICH BULGANIN

10 - COMMUNIST YOUTH (VLESN - Federated Union of  
Communist-Leninist Youth)

This is the principal reserve upon which the C.P. of the USSR relies for its future cadres. 99% of the members of the C.P. are from followers who formerly were in the ranks of the VLESN.

Structure of the Organization, and Election System  
of the VLESN:

b6  
b7c

- VLESN Cell
- " Committee
- " Komsorg (Komsomol Organizer)
- " District
- " City
- " Region
- " Territory

There is also an organization of the VLESN for each Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR.

The VLESN also has its own reserves, which are the Pioneers, which include children up to 16 years of age.

The children from 7 to 10 years of age are enrolled in the "Octobrist" organization.

Reference is made to the Pioneer unit named "ARTEK," in Crimea, which is declared to be the largest in the USSR, it was in this "ARTEK" unit that there were lodged, during the time of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Spanish Civil War, thousands of young Spanish Communist orphans, who today, having grown up, and having been educated, are recruited in the cadres of Soviet espionage in countries speaking Romance languages, especially those which speak Spanish, and Portuguese.

#### 11- KOMINTERN

The Komintern, or Communist International was organized after the Russian revolution of the proletariat, and was constituted by the representatives of the Communist Parties of the other countries. Its headquarters were located on Vozdvizhenka Street (after 1935 the street took the name of "Komintern"); where it functioned until the year 1943 (5/22/43). The idea of the establishment of the III International was discussed for the first time in Switzerland in 1915-1916. It was actually organized in Russia in 1919. The First Congress of the III International was held in March of 1919, with representatives from the majority of the leaders of the Communist Parties of the entire world. In this Congress the Statute for the III International was prepared, the members of the Executive Presidium of the Komintern were elected, who, in turn, in a meeting, elected the members who were to constitute the Secretariat. The members of the Secretariat elected the component members of the Komintern Politburo. The Secretariat also elected the GENERAL SECRETARIES, who are automatically the leaders in the Executive Presidium, the Secretariat, and in the Politburo.

Structure and Organization of the Komintern: It is little different from the structure of the C.P.(S), of the USSR. The structure of the C.P. of each country, is no different in the lower part; the difference only appears in the higher parts. Normally, in all the Communist Parties of the various countries, their superior positions are constituted by two, or three secretaries, one of them being the Secretary General. All the secretaries are automatically considered members of the Komintern. Thus the Secretary General is termed: SECRETARY GENERAL of the Central Committee of the C.P. (and afterwards the name of each country). In the PLENUM of the Central Committee of the C.P. in a given country, the various leaders, or other officers of the party elect one, or two members from this Central Committee in order to represent it in the Komintern in Moscow. All the representatives from all the Communist Parties, from all countries, meeting in the "Komintern Plenum" (about 500 representatives) elect the KOMINTERN POLITBURO (about 50 representatives). In these, the members are the Secretaries General from the Central Committee of the C.P. of each country, and in addition, important elements of the Party, who merit the confidence of the Komintern. The members of the Komintern Politburo elect the Komintern Secretary General. The last Secretary General of the Komintern was GEORGE DIMITROV, former prime

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

minister of Bulgaria, and also, former leader of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, who died sometime ago. Immediately afterwards, the members of the Komintern Politburo elect the ORGBUREAU OF THE KOMINTERN. The Politburo appoints: The Chiefs of Sections, and approves the designation of the personnel of the sections: AGITPROP (Agitation and Propaganda); SPETZOTDEL (Special Section); O.P.P.K. (Otdel Podgotovki Partnir Kadrov) - Section for Training of Party Personnel (for the Party Cadres); O.K. (Otdel Kadrov) - Section on Party Personnel.

[redacted] was one of the members of the Komintern Politburo elected to "chair" No. 35. The members of the Komintern Politburo in practice appoint the PREZIDENT M.O.P.R. (President of the Organization for Aid to the Workers. Theoretically the M.O.P.R. is separate from the Komintern, but in practice follows its instructions; its headquarters are located in a building on Ogariova Street, in the center of Moscow. Like the Komintern, it was formally dissolved after 1943. In the same building, from 1943 to the present time, there came to function the U.N.V.D., (Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) which serves only for the City of Moscow, and for the Moscow Region. All the members or affiliates of the C.P. are obliged to contribute a part of their salary monthly, but this contribution is insufficient for the maintenance of the huge propaganda, and other expenses which the party supports; therefore, the M.O.P.R. was created which receives the money of the workers whether they are C.P. elements or not, the majority of them being members of the WHITE M.O.P.R., having a special card as an international member. Each worker who is a contributor to the M.O.P.R. receives a special stamp on his card. The greater part of the money received by the M.O.P.R. is sent to Moscow, through the means of an un-official channel, not even a formal channel, and destined to the Komintern. In the event of strikes in the various countries, the support for the workers on strike is paid for by the M.O.P.R., with the aim that the strike movement shall be as extended as possible. The M.O.P.R. takes advantage of the situation of the unemployed in the various countries, and when they are in a precarious situation, assists them, if they promise to join the C.P.

b6  
b7c

O.P.P.K. Section for the Training of Party Personnel - Each Section has a representative in each country. The representative of the O.P.P.K. receives Communist literature for study, and prepares instruction lessons on the doctrine for each country. Parallel to this a selection is made among the members of the C.P. with the greatest possibilities, and of greatest trust, and when possible, these individuals are sent for a more profound study in Moscow. As soon as they are in Moscow, under the protection of the Komintern (lodging, money, etc.) the most intelligent, and talented are sent to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the LENIN-HUGO-BERNE-LININ-STALIN INSTITUTE of Communist Education, located on the corner of Gogol Boulevard, and Kropotkin Square; the others who were not selected for this Institute, remain in Moscow, in order that, under the leadership of the Komintern, they shall complete their theoretical, and practical studies in other places. In this Institute they learn the Lenin-Hugo-Berne-Linin-Stalin theory in order to construct the world Communist State, and, at the same time, they make a study of practical matters, such as, Communist propaganda, how to prepare revolutions by the proletariat in other countries, how to take over the power, etc.

SPOTSTORM - Special Section - This is the most important organization of the Komintern, more important than all the others combined. Its attributions are: Counterintelligence, Intelligence, Court action, and that of Execution.

Members of the Spotstorm in all countries must guard against the infiltration of traitors in the ranks of the C. P., must guard against the treason by members of the C.P. itself (and, in this event, liquidate the traitor), it must receive secret, and non-secret information of interest for the C.P. of the country in question, and this will include information from the Komintern, and information to be transmitted to the Komintern, it must guard against the disclosure of all the subversive preparations of the party, it must direct the preparation, and carrying out of acts of sabotage.

b6  
b7C

### 13 - KOMINFORM (Communist Information Bureau)

The Kominform in practice does not exist as an organization in the world, it is a word which was born in the languages of the democratic countries under the initiative of incompetent persons, because the Komintern was formally dissolved, but the relations between the C.P. of the USSR, and the other Communist Parties of other countries continue. In reality, today, cadres from personnel of the former Komintern work in two systems of tasks; in the countries occupied by the Red Army after the last war, ex-members of the Komintern Politburo, such as [redacted]

[redacted] and others have assumed the power in their countries, and work legally, conducting open conferences with the leaders of the Russian C. P.; for example: some time ago all of them received open instructions from the late member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the C.P. of the [redacted] was succeeded in this position by [redacted], also a member of the Politburo. This same situation exists in the Orient (China). In the other countries, in which the C.P. up to the present has not attained actual, legal, and official power, the relations between these Communist Parties, and the Russian

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C.P. continue under various legal, and illegal channels and, by the means of experienced members of the SPETZOTDEL of the former Komintern, which continues today under the highest, and complete protection which is received from the SPETZOTDEL of the Central Committee of the C.P. of the USSR.

From 1917 to 1943 the Komintern, and the Central Committee of the C.P. of the USSR existed legally, there being such relations between the two that all the orders which appeared issued by the Komintern were really from the Central Committee. Thus it was that upon the dissolution of the Komintern in 1943 all the Communist Parties of all countries came to receive their instructions directly from the Central Committee of the C.P. of the USSR.

All that was said above about the Kominform comes from the practical knowledge of the present system of subordination of all of the foreign Communist Parties to the Central Committee of the C.P. of the USSR, and also from the systematic study of reports which appear in the world press.

Furthermore, according to what was written in the "World Almanac for 1949," the KOMINFORM was organized as the Fourth International, and is it called "INFORMATION BUREAU" of the Communist Party. It was organized at a secret meeting between the representatives of the Communist Parties of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, France, and Italy, in the period from September 21 to 28, of 1947, in Poland.

Moscow officially proclaimed the organization of the Kominform on October 5, of 1947, and established as its headquarters the capital of Yugoslavia, Belgrade.

In the event that this may have been true, the headquarters has now probably been moved, since, in the summer of 1948, TITO, the leader of the Yugoslavian C.P. was publicly expelled from the ranks of the Kominform, and, had his relations with the C.P. of the USSR, and with that of the other countries severed.

This is the reason we cannot guarantee anything positive regarding the Kominform.

### 13 - INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXISTING IN THE SOVIET UNION

U.S.S.R. - MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY - This Ministry conducts intelligence, and counterintelligence in general, and especially

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

political intelligence. The present M.O.B., was created (in December of 1917), after the revolution of October, 1917, and at that time it took the name of Extraordinary Commission, which at that time exercised the function of liquidation of all the counter-revolutionary elements at the time of the revolution. A short time later, in 1918, its name was changed, when LENIN moved the capital of Russia from Petrograd to Moscow, and when the RSFSR was organized, the name became Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission. The first Chief of the Extraordinary Commission, which later became the Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission was FELIX DZERZHINSKI, of Polish nationality, one of the five ranking organizers of the proletarian revolution in Russia, along with LENIN. DZERZHINSKI directed the organization until 1926 (Extraordinary Commission, Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, and O.G.P.U.). In 1922 the name of the Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission was changed to O.G.P.U., Special Political Department of the State. The successor to DZERZHINSKI in the O.G.P.U., from 1926 to 1934 was VIATCHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH KIDINSKI, a Jew. After KIDINSKI the direction of the M.K.V.D. was taken over by GHEORGIY GRIGORIEVICH YAGODA; in 1936, YAGODA was arrested as an "enemy of the people," and in 1937, was liquidated as a result of the famous Moscow trials. The successor to YAGODA was NIKOLAI IVANOVICH EKLOV. Again in 1934 the O.G.P.U. had its name changed to that of M.K.V.D. - Commissariat of the People for Internal Affairs. In 1938 EKLOV left the M.K.V.D., and he was correctly liquidated; his successor was LAVRENTI PAVLOVICH BERIA. From 1936 to 1940 the NKVD had two important sections: O.U.G.B. - Central Department of Security of the State, which, during this period from 1936 to 1940 had as its function the same which was previously exercised by the Extraordinary Commission, the Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, and the O.G.P.U., and another part constituted by various departments of frontier troops, interior, concentration camps, regular militia, and others.

In 1940 the M.K.V.D. was divided into two commissariats: the M.K.V.D., and the M.K.O.B. (Commissariat of the People for the Security of the State). The M.K.V.D. continued under the direction of BERIA as the Commissar of the People, and had subordinated to it many frontier troops, internal troops, concentration camps, militia (regular police) etc. With regard to the M.K.O.B., it remained under the direction of Commissar of the People, VOLEVOLOD NIKOLAEVICH KIDINSKI, who until 1940 had worked as the first assistant to BERIA in the M.K.V.D. (prior to the division). Immediately after the beginning of the war between the USSR, and Germany, in 1941, the M.K.O.B. again became an integral part of the M.K.V.D., as it was from 1936 to 1940, under the name of O.U.G.B. In the spring of 1943, the M.K.V.D., for the second time, was divided into the M.K.V.D., and the M.K.O.B., and their Commissars of the People were the same individuals, BERIA, and KIDINSKI. In the session of the Supreme

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Soviet of March of 1946, there was revised the decree which created the Commissariats of the People,\* and their directors "The Commissars of the People," such titles having been changed to "Ministries," and their directors being called "Ministers." As a result of this change the N.K.G.B. changed its title to N.G.B., Ministry of State Security, and the N.K.V.D. to M.V.D. to Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the same session of the Supreme Soviet, LAVENTI P. BERIA was removed from the position of Commissar of the People for the N.K.V.D., and remained as assistant to the First Minister, STALIN, in the Council of Ministers (Deputy Minister). Also in this same session, the Supreme Soviet indicated as the Minister of the N.G.B., V. N. MERKULOV (the head of the N.K.G.B.), and named for the Minister of the M.V.D., GURGEN KHRUSHOV, former first assistant to BERIA in the NKVD. In practice both of the ministries, NGB, and MVD, along with their ministers, MERKULOV, and KHRUSHOV, are subordinated not officially, but practically, to BERIA, who, in turn, exercises the function of liaison between STALIN, and these two ministers. It is necessary not to confuse the NGB with MVD, since abroad Russia always created a great deal of confusion between NGB, and MVD, since the majority of the organizations of foreign enterprises always consider the MVD as the organization of the Russian secret police for espionage, and counterespionage. In reality, since the latest division, in the spring of 1943, when the NKVD was divided into NKGB, and MVD, up to the present, the MVD has nothing to do with the services of espionage, and counterespionage, all of its personnel being concerned with the functions of frontier guards, prisoners in the concentration camps, guarding criminals, the construction of important strategic objectives: roads, highways, fortifications along the frontiers, guarding the State archives, etc. The only relation existing between the MVD and "espionage, and counter-espionage" is that which is conducted by the intermediary of one of the two departments of the MVD, the GUPV, Central Department of Frontier Troops, which concerns the permission given to the Soviet spies to cross the frontiers of the USSR, to enter, and depart; such permission is carried out upon a basis of instructions received directly from the NGB, by means of the Minister of the MVD, KHRUSHOV. In 99% of these cases, the officials of the frontier troops of the MVD do not know the identity, and the mission of the spies; they merely know the password which they must state.

On the other hand, the NGB is really the heart, or the strongest organization of the espionage, and counterespionage services in the USSR, and outside of Russia, working on behalf of the Politburo. The

The personnel of the NGB is constituted by about 300,000 to 400,000 officers; there are no soldiers, or non-commissioned officers, and no more than one-half of one per cent of civilians. The officers

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

have their rank in their positions in the same manner as the Red Army. Thus, from bottom to the top: lieutenant Jr. grade, lieutenant, lieutenant Sr. grade; captain; major; lieutenant colonel; colonel; major-general; lieutenant-general; colonel-general; general of the army (one only, who is the Minister of the DSB, V.I. LENINSHOV). All of these officers receive a special education, and have at their disposition and under their orders from five and a half to six million collaborators, and secret informants. The total, thus, of the personnel, including officers, collaborators, and secret informants is about 7 million, greater, therefore, than the members of the Russian C.P. Among the collaborators, and secret informants there are representatives of all the classes, professions, and nationalities of the USSR, from criminals to the ministers. In this manner, the DSB has been the only basis to guarantee the dictatorship of STALIN to remain in power.

#### 14 - SYSTEM OF RECRUITMENT FOR MILITARY SERVICE IN THE USSR IN GENERAL

The monograph states that military service, according to the Constitution, is obligatory for all the men of the USSR. Military service in the USSR, however, does not mean only service in the Red Army, as there are three ministries which may receive the youths who are at the age to render military service: MVD, LVO, and MGB. The recruit may enlist in any one of these three ministries.

The Military School of Sverdlov exists for the training of officers of the MVD and the LVO.

The other data presented in this section presents details concerning the administration of the military recruitment system in the USSR.

#### 15 - RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS IN THE MGB

Differing from the process of recruitment for the ranks of the MVD, and LVO, the recruitment for the personnel which must constitute the future officers of the MGB is done in the following manner:

- a) Annually, the U.S.S.R.-Department of Personnel of the MGB of the USSR (which at the same time exercises the functions of the MGB of the USSR), let us remember that the MGB is a Ministry of type "a", that is, it is a Ministry for the Union, and for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

each one of the Soviet Republics, or that is, those which exist both in the USSR, as well as in each one of the Republics, ~~SOIUSIZO~~ ~~MINISTEROV~~ ~~MINISTEROV~~, and, in the case of the MVD, the MVD of the USSR is the one which exercises the functions for the USSR, and the U.K. of each one of the fifteen republics, by the means of its section of the OPI-Section on Training of Personnel, sends an official letter to the MVS, with a copy for the Spetsotdel, Central Committee of the C.P. of the USSR, and for the Voeni Otdel, Central Committee of the VRSK, and this document indicates how many recruits are necessary for the filling of the cadres of the MVD. The MVS, the Spetsotdel, Central Committee of the C.P. of the USSR, and the Voeni Otdel, Central Committee of the VRSK, after the receipt of this data, transmits the necessary orders for this campaign of recruitment in the ranks of the MVD, in accordance with the closest cooperation with the R.O. (district section, ward, of the MVD) which, in turn, also receives orders in this regard, directly from the MVD of the USSR, or from the MVD of the Republic in question.

- b) In each one of the districts subordinate to the jurisdiction of the R.O. of the MVD, all the collaborators, and secret informants who exercise their functions in the factories, offices, collective farms, theaters, apartment houses, family houses, etc., furnish to the R.O. of the MVD all information about each one of the individuals in this district, or ward.
- c) In each one of the places of greater importance, such as institutes, factories, offices, and shops, etc., there are the Special Representatives, Special Sectors, or Special Sections (for a better understanding of these sections, see subsequently the part in which the 2nd Department of the MVD is explained). All of these sections are directly subordinate to each one of the ~~SPETSOTDEL~~ of the Ministries to which they belong, such as factories, institutes, etc., but their collaboration is closer with the R.O. of the MVD. The directing members of these sections are the demobilized officers of the Extraordinary Commission, the Extraordinary Pen-Russian

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Commission, the OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, and MGB, who continue as experienced, and trusted members within the ranks of the Communist Party.

- d) Of all those who present themselves to the OGPU, NKVD, or to the MO of the MGB, as volunteers for the MGB Service, usually only 1% are accepted for this Service.
- e) In the course of the selection of the individuals who are to constitute the recruits of the MGB, the MO of the MGB, in the closest cooperation with the Military Section of the District, of the District VLSM, and of the directors of the local Special Section, Special Representative, and Special Sector, shall proceed in the following manner: In an unofficial session, the aggregate of all these members, in accordance with the information which they possess individually, shall prepare a list of the individuals who may be accepted as recruits; as a rule, only a maximum of 20% of the individuals indicated shall already be secret collaborators, or informants; they preferably will not choose as recruits the collaborators, and informants. After all of these members discuss each one of the candidates, from the list they have prepared, they shall begin the individual study of each one of these candidates. This individual study is made in the following manner: If it concerns a member of the VLSM, one of the secretaries of the District VLSM shall call, and initiate a personal discreet investigation. In this conversation, nothing will be stated about the MGB, and about his proposal as a recruit for the MGB. If the individual is a member of the Communist Party, the same thing is done regarding him by the chief of the military section of the Party, of the District, and so on. Parallel to this inquiry, the MO of the MGB, and the Special Section, Special Sector, and Special Representative shall make secret investigations by the means of their secret collaborators, and informants with regard to the individuals in question, with the aim of confirming that there are no unfavorable records against them, that they are true patriots, that they really like the regime, etc. If, after all of these investigations nothing was found against the individual, the chief of the military section of the District, of the C.P.(D), shall have this individual reply to an

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

official questionnaire, and answer the following questions:

BIOMETRIC DATA - FINGERPRINTS - SKIDAL PRINTS  
CUBES, etc.

These are the titles used on the various questionnaires

- 1) Complete name
- 2) Day, month, year, and place of birth
- 3) Nationality
- 4) Complete name of father, with age, and place of birth, class before the 1917 revolution, after the revolution of 1917; whether or not (the father) made war against the revolution, whether he was ever tried, imprisoned, under the Soviet regime, whether he is a member of the Communist Party (Bolshevik), if not is he a member of any other party, and what is he doing now at the time of this questionnaire, address, employment, and telephone number.
- 5) Complete name of mother, and all the questions which were already enumerated for the father.
- 6) Other relatives, both on his father's side, as well as his mother's side, uncles, cousins, etc. and regarding these relatives, the information will consist of addresses, employment, whether or not they are members of the Communist Party, etc.
- 7) With regard to the total number of relatives abroad, whether all of them have been given, with addresses, complete names, data about when they left the USSR, reason why they did so, what are his relations of friendship with them (letters, etc.).
- 8) Education; detailed data, with the names of the schools which he attended, etc.
- 9) Occupation
- 10) Particular studies which he has pursued, such as: music, languages, etc., in various schools, the names of the schools, and of the professors, etc.
- 11) What are the languages which you speak, what language do you know perfectly, knowing how to speak, write, read, and understand.
- 12) What did you do during the period of the revolution, of 1917 (for persons born before the revolution, since, sometimes there are admitted into the ranks of the USSR persons who were born before the revolution).
- 13) Whether you have traveled abroad or not; if you did travel, explain in detail whether it was done legally,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

or not, as a military man, or as a civilian, on a State, or private mission, in what countries you have been, with detailed addresses, who were the persons with whom you maintained contacts in these countries, etc.

- 14) Whether you have decorations from the Soviet Government, or the Czarist Government, or even, from a foreign government, why you received them, etc.
- 15) Whether you had military service, in what troop did you serve, how many years were you in this service, etc.
- 16) Whether you have had any punishment, or reprehension in the USSR, whether it be imprisonment, reprehension by the Party, whether in the offices, factories, etc., whether you ever took part in any scandal, etc.
- 17) Whether you have any intimate friends, or acquaintances in foreign countries, and what are your relations with them, their names, and addresses.
- 18) If you have any intimate friends in the USSR who have been reprimanded, and what are these reprimands, whether political, or criminal.
- 19) Whether or not you are married; in the affirmative case, complete data about the spouse, family, etc.
- 20) What was your previous employment.
- 21) How many brothers, and sisters do you have, and what is each one of them doing.
- 22) With whom are you living now.
- 23) Where do you work now, address, where do you reside, complete address, etc.
- 24) Condition of health, category in the military reserve.
- 25) Signature and date.

After the completion of the questionnaire, it shall be turned in, and along with it a typewritten, or handwritten autobiography, signed, and dated, with not less than three, front view, and profile photographs, without a hat.

The questionnaire in question is completed in three copies, on all of which the declarant shall place his signature. The preparation of the questionnaire is done in the building, where the individual was called to make a statement, and he is not given permission to take it home with him, in order to consult with him about how he shall fill it in.

- f) The questionnaire shall be promptly (transmitted) to the Chief of the Military Section of the District C.P.(D), or, one of the two secretaries of the District

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VLESM, who shall receive and maintain one copy; another copy shall be sent to the chief of the R.O. of the LEB, who, upon receiving it, shall study all the replies in detail, with the aim of verifying it in all of the smallest details in comparison with the information received about the same individual from the collaborators, or secret informants, during the time he was under surveillance, and with the aim of certifying that nothing exists contradictory to it. In the event that nothing of a contradictory nature is confirmed, the Chief of the R.O. of the LEB shall send the copy of the questionnaire received to the (U.K.) Personnel Department of the LEB of the respective Republic (or, in the event that the district is in the territory of the RSFSR, for the Personnel Department, LEB, of the USSR). The Personnel Department, receiving all the questionnaires, shall make a detailed investigation, and a selection, giving attention to some, and dispensing with others, which shall be returned to the Chief of the R.O. of the LEB due to not being satisfactory. When the Personnel Department of the LEB succeeds in finding individuals who may be utilized, it sends the respective questionnaires to the 2nd Department of the LEB (See further on the explanation about this Department), which will proceed to the final secret investigations regarding such individuals, utilizing the secret channels at its disposition, which are the strongest channels of this type existing throughout the USSR, and in all the republics, for investigation about each one of the individuals who live in the territory of the USSR. Such measures may last up to three months; this period having ended, and nothing having been found against the individual in question, the 2nd Department of the LEB shall give the reply to the Personnel Department of the LEB, explaining that it hasn't found anything suspicious, and returning to the same Personnel Department the corresponding questionnaire. The Personnel Department in turn, shall reply to the R.O. of the LEB, specifying that such individual qualifies for the service. In this case, the chief of the R.O. of the LEB, upon receiving such an official letter, shall communicate with one of the two secretaries of the VLESM, and with the chief of the military section of the district of the party, transmitting to him the result which it has secured. The chief of the military section of the district shall verify whether the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

individual belongs to the C.P.(B) or to the VLKSM; in the first case, he will already have the questionnaires; in the second case he will receive from one of the secretaries of the VLKSM the questionnaires which are in his possession. Upon securing the questionnaires completed by the individual, the chief of the military section of the district shall summon the individual, and talk with him in an official and even in a theatrical manner; he shall relate to the individual a resume of his life, and his work, as well as his situation in the party, or in the Communist Youth, adding immediately afterwards that the party desires that he shall be mobilized in a very important service for the State, since the district of the C.P.(B) has designated him to be placed at the disposition of the Central Committee of the C.P.(B), Military Section (or, Central Committee C.P.) of one of the 15 republics; moreover, that the District C.P. has already given the necessary instructions to the manager of the place where he works in order that he shall be freed from this service, and so that he may be entered on the Special Register. He continues by stating that now the District of the C.P. gives him one day, or, at a maximum, one week of preparation for the trip (the travel expenses, etc., which will be paid by the district). His final recommendations are that he shall not tell anybody about this appointment; he may only state that he will travel with the aim of carrying out a mission for the party. On the day of his departure he will return to the military section in order to receive his travel tickets, secret official letter, and a certificate declaring that he is going on an official mission to such an address, food coupons (when there was rationing) and money. The destination is always one of the capitals of one of the fifteen republics, or Moscow, capital of the USSR (in case the district is in the territory of the RSFSR). Arriving in the capital he presents himself to the military section of the Central Committee of the party of the republic in question. The Military Section of the Central Committee of the party of this republic, in cooperation with the Spetsotdel (Special Section), and, after one or two days of discussion with the individual, shall place him at the disposition of the Special Section. This Section in turn, if it is not antipathic to the individual, issues to him an official letter addressed to the Personnel Department

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the MGB of the Republic. The individual then goes to the Personnel Department of the MGB of the Republic, and remains at the disposition of the OPR, Section for Training of Personnel, and this Section begins to interview the individual for about a month, and after which he goes to the school which the MGB decides he shall attend. During this period, all the individuals who remain at the disposition of the OPR are interviewed by various experienced officers of the intelligence, and counterintelligence services of the MGB, who maintain conversations of an individual nature with them, at the same time that they are submitting them to various tests. Immediately afterwards, each one of these officers gives his opinion to the chief of the OPR about each one of the individuals with whom he has talked. During this entire period the MGB provides for each one of these individuals good material living conditions in order to earn a living in the capital, at which time the strongest channels of the counterintelligence of the MGB (2nd Department, by the intermediary of collaborators, and secret informants) exercise a complete surveillance over this individual, day and night. If, after all of these tests, the individual is in proper condition to be utilized, in the opinion of the OPR, he is sent to one of the MGB schools. All of this process for the completion of the recruitment lasts from 6 months to a year (letter "e" and "f"). All of these processes in Russia are given the name of **SPETSNAKOR**, Special Conscription.

g) With all the individuals who enter the MGB and remain at the disposition of the OPR, presently, in accordance with the traditions of recruitment for the ranks of the MGB, they proceed in the following manner:

- 1) There cannot enter the ranks of the MGB persons who have completed less than ten years of school, either the Secondary School, or in the Technical School. The latter school provides for its students the same general knowledge as the secondary school, and in addition, professional knowledge.
- 2) About 25 to 30% of the individuals recruited for the ranks of the MGB in the last 2 years graduated from one of the institutes, or higher universities, and have a diploma as an engineer, artist (in the USSR the theater, and the opera demand a very high

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

theatrical education, as all of those who desire to follow this career must graduate from the Secondary School, and afterwards in the highest institute of dramatic art, where they must study from 5 to 7 years in order to receive a diploma as an artist), journalist (they also must study for 5 years in the literary institute in order to receive their diploma, following their secondary education), translator (after having concluded the higher course in foreign languages), physician, builder, chemist, agronomist, etc.

- 3) The other 75% have an education from the secondary level up to that of university professor, but this does not mean that all of the present officers of the MVD, especially the oldest, and most experienced, officers who have been in the service for about 15 years, have as much education as that which was explained above, since on the contrary to what occurs with recruitment for the NKVD, MVD, from 1940 up to the present, all of those who were recruited for the Extraordinary Commission, Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, OGPU, and NKVD up to the year 1940 were almost always illiterate.
- 4) In accordance with the tradition up to a certain point instinctive which is found in all countries, those who are in the highest positions, and who are less cultivated, want to do everything in order to continue in their position of command, they always resist the younger individuals who have greater knowledge in the various disciplines. This occurs with the older, and experienced officers of the MVD, admitted when it was still the Extraordinary Commission, Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, OGPU, NKVD, or NKGB.
- 5) There are recruited for the ranks of the MVD in the majority, persons from 18 to 30 years of age; sometimes they recruit individuals who are as old as 45 years of age. Thus, the individual remains at the disposition of the OGPU-MVD, Personnel Training Section, Personnel Department of the MVD, and his process of recruitment concludes, as he is then in the MVD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16 - TRAINING OF PERSONNEL IN THE USSR

In the USSR there exists a total of 16 State Security Ministries (MVD), since one, at the same time exercises functions for the USSR, and for the RSFSR. Each one of these ministries has its M.K. (Personnel Department), and each one of the U.K.'s has its OVK (Personnel Training Section), and each OVK has at its disposition the RESPUBLIKANSKAYA SHKOLA of the MVD (Republican School of the MVD). In the large Republics such as the RSFSR, and the Ukraine there are 2 or 3 of these Republican Schools. The OVK of this republic assumes charge of the individuals already recruited, and at the disposition of the OVK, for the various courses in the various schools:

a) REPUBLICAN SCHOOL - The majority of the persons sent by the OVK to the Republican School are those who have pursued studies at the secondary school, or the technical school (about 70 to 80%), and the others are from the categories of engineers, journalists, etc.

As a rule the OVK only sends for the courses in the Republican School the individuals who are of the nationality of the republic (and who speak correctly the national language of the republic, as well as the Russian language) to which the school belongs. The Republican School prepares the officers of the MVD for general services (universal) and gives special attention to the counter-intelligence services. The period of instruction in the Republican School is from one, and a half to two years, and during this time the students live in barracks at the school. The number of hours in the classrooms during the day is ten. In this school they study the following disciplines:

- 1) Detailed course on the history of the Russian Communist Party (the principal book is that written by SEMENOV) "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (B)."
- 2) Methods utilized in the foreign intelligence organization for work against the USSR; (general lectures regarding books containing the memoirs of some spy, and regarding many abstract lessons).
- 3) Organization of the network, and the utilization of collaborators, and secret informants - How to secure the collaborators and secret informants (very detailed and methodical studies). See the "Addendum to item 3" below.
- 4) How to conduct provocations in counterintelligence operations.
- 5) How to make a loyal interrogation, and a disloyal interrogation (physical) and how to conduct an inquiry (PROTOCOL SOPHISMS).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 6) How to collect compromising documents for a future trial.
- 7) How to utilize, and organize a filing system.
- 8) Physical, and sport instruction and some details about judo, and boxing.
- 9) The utilization of firearms (details regarding the pistol, and general studies about machine guns, grenades, etc.).
- 10) Surveillance and "tailing" (?). - (In a secret manner).
- 11) How to drink and not lose the power of thought, and of memory.
- 12) Methodical intensive memory training in general (for example: to exhibit 15 telephone numbers for one minute, and then make the student write the largest number possible; to exhibit the plan of a city, and after a certain time to make the student tell the names of the streets, intersections, and even draw a small outline showing the arrangement of the streets; to explain, and relate a story with data which the student must reproduce, in writing, enumerating all the details which he remembers, and, after several days, to make a similar report on the same matter, in order to be able to confirm whether the student really has a good memory; with regard to the training in drinking, to have the student drink a liter of vodka (5 glasses) and smoke 5 cigarettes, and afterwards confirm whether he is in a normal state (or not).
- 13) Sharpness in observation (the student must remember the arrangement of objects, furniture, persons, etc., in a place where he has been).
- 14) To be apt at preparing a false story, logical, however, and as rapidly as possible, and without demonstrating that he is indulging in a falsehood.
- 15) Traditions in order to maintain secrecy.
- 16) Lecture in order that the student shall learn to dominate himself without demonstrating any reaction, in order that the student shall be fearless.
- 17) Brief infantry course.

After the student concludes the course at the Republican School, he receives the lowest rank of an officer of the IGB, Lieutenant Jr. grade; very few receive the rank of Lieutenant, who almost demonstrate they are at the genius level; afterwards they remain at the disposition of the UI of the IGB (Personnel Department of the IGB) where, in the OMI Section (Personnel Movement), they are designated in order to serve in the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, or Operations Section, or, even in technical functions such as secretary in the UI, or in the A.M. U., this is for a minimum period of 3 to 4 years;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

during this period the officer receives the title of "Operations Officer."

APPENDIX TO ITEM 3

Various methods are used by the KGB in order to secure its collaborators, and secret informants:

- 1) Sometimes, when there is a necessity to cause a certain individual to become a collaborator, or a secret informant, the KGB arrests him, and, only through the means of the signing of a promise to render assistance, or secret information is he set free.
- 2) Other times, it is done in a more ostensive manner, in such a way that the individual shall be under the condition of not being arrested, as for example: an officer of the KGB contacts him, and tells him that it is necessary that he render assistance to the KGB by giving certain information which it has need of from him, and that for this reason it is necessary that he sign a statement declaring that he will act in this manner, and, the individual under the pressure, and with the fear of being taken prisoner, signs the aforesaid promise.
- 3) At other times, individuals who are opportunists are taken advantage of, who desire to further their career, and time, who seek to sell out their own friends so that through this, they will secure access into the highest positions of their profession, and at the place where they work.
- 4) The last case, is where it concerns a person of good education, and of prestige in the government against whom the KGB cannot adopt any of the three aforesaid procedures, since it will be unable to arrest the individual, because there is really nothing against him; it cannot make an opportunist of him, since he already has a career, and a position, and, finally, it cannot use threats against him since he enjoys prestige within the government. It being thus, the KGB then seeks to investigate the entire life of the individual in order to find out whether there is any weak point in it, this point which will be the point of departure in order to place him in jeopardy, and thus, to cause him to become a collaborator. For this reason it seeks to find out whether he has any mistresses, if he quarrels with his wife, whether he drinks, etc., making an ever more intimate contact with

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

this person, until the opportune moment arrives in order to place him in jeopardy. Then, through the means of a fact which compromises him, or, even through the means of a falsified document, which will be in its custody, it demands that he collaborate with the KGB, instead of being arrested for this error.

b) V. Sch. KGB USSR - VISHNAYA SHKOLA KGB USSR -  
Highest School of the KGB

There is only one of these schools in the USSR, which is at the disposition of the GPK-UK of the KGB of the USSR. About 90% of the persons who attend this school already possess several years of experience in the service, as an officer, in the ranks of the KGB, or as collaborators. In accordance with its elevated programs, the students for this school need to have an advanced education. Each student who completes the course, automatically receives a position in the ranks of the KGB, of no less than Superior Operations Officer. All of these individuals who complete the course at this school very rapidly enter the middle ranks of the officers of the KGB, and two or three years after the completion of the course, they have the rank of Major, or Colonel of the KGB. The period of instruction in this school lasts for about two years. Its curriculum contains all the disciplines taught in the Republican Schools, and even the disciplines of the SPECIAL SCHOOL of the KGB (complete lectures on espionage within, and outside of the USSR). Some of the lectures for students of this school are given by the most experienced, and highest leaders of the KGB, such as: Department chiefs of the KGB, and, sometimes, assistants to the Minister of the KGB. The students who complete this school will have better opportunities within the KGB for advancement than anybody who has gone to any other school. The other 10% of the students of this Highest School are comprised of students who have the protection of a father, uncle, etc., who occupy very important positions in the KGB, or in the Central Committee of the C.P.(S). In this case, the youth, after having completed the Secondary School, enters this school at 10 years of age, and at the age of 22, or 23 years, he is a major, or a lieutenant colonel.

c) OSPECIALNAYA SHKOLA - S.SCH. KGB - Special School of  
the KGB of the USSR, or, of the KGB of one of the other 15 republics, or even KGB of Moscow, and L.O., or KGB of Leningrad, and L.O. (KGB which has joined to the name of the city the department of the KGB). In the USSR the departments, KGB of Moscow, and L.O., and KGB of Leningrad, and L.O., have the same right as one of the other 15 republics, because each one of these departments are as large as

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

one of the KGB organizations of some republics of the USSR. In the Special School, there is no rule about who are the individuals who must attend it, and in it there enter individuals of all the categories who are at the disposition of the OPR-UK of the KGB. The Special School is constituted essentially of two types: 1st type) CAMOUFLAGE AND ESPIONAGE; and 2nd type) RADIO-CODE School which prepares radio-telegraphers, and specialists in codes. All the students who study in the special schools formally are subordinated to the chief of the school, and the chief of the general staff of the school, but, the great majority of them are students who in practice are subordinate to the chief of the department, or section of the KGB which had service relations with this student until he entered the school, and, who has an interest in utilizing this individual after the completion of the course. The course in the Special School has a duration of from six months to two years. There are many of these special schools in the USSR; each republic has at least two of them. The KGB-UKB, with the USSR of Moscow, and U.S.S.R., and the USSR of Leningrad, and the L.S., has at its disposition about ten schools in time of peace, and many more in time of war. In the special schools there is not a fixed program for the conduct of the various courses, and, for each class of students which arrive a new program is prepared which is of variable duration; sometimes there are combined programs (4 specialties, 2 of each type), sometimes there are programs which consist of only 1, 2, or 3. The following is taught in this special school:

Those of the first type:

- 1st) Personal camouflage, changing clothing, hair style, moustaches, etc., utilizing ink, false moustaches, beard, spectacles, hats, wigs, etc.
- 2nd) Manners - instructing the student how to conduct himself as a person without education, and the opposite.
- 3rd) How to avoid pursuit upon being cognizant that one is being followed by somebody. How to act in order to free oneself from this surveillance.
- 4th) Psychology - test which consists in evaluating a conversation with somebody, the student being required to answer whether or not this person is speaking the truth, if this person has weak points, and on what points he may be psychologically dominated. This is one of the most important courses.
- 5th) Methods on how to receive information at a glance, from photographs, with conversations, with the reading of anything written, and selection of data, details, or articles, or important paragraphs, including the listening to telephonic conversations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 6th) To rapidly prepare drawings, and plans of airports, buildings, cities, camps, etc.
- 7th) To utilize codes, and ciphers which he already knows.
- 8th) To translate coded messages in codes, and ciphers which he already knows.
- 9th) To utilize all types of grenades, bombs, mines, detonators of the electrical, and mechanical types; what is the quantity of explosive necessary in order to destroy a given object, and also, to camouflage mines, to personally prepare them when in a situation where you cannot receive them quickly, and thus, to know what are the materials which must be bought for this preparation.
- 10th) To utilize all types of arms.
- 11th) How to utilize all types of photographic cameras, including micro-film cameras, and all phases of a laboratory corresponding to development, copying, enlargement, etc.
- 12th) How to write with sympathetic ink, and how to reveal these inks.
- 13th) How to learn the contents of a letter without opening it. The various processes (a steel needle about the thickness of a pencil lead with a point in the center in order to withdraw the letter).
- 14th) How to listen in the chimneys of buildings, telephone apparatus, and how to record conversations.
- 15th) How to utilize a very thin layer of vaseline on objects which may be touched by persons from whom it is desired to take a fingerprint so that this fingerprint may be used afterwards.
- 16th) How to procure spies.
- 17th) How to instruct spies, and how to exploit them.
- 18th) How to move through fields, and forests without maps, without apparatus, and, how to orient oneself by the stars, constellations, and trees (in the Northern countries the trees present up to 1/2 meter in height a type of velvet moss. All of these systems of recognition take the name of "Laisuth").
- 19th) How to travel with an equal pace, in order afterwards to know the given number of hours which one has traveled.
- 20th) How to kill persons using blackjacks, stilettos, needles, etc., without the making of any noise, and also, the utilisation of ju-jitsu, and boxing, and what are the best positions for attacking.
- 21st) How to make luminous signals.
- 22nd) How to make parachute jumps.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 23rd) Practice in: swimming, skiing, to travel no less than 50 kilometers per day, to remain three days without eating (only taking water), to travel on horseback, to drive all kinds of automobiles and trucks, to get on a train while it is moving, and to also jump off while it is moving, to drive a launch, and a boat, to sleep in the snow, and the ice, to take a bath with snow, to remain for 6 hours at a sentinel post at a temperature of about 35 degrees below zero, Centigrade; to swim with a complete uniform on, keeping dry pieces of equipment which cannot become wet, such as weapons, cameras, etc., all of this material weighing about 5 kilograms.
- 24th) How to utilize carrier pigeons.
- 25th) How to transmit messages through the means of advertisements in newspapers or over the radio, or by combinations of certain musical scores on a certain program which plays the numbers requested by listeners.
- 26th) To rapidly create fantastic stories, and legends in order to reply in case of imminent danger.
- 27th) First aid.
- 28th) To study foreign languages.
- 29th) Brief infantry course.
- 30th) To study methodically, daily, and parallel with all, or with a part of the courses mentioned above, details, and necessary knowledge for future missions, and their utilization by this student; the study of these details will be made by the student under the direction of the department or section of the MGB which has an interest in future works to be executed by such agent.

Note: Above all in the courses mentioned as disciplines of the Special School, they do not have a specific curriculum, they are courses destined to prepare spies, and saboteurs in the schools of the first type. Sometimes, but very rarely, aside from all the disciplines of the first type, the student also receives instructions in radio transmission by means of portable apparatus.

#### SPECIAL SCHOOLS OF THE 2ND TYPE

The Special Schools of the 2nd Type prepare:

Category "A") In this category there are trained the qualified radio-telegraphers (that is, the technicians in the construction, and repair of transmitters) and specialists in the utilization of codes. The students who remain in this school of this type also have at times

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in their program of courses, those of numbers 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, and 30 of the Special School of the first type.

Category "B") In this school the instruction is done in order to prepare the greater number of persons in the study of codes, and ciphers (cryptanalysis); how to prepare codes, and ciphers, and how to decipher the various codes, and ciphers of the enemy. The students of this school only study this matter, and in addition the courses of the schools of the first type: 7, 8, 9, 10, 27, 28, and 29. In all the special schools the following courses are also furnished:

1st) Detailed course regarding the history of the Communist Party of the USSR (the principal book is written by STALIN), "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (B)."

2nd) Methods utilized in the foreign intelligence for work against the USSR (courses of a general nature, utilizing books, and the memoirs of some spy, and also with abstract lessons).

Upon completing the course, the student takes an examination on all subjects which he has studied, before an examining commission.

The examining commission is constituted by the Chief of the School, the Chief of the General Staff of the School, 1 of the two directors of the U.S., 1 of the two directors of the OPR, and 1 of the two heads of the department, or the section which is interested in the student. The conditions for approval are not formal, but, instead, practical, thus, during the course, the student who is studious and takes good advantage of the work is stimulated in his study with special privileges to go to the theater, movies, walks, good uniforms, and money. The student who does not take good advantage of the work does not receive permission to be absent from the school; if this does not produce a result in the student, and he continues to do poorly, he is daily assigned for sentinel duty at the school, even in the winter, in the rain, etc. If, after this the student still does not progress, he is placed in solitary confinement on black bread, and water (about 400 grams of bread, and 1 liter of water). If, this still does not bring a result, in time of war the student will be sent to the front line in difficult battles, in time of peace he is dismissed from the ranks of the USSR, and logically, from the ranks of the C.P.(B) of the USSR, or of the VIKOL, or sent to a concentration camp. They proceed in this manner because in these schools there is a special rule which permits the student who is not comprehending the material very well, to contact the professors of the subject, or, the Chief of the General Staff of the School, for assistance, from 6 A.M., until late in the evening. By virtue of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

these conditions of study, at the examination period 60 to 65% of the students always receive grades of GOOD, and the remainder the grade of EXCELLENT.

About 75% of the students who complete the work in the special school of the first type enter the activities in the ranks of the KGB, outside of the USSR, and work permanently, or periodically, in foreign countries; the remaining 25% work in the ranks of the intelligence, and counterintelligence of the USSR itself. About 25% of the students who complete the course of the schools of the 2nd type of category "A" also work in foreign countries along with Soviet spies; the other 75% work in the ranks of the KGB in the various departments, and sections as telegraphers, and specialists in codes. All the students who complete the work at the special schools of the 2nd type, category "B" work in the code section.

Despite the fact that the schools of the first type have various courses (as we noted, about 30), this does not mean that all the students of the school of the first type are obliged to learn all of them; the number is greatly variable.

After the student completes the courses at the Special School, he is, upon an order from the U.S. of the KGB of the respective republic, or U.S. of the KGB of the City (Moscow or Leningrad) officially transferred to the department, or section to which he is assigned.

#### 17 - INDIVIDUAL TRAINING OF FUTURE SPIES OF THE KGB FOR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

All the future spies, and leaders of the spies in foreign countries, after having concluded the course at the Special School of the first type, shall take a Course in Individual Training. The course in individual training which the KGB has these individuals to pursue, has for its objective, conspiratory aims. For this reason, there is at the disposition of the 1st, and 4th department of the KGB (KGB of the USSR, or KGB of one of the 15 other republics) sufficient separate individual apartments in the buildings in the cities, and also, houses in the interior, in the midst of the forest. Moreover, there exists at the disposition of the 1st, and 4th departments some bases, and stores for food products, clothing, radio materials, all types of explosive materials, and weapons. During the period for the duration of the course of individual training, the student only has contact with elements of the KGB of the department to which he is directly assigned, and for whom he is being trained; he may only have contact with the persons whom the representative of the KGB finds possible, and thus, without ever

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

mentioning his real activities. During this entire individual training period, all the courses in which they are being prepared, are furnished in their own apartments by the professors, and instructors, or, in rooms at the department to which they are assigned. During his training, the individual resides in conspiratory apartments, or, in houses, alone, or with a professor. This individual program is constituted of the following courses:

- a) Complete intellectual education regarding intelligence, and counterintelligence operations by other countries, and by the USSR in the last 30 years. For this purpose, the majority of the individuals trained individually receive the right to utilize the volumes collected in the "Special Bureau at the Disposition of the Ministry." In this Bureau there is a large collection of the volumes, instructions, official books of restricted circulation, reports, which were published officially in foreign countries, and in the USSR, published only for the official ministries, and which were never openly circulated. In the latter two cases, these consist of volumes, or reports stolen by Soviet spies in foreign countries, and which were taken to the MVD. All the volumes which are collected at the Special Bureau, in addition to the volume in the language of the country in which it was prepared, also exists in a perfect translation in the Russian language. From 20 to 30 copies of this translation are printed for distribution among the MVD's of the other republics.
- b) After carrying out the first part, which is utilizing the books of the Special Bureau, the student is obliged to make comments regarding all the books which he has read, stating what are the errors which he has observed, what are the interesting points, and which are worthy of note due to the technic employed, etc. With regard to this matter, he has with the representatives of the department to which he assigned extended discussions analyzing all of these matters.
- c) Another matter which is taught throughout the period of the duration of the course is a part regarding psychological matters, teaching the students how they must proceed under various situations, without meanwhile demonstrating, or incurring an error in attitude. Thus, for example, they are taught how they must act calm on various occasions, how to appear as agitated on other occasions, how to lie without showing that one is lying, how to rapidly construct a false story,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

how to understand persons through a psychological analysis of them, how to play upon psychology in an interrogation, etc. A certain time after having started these courses, the student enters into contact with another professor who will begin to analyze, without him knowing about it, his progress in psychological matters, and, for this, he will utilize in his conversations the most varied topics, not allowing the student to perceive that he is being examined. If he concludes that the student is making progress, several days later he is directed to converse with another official of a higher category, who will proceed to the same study; and thus, if the student continues demonstrating that he is making progress, he will go on being examined in the various offices, until he comes to be examined by the assistant to the minister, or even by the minister himself, and, upon the result of these successive examinations depends whether or not he will be appointed for future missions in foreign countries.

- d) Moreover, during the time of individual training the student continues to study, and perfect himself in the course which he pursued in the special schools.
- e) After having concluded the individual training course, which lasts from 3 months to two years, the student either leaves the territory of the USSR to go to one of the countries in which it is necessary that he work in the future, or, also under the orders of, and upon the approval of the ~~SPETSPOBNA~~ of the Central Committee of the C.P.(B), or the Central Committee of one of the other 15 republics, he is appointed to an important post in one of the other intelligence departments of the MVD, in a key position.

#### 18 - MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY (MVD) OF THE USSR

The Ministry of State Security is directed by Minister ~~VENKELAS~~ ~~MECHALAYEVICH~~ ~~MECHALAYEV~~, General of the Army, plus a minimum of four assistants. Two assistants are for matters of counter-intelligence, and surveillance. The minister is directly in charge of a part of the intelligence work. The third assistant to the minister directs the U.S. (Personnel Department), and the fourth assistant to the minister directs the A. S. U (Russian initials: A.S.U.). - Economic Administrative Department.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The MIB is comprised of sections, departments, and other organizational units. Thus, we have:

SECTION A: Code Section.

SECTION B: Radio-telegraphic Section, having at its disposition the central station of the MIB.

SECTION E: Central Files Section.

SECTION OPEROS: Operations Section - In charge of Imprisonments.

1st DEPARTMENT: General Espionage.

2nd DEPARTMENT: General Counterespionage.

3rd DEPARTMENT: Counterespionage on Transportation.

4th DEPARTMENT: Espionage, and Sabotage Against Germany.

5th DEPARTMENT: Charged with Investigations, and Interrogations.

6th DEPARTMENT: Charged with the Security of the POLIZEIRO.

U.L. - Personnel Department.

A. W. E. - Economic Administrative Department.

O.I. - Special Inspections (Commission appointed by the Minister.)

PARTY - Party Committee of the Ministry.

SECRETARIAT OF THE MINISTER - Office of the Minister constituted by the most experienced intelligence, and counter-intelligence specialists, and secretaries, assistants, and typists. About 200 officers.

SECRETARIAT OF THE ASSISTANT TO THE MINISTER - Office of the Assistant to the Minister: with about 50 officers for each office of an assistant.

SECRETARIAT FOR EACH ONE OF THE CHIEFS OF A DEPARTMENT.

SECRETARIAT FOR EACH SECTION CHIEF.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRINCIPAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF SECTIONS "A",  
"B", "E", AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE KGB

All the departments from numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, utilize their number as a cipher for conspiratorial aims. In the Russian language they are called: ПЕРВОЕ, ВТОРОЕ, ТРЕТЬЕ, ЧЕТВЕРТОЕ, ПЯТОЕ, and ШЕСТОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Departments). Each department in turn is constituted of various sections; for example: the greater part of the departments have 8 sections. Each one of these sections have numbers such as 1, 2, etc. For the classification of each one of these sections they use the number of the section followed by the number of the corresponding department, for example: 21 (2nd section of the 1st department), 25, (2nd section of the 5th department).

Each section in turn disposes of various sub-sections (ОТДЕЛЕНИЯ), (as many as 5), and each one of the sub-sections is classified by numbers from 1 up to the number of sub-sections existing. Thus, for example, we will have 242 (2nd sub-section, of the 4th section, of the 2nd department). This nomenclature alone is used in the ministries (central organizations) of the USSR in the USSR, and in the other 15 republics.

**SECTION A:** The Code Section is directly under the minister, and is charged with ciphering, and deciphering all the messages, both for the interior, as well as those which go abroad. This section has three sub-sections: The 1st sub-section only executes services for the 1st, and 4th departments; the 2nd sub-section only does service for the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, U.S., A. R. U.; and the 3rd sub-section carries out the service of the preparation of codes, and the deciphering of codes in messages intercepted by the USSR station.

**SECTION B:** Radio-telegraphy section, which is also directly under the minister. There is at the disposition of SECTION B the central radio station of the USSR, and many other transmission stations along the frontier zone of the USSR, and also many portable transmission stations for special services.

**SECTION E:** Central Files Section; under the 1st assistant to the minister, it is comprised of the files on all the processes against persons who were arrested from 1917 until the present, and also, files on all suspects, on all the agents of the Extraordinary Commission, the Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, OGPU, NKVD, MVD, MGB, MVD, and also, on all the collaborators, secret informants, and other persons in whom the USSR has some interest. Sometimes there may be found in this files section data on the representatives of three generations of a family (grandfather, father, and son), or grandfather, mother, and daughter, etc.). The individual file is

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

as complete as possible on each one of the individuals, consisting of photographs, fingerprints, and a large number of other data regarding the individual.

**SECTION OPERON:** Operations Section; this Section is directly under the minister, and it is charged with carrying out imprisonments, seeking at their residences for the individuals who are arrested. In the USSR, formally, no imprisonment may be made without an order for imprisonment signed by the Minister, or, in the event he is not present, signed by the first assistant. Specialists who are skilled in finding people work in this section, and a large contingent of transports is used.

19 - FIRST DEPARTMENT OF THE MVD

**1st DEPARTMENT:** This is the strongest intelligence department which exists in the USSR against foreign countries. The first department sends spies and resident agents (chief of an espionage network) to foreign countries. The 1st department is constituted by the following sections: SCANDINAVIAN, CENTRAL EUROPEAN, BALCAN, GREEK, MIDDLE EAST, FAR EAST, UNITED STATES, and LATIN AMERICAN. Each one of these sections has a number which is changed every two years. In turn, each one of the sections has a sub-section, and each one of the sub-sections does service against a State, part of a large country, or, against a country, or against 2, or 3 countries jointly. For example, the SCANDINAVIAN SECTION has a sub-section which works only against Norway, a sub-section which works only against Finland, and a sub-section which works only against Denmark. The English section has a sub-section which works only against the British Isles; another sub-section working against Canada, another sub-section working against India; a 4th and 5th, against other British dominions. The NORTH AMERICAN Section has sub-sections which are only responsible for the work against the various States of North America; one of the sub-sections is especially occupied in utilizing for intelligence aims racial prejudice in the United States, another against Alaska, another against the Philippines, etc. The LATIN AMERICAN Section has sub-sections against Argentina, another against Brazil, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, against the countries of South America, Mexico, and Central America in the aggregate.

**ARGENTINA:** Officially, at the time of the PERON Revolution, Soviet propaganda in the San Francisco Conference, and in the Soviet press was against PERON and his dictatorship. The principal reason in this period for the Soviet attacks against PERON was the utilization which he made of former officers from the armies of HITLER and MUSCOLENI, and some submarines, and ships from these two countries,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and also the good relations of Argentina with Franco (Spain). On the other hand, the 1st department of the KGB, and other intelligence agencies of the USSR utilized the feelings of the Peronists toward the Germans, Italians, and Spaniards for the purpose of infiltrating agents from the 1st department of the KGB, and other intelligence agencies of the USSR, among the emigrants to Argentina. After the establishment of diplomatic relations between the government of the USSR, and the Peron Government, and, on the other hand with the increasing differences between the USSR, and the Government of the United States, after the death of President ROOSEVELT, the 1st department of the KGB, principally, and other intelligence agencies of the USSR, through the intermediary of the Argentine sub-section of the LATIN AMERICAN Section began to utilize three principal means for intelligence in Argentina: 1st. Maximum amount of information regarding opposition against PERON (as complete as possible); 2nd. Greater efforts in order to provoke a break in relations between Argentina, and the United States; 3rd. Greater, and more complete information regarding the liaison between FRANCO and PERON. As has been shown, the period from 1945 to 1948, brought great results for this mission of Soviet intelligence, and only now in the 1st half of 1949, have its results been declining, due to the activities of PERON against the PAN-AMERICAN and Communist Party organizations in Argentina.

BRAZIL: The intelligence services of the USSR, in the Portuguese-speaking countries, always assign to this field great, and important tasks for the following reasons: during the entire period of the existence of the USSR, it has always had fewer relations with peoples who speak the Portuguese language than with any other people. On the other hand, in the territory of the USSR there are only a small number of people of Portuguese blood; also, the two countries which speak the Portuguese language, Portugal, and Brazil, occupy very important key positions on the two continents for the future war by the USSR, with the Anglo-Saxons. Portugal serves to control the Gulf of Biscay, near to Gibraltar; Brazil, is the principal land power of South America, and disposes of a large supply of raw materials for the industry of the United States, and food products for England. For these reasons, after relations were resumed between the USSR, and Brazil on 5/21/46, the USSR sent to Brazil one of the most experienced individuals in the diplomatic corps of the USSR, GUMILEV, to organize a good, and strong basis for friendly relations in Brazil. Thanks to the incompetence of the Soviet policy toward the Latin American nations, such relations were broken. Therefore, during the period which they were maintained, and, even after they were broken, the USSR continues giving great attention, in the various intelligence services, against Brazil, and also, in its propaganda on behalf of the Brazilian Communist Party, distributing a large amount of literature of Soviet, and Communist agitation, and,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

daily transmitting special programs for Brazil in the Portuguese language over the Central Radio of Moscow, on 15,400 Kcs., from 8:30 to 9:00 P. M. No time (broadcasts are also made on other frequencies) these times from 2:30 to 3:00 A. M. After this program, the station continues the broadcasts for Latin America, transmitting in the Spanish language from 9 until 11 P. M. No time.

The present political program of Soviet intelligence in Brazil is to secure the maximum number of details regarding the relations of Brazil with the United States, through underground Communist forces, in order to learn the economic, and military possibilities of Brazil in the future war. To make the greatest effort in order that Brazil shall break its friendly relations with the United States. The Soviet intelligence agencies in conducting their service against Brazil, and Portugal find much greater difficulties than against the countries where the Spanish language is spoken, for the following reasons:

- a) For work against the people who speak the Portuguese language, the intelligence services of the USSR have fewer Russian personnel who already know one of the two countries and the Portuguese language; on the other hand, for the work against Spain, Argentina, and the other countries where the Spanish language is spoken, the intelligence services possess many persons from the Republican ranks in the civil war in Spain, many Mexican members of local C.P., and also many citizens of the USSR, who, under the cover of military men, or diplomats, were in Spain during the time of the civil war, and also in other countries.
- b) After having broken diplomatic relations with Brazil, the USSR, by the means of its intelligence services, received (etc) an order to take the maximum caution in the work against Brazil. For this reason since 1947, the period when relations were broken, up to the present, in reality, the Soviet intelligence has not carried out any service which has allowed the discovery of its network, but this does not mean that it has not been working calmly, and cautiously in Brazil, with the aim of accumulating forces for the future by the USSR against the desperate counteraction this is the reason for the necessity of giving great attention to all the small details which at present, the forces of the Brazilian counter-intelligence have in their possession in order to calmly, and in a detailed manner study, and prepare

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

a defense against the great opposing forces of intelligence in Brazil, at the beginning of the future war. The principal means utilized by the Soviet intelligence for its penetration by the means of spies in Brazil are: a) emigrants of all nationalities who enter Brazil, including former Nazis (Germans, Italians); b) Travellers, principally those of French, Spanish, Argentine, Chilean, and Mexican nationality, c) Liaison, and transmission channels by mail which goes through the intermediary of Uruguay, Argentina, and France, etc., and the commercial vessels of all the nations now dominated in Eastern Europe, and under the control of the Soviet service. In the same manner, the Embassies, and Consulates of these countries in Brazil, easily, and economically offer the means in order that the Brazilian counterintelligence forces shall study the methods of operation by the Soviet intelligence in practice, and, for this only three things are needed: 1st) the will to do so; 2nd) observation, and calmness; 3rd) to spend a small amount of money on the buying of good informants among the personnel of these consulates, and vessels.

It is very important for Brazil before the time of the war against Russia arrives, to prepare the plans, and necessary equipment in order to organize a service of radio goniometrical stations for the location of clandestine stations in the service of the C.P. on behalf of Russia, a service which may already be in operation, and which will naturally be increased with the beginning of the war.

20 - WORK METHODS EMPLOYED IN THE FIRST DEPARTMENT  
OF THE KGB IN THE USSR

- a) As we have noted previously, the first department conducts the intelligence service against foreign countries.
- b) The system of work of the first department is done under principles absolutely independent of other organizations of the government of the USSR.
- c) The Chief of the first department of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General PIKIN is directly subordinate to the Minister of the KGB of the USSR, V.N. KHRUSHCHEV, and he, in turn, is directly subordinate to the Deputy President, member of the Politburo, I.P. BERIA. BERIA is also directly subordinate to JOSEPH STALIN. All of this hierarchical scale means that the most

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

important news received through the intermediary of the first department reaches the cognizance of only two members of the Politburo: STALIN, and BERIA, and if they desire to do so they transmit this data to the other members of the Politburo.

- d) About 75% of the spies who work at the orders of the first department in foreign countries, are constituted of the individuals from these same foreign countries. These individuals work in each country under the direction of the resident agent (chief of the espionage network).
- e) The resident agent is the citizen of Russian nationality, or of the nationality of a country belonging to the USSR, or a foreigner who has taken refuge in the USSR, and who remained under the protection of the KGB, and who went to school with the aim of future employment as a resident agent in his country of origin.  
These types of resident agents constitute at least 20 to 25% of the individuals who work under the orders of the first department in foreign countries.
- f) The resident agent, and the spies subordinate to him comprise a network which has from 5 to 25 individuals. The system of work of each network is as follows:

- 1st) The resident agent gives instructions to the spies who are subordinate to him regarding what is necessary to be done, and the spies inform him about what are the difficulties they encounter in the execution of the orders in order that he may furnish the maximum amount of protection to the spy so that he will be able to carry out his mission.
- 2nd) The resident agent is responsible for knowing the maximum information about each spy who is subordinate to him, possessing photographs, auto-biographical manuscripts, addresses, and details with all the names of members of the family, the signature of each spy on each important item of information which he furnishes, etc.
- 3rd) All these documents, photographs, etc., are sent by the resident agent through his channels to the USSR.
- 4th) Among all the members of the espionage network the maximum number of spies who may know who the resident agent is, and know his real name, and address is: 1 spy; all the others only know the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

resident agent through a pseudonym, and do not know his address: they merely have a chart showing what are the places for contact with the agent. All the spies subordinate to the resident agent do not know that they are working on behalf of the KGB, or other intelligence service of the USSR. Sometimes the spies do not even know that they are working in behalf of the USSR. For example: the resident agent in a foreign country receives information stating that certain individuals are sympathizers toward England, and thus, they enter into contact with these individuals, alleging that they also have the same sympathies, and that they are working for a given British Intelligence service; and, moreover: that since he wishes to collaborate he might be able to furnish information which will be very useful to England, such as: who are the individuals belonging to the various ministries who are sympathetic toward England; such individuals are thus deceived, and go on furnishing information which they think is for England, but which is for the USSR. This is because it is very important for them to know who are their real enemies. Other times the resident agent will learn that given factories, for example, are being sabotaged and, if by chance one of the saboteurs is captured, and subjected to all kinds of interrogations, and corporal punishments, it is learned that nothing is gained, since this individual will reveal nothing about the other individuals who were not caught. Therefore the Russian intelligence agents enter into contact with this individual acting as if they are sympathizers for the same cause, and that they are also working for the same aim, and even, that they have money, and other individuals of what he perhaps may have need; they give this individual detailed instructions about how to execute the sabotage according to the technic which he is already accustomed to follow, and afterwards, through the means of this same individual, they enter into contact with other members of the sabotage network, therefore becoming masters of the situation. They may thus locate any member whenever it is deemed necessary. This is how there is justified that which was stated above regarding the fact that some elements do not really know for whom they are working.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (5th) In the majority of the espionage networks none of the members of the network knew of the individuals in the same network.
- (6th) The resident agent directs the spies under the principles of the ideological will for the work of each spy; the will to have a career; the payment of money; fear (through the fear of provocations which the resident agent may direct against him), etc.
- (7th) About 50% of the resident agents have at their disposition radio-telegraphers who personally know how to transmit, and to receive radio-telegraphic signals, and possess up to 5 short-wave portable radio transmitters, which are located in various parts of the country in order to throw the radio communications stations off the track. Furthermore, the resident agent has the right, upon the approval of the chief of the subsection, section, or department to which he is assigned in the USSR, to utilize other methods for the transmission of information to the USSR; letters by regular mail through the intermediary of another country; letters through the means of personnel, ships, trains, planes (on the international airlines), transmission in the form of advertisements over the radio, or advertisements in newspapers (radio, and the local press), transference by the means of travelling salesman (trusted agent who has all documents indicating that he is an agent of a given firm, when in reality he is not) etc.
- (8th) The other 50% of the resident agents who are in countries in which the counterintelligence forces of the country do not permit the utilization of their portable transmission stations, in the majority of cases use the other methods which were enumerated in item 7.
- (9th) One of the principal endeavors of the 1st department is, in the majority of its operations to not utilize controls of the Soviet Embassy for conspiracy acts, and for this reason, among each 100 resident agents of the 1st department who are in other countries, only a maximum of 10 work as employees of the Soviet Embassy or have contacts with the Soviet Embassy. In this case, the resident agents who officially are employed at the embassies, are disguised as consular officials,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10th)

Embassy officials, or officials assigned to the various attaches (consular, press, etc.). In this situation, the official has the right to utilize the radio transmitter of the embassy, or the diplomatic courier, and none of the other employees of the embassy know about his real functions. He formally renders his service to the embassy, and, on the other hand, he has absolute freedom, with the permission of the ambassador, because he, in turn, receives orders in this regard from his superiors (Minister of Foreign Relations, or one of his assistants). The espionage networks of the 1st department work parallel without one network knowing the other, the result being that at times, there may be two, three, or ten espionage networks, each under the direction of a resident agent working in the same country; other times, in the same city, without knowing about each other, and symmetrically there may exist one or two more networks which work under the direction of resident agents who are officially employed by the Soviet Embassy; this means that the first department of the KGB of the USSR itself may have five, or ten networks working on parallel channels in the same country, all of them being subordinate to it.

11th)

The first department has as its chief interest receiving the maximum amount of political information, regarding the parties which exist in the country in a general manner, the opposition groups, conspiratorial groups, etc.

The first department of the KGB places great value on complete information regarding persons in the various classes of the country, in order to prepare so that in the future some of them may be utilized, and others may be liquidated in the interest of the USSR. Parallel to this the representatives of the 1st department in the various consulates have an interest in gathering complete information regarding military, diplomatic, consular, economic matters, etc. Members of the network who become suspects: the 1st department prefers to transfer them to the KGB, and then to execute them there. In case this is not practical, they are quietly liquidated in their own country.

12th)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- g) In the USSR there are 16 large republics, and 16 KGB's; 15 of these 16 KGB organizations belong to 15 republics, and the 16th KGB works not only for the USSR, but also for the USSR. Each one of the KGB organizations has its 1st department. This is in accordance with the fact that each one of the 16 KGB organizations has under its care a strong department of foreign espionage. For the execution of operations outside of the European-Asian continent, only the 1st department of the KGB of the USSR has a right to act, but, in European, and Asiatic countries each one of the first departments of each one of the KGB organizations of the 16 republics has the right to take steps, and to organize its espionage networks in foreign countries, especially in the countries which are near the frontiers of the republic in question. For example: the 1st department of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR has the right to organize espionage networks in the following countries: Poland, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Tunisia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and also as a test, it may send spies into the other countries of Eastern Europe, and, even outside of the European continent. In the event that this test proves to bring a good result, the chief of the 1st department of the KGB of the republic, by means of his superior, the Minister of the KGB of the republic is obligated to immediately transmit all details regarding the individual who penetrated into the other country, to the 1st department of the KGB of the USSR, and thus, this individual will immediately come to belong to the 1st department of the KGB of the USSR.
- b) Each one of the departments of the KGB of each one of the 15 republics is directly subordinate to the Minister of the KGB of this republic, in the same manner as the KGB of the USSR. Among all the sixteen first departments which are in the territory of the USSR, there are good relations of cooperation, collaboration, and exchange of information, but this is, however, done only through the means of their chiefs of departments.
- 1) At the disposition of each one of the KGB of the regions which are on the frontiers of the USSR, in turn, there exists a 1st section. The 1st section of each KGB has in its charge the same functions of foreign espionage as each one of the 1st departments of the KGB, and has the right to conduct espionage operations only against countries which are near to this part of the frontier of the USSR which is occupied by this region.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As an example, the URS of the city of Leningrad, and L.O. (URS department of the city, and region of Leningrad) through the 1st section has a right to organize an espionage network in Finland, and Sweden. Another example: the URS of the city of Ugorod, and Z.O. (department of the city of Ugorod, and the Trans-Carpathian region), the Section of this URS of Ugorod has a right to organize an espionage network against Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and thus against all the regions which are near the principal frontiers of the USSR.

This corresponds to the fact that in the foreign countries which have frontiers with the USSR there are a minimum of 3 URS espionage services working parallel to each other that is, sub-section of the section of the 1st department of the URS of the USSR (sub-section which is working especially against that country), sub-section of the section of the 1st department of the URS in the corresponding republic, and sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the corresponding region. Sometimes the espionage services even reach the figure of 13, at times even higher, in parallel with an espionage channels, in a single foreign country. For example: the URS intelligence in Poland consists of: 1) the Polish sub-section of the Central European Section of the 1st department of the URS of the USSR; 2) Polish section of the 1st department of the URS of the Lithuanian SSR; 3) Polish Section, 1st department of the URS of Byelorussian SSR; 4) Polish section, 1st department of URS, Ukrainian SSR; 5) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of URS of city, and region of Vilnius; 6) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the city of Kaliningrad, and the region (former German city of Königsberg); 7) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the city of Grodno, and its region; 8) sub-section of the 1st section of the URS, and region of Dnestry; 9) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the city, and region of Lutsk; 10) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the city, and region of Lvov; 11) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the city, and region of Drohobych; 12) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the city, and region of Stanislaw; 13) Polish sub-section of the 1st section of the URS of the city, and region of Ugorod, and Z.O. (Trans-Carpathian region).

All of these channels work without the knowledge of each other, and the only person in the ranks of the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KGB who has a right to receive complete information regarding details on each one of these channels of the KGB of the USSR 1st Hierarchy through the intermediary of the KGB Ministers of Lithuania, Byelorussia, and Ukraine, because with all of these channels, always are subordinate to these three ministers, and only two are directly subordinates to the KGB of the USSR (No. 1 and No. 6).

One of the systems for the intelligence work of the KGB is to engage the smallest possible number of foreign Communist militants for the ranks of their agents, because the majority of the Communist militants in foreign countries know quite well the doctrinal theory preached by KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSH, and STALIN, but, in reality, they do not know how all of this is put into practice at the present time in the USSR, where egotism surrounds everything, where all sets the national effort in order to secure a position, a high position, at the expense of the best of means, such as informing on one's own wife, or children. Practice has shown that when they utilize Communist militants of foreign countries, these members of the Communist Party who were educated in a country where more freedom exists than in Russia, do not adapt themselves to the cold manner of operation of the KGB through the intermediary of the resident. Thus, there arises after a certain period of time friction between the resident agent, and this militancy, since the manner of acting as ordered by the resident agent runs counter to his ideals, and principles. The KGB prefers to utilize in place of them "former Communists," who work like automata. It also takes advantage of traitors who officially demonstrate great opposition against the USSR, and against the Communist Party, with the protection of the KGB, such traitors reach the highest positions of leadership in their own country.

5) The KGB has as its disposition a large sum in the budget of the USSR, and of each one of the 15 republics. The sum allotted for the KGB is known only to STALIN, KHRUSH, the Minister of the KGB (KHEMKHIDZE), and the Minister of the Treasury, ZILBERMAN. In its operation outside of the USSR, the KGB spends a great deal of money as payment to its agents abroad, and also, in the purchase of property, or even factories, which are entrusted to trusted agents, or resident agents, in order that they may, through this, become independent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

from the receipt of money from Moscow, in the event that there is a war these agents, or resident agents, in the event of war, will support the network with the return from the factory, or from the property acquired through the money furnished by the IIRB. As an illustration, there is offered an case which, despite the deficiency of the existing data, demonstrates that this is not impossible to put into practice: One of the students of the VISCHIAI COMPLEX in 1939, a colleague of [redacted] was trained in order to continue to the United States, where he entered illegally, remaining under the protection of a millionaire of the State of Texas, the owner of a good deal of property. After about a two-year sojourn in a safe place where he learned to speak English correctly, he had the millionaire have prepared a passport, and other documents indicating that he was an American citizen. The millionaire was a spy for the USSR, and about at the end of his life. After his death in 1942 the aforesaid individual entered the espionage service in possession of his fortune, and continued to direct the espionage services which had been operated by this old millionaire, and spy.

We have here a concrete example: one of the spies subordinate to GEFROSKY (the informant) named [redacted]

[redacted], the son of a Russian emigrant, a nationalized Czechoslovakian, a construction engineer, who in 1946 occupied the position of chief engineer in the firm for construction, and repair of the hygienic services in the capital of Czechoslovakia (Prague, Tyretova street, or Tirova in Czechoslovakia, number 7); a firm called "FRAKTISCH 340335" (or "FRAKTISCHER TAJOUT"), prepared in accordance with instructions from the IIRB representative a series in order to join as a member of this firm, and the firm had already given an order to spend in this activity up to 50,000 dollars which, on the official exchange at that time, was 2,500,000 Czech Crowns, and, on the blackmarket, 12,000,000 Czech Crowns.

- k) All the resident agents, and all the spies subordinate to them who work on the channels of the 1st departments of the 16 IIRB organizations, and of the 1st sections of the IIRB groups (Department of the IIRB of the city, and the region) utilize in their work, all the varied methods in order to receive the maximum amount of information in favor of the USSR; all these methods are those which have been used by the various intelligence services of the world for centuries.

b6  
b7c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21. - RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE 1ST DEPARTMENT AND  
THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF THE KGB:

Explanation: the 1st department in each one of the 16 KGB organizations is always the department which is concerned with intelligence in general. The 1st section of each one of the KGB groups is also charged with exercising intelligence in general.

- 1) All the services related to codes cause the 1st department to enter into contact with SECTION A.
- 2) All the services related with radio transmission cause the 1st department to enter into contact with SECTION B.
- 3) All the services related with the supplying of new individual cards, or of identification cause the 1st department to enter into contact with SECTION F.
- 4) All the services related with the securing of new agents, among the personnel of the foreign embassies, and consulates which are in the USSR, and also other foreign travelers who enter the territory of the USSR, cause the 1st department, or, the 1st section, to enter into contact with SECTION "E.L.O." of the 2nd department of the KGB.
- 5) Certain of the intelligence, and sabotage services which are conducted by the 1st department in Germany have relations with the 4th department.
- 6) All the operations of the 1st department, or 1st section for the purposes of the penetration of its agents in foreign countries, or vessels of the merchant marine of the USSR, international trains (trains which go beyond the borders of the territory of the USSR) and international airlines, cause this department, or section to enter into contact with the 3rd department of the KGB.
- 7) The majority of the operations of the 1st department, or 1st section, in causing the frontiers of the USSR to be crossed by agents subordinate to the 1st department, cause this department to enter into a superficial contact with the GUV of the KGB of the USSR, or the GUV of the KGB of each one of the other 15 republics.
- 8) Some relations between the 1st department and the R.U.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Military Intelligence), the MIA (Department of Diplomatic Intelligence), or the MFI (Department of Economic Intelligence) are also carried out.

22 - 2ND DEPARTMENT (IN THE MIB)

The 2nd department of the MIB is that of general counter-intelligence, only in the territory of the USSR, and in the territories occupied by the Soviet Army. The 2nd department is the strongest counterintelligence service which exists in the USSR, and it has no competitor in the world with the same number of collaborators, or secret informants (about 6 million), which means that there is for each 32, or 33 citizens of the USSR, one collaborator, or secret informant. The 2nd department of the MIB is the principal base for the power of the government of STALIN, and his colleagues of the Politburo. The 2nd department is directed by it, General TIMOSHIN, an authority who personally accompanied STALIN, along with a large number of secret officers of the MIB to conferences such as: YEREMAEV, YERIN, and POTEMKIN. It, Gen. TIMOSHIN is subordinate to the 1st assistant to the Minister of the MIB, Colonel-General KADOMOV (a Georgian, personal friend of STALIN, and of BERIA; the history of the Extraordinary Commission, the Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, OGPU, NKVD, MVD, and MVD, shows that for 32 years, STALIN has always incriminated one of his Georgian competitors, into one of the most important key positions of general counterintelligence. The 2nd department is constituted of various, and numerous sections, and each one of these has numbers which run from 1 to 30. These numbers are changed every 1 or 2 years in the same manner as those of the 1st department. Each one of these sections is responsible for the surveillance over a given contingent of the population employed in the services of the various occupations, and also responsible for the recognition, and discovery of foreign spies, saboteurs, uncertain elements, opposition against STALIN, and his government, etc., in these occupations....For example: the IN.O (INSTRUMENT OPIEL - Foreign Section), performs the following services: surveillance on all foreigners employed in the embassies of their countries, and on foreigners travelers who are in the territory of the USSR; to infiltrate into the foreign embassies their collaborators, and secret informants under the guise of translators, professors of the Russian language, managers for the handling of supplies (all kinds of food supplies, etc.), friends of the secretaries, and families sex for the employees of the foreign embassies who are single; surveillance on the relations between foreigners, and Russian citizens; to study,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and to prepare the necessary means, and provocations in order to secure employees of the foreign embassies, foreign citizens, as future spies for the 1st department of the KGB, to cooperate, and collaborates in all the operations which the 1st department has an interest in conducting in the territory of the USSR, to listen, to photograph, to copy, and to record the maximum possible amount of material regarding contacts, communications, and relations which the foreigners conduct while they are in the USSR, with other persons who have already departed from the USSR, to organize a perfect service of surveillance, and information in the principal hotels which have foreign guests to organize a strong system of counterintelligence by the intermediary of collaborators, and secret informants in the "EMBASSIES", Organization for Foreign Tourists to secure the maximum number of servants from foreign countries in the USSR as secret agents, chauffeurs, barbers, cooks, maids, waitresses, etc.

All the foreign embassies in the USSR are under surveillance by the sub-sections of the 1st d.s., and in this case they are grouped according to their language origin: Anglo-Saxon, Latin, Asiatic, and Germanic languages.

Other sections of the 2nd department of the KGB each have a specific function regarding professional matters, for example, there is the Art Section, or Artistic Section. This section works in accordance with the following method: the 1st sub-section which is under this section has a direct liaison with the Spetsotdel, or Committee on Art Affairs (this Committee is subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the USSR) and with the Spetsizdel, and Spetschest of all the theaters, and theatrical institutions, art galleries (painting, etc.), museums, etc. As we already know (see the part on "Recruitment") all the leaders of the Spetsotdel, Spetsizdel, and Spetschest are former officers of the Extraordinary Commission, Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, OGPU, KGB, NKVD, and KGB, who continue working as a collaborator, or secret informant, so that each one of the leaders of the Spetsotdel, Spetsizdel, and Spetschest, in their liaison, (sic) secret informants who work infiltrated among the personnel of the Committee on Art Affairs, and also that on theaters, museums, galleries, etc. This corresponds to the fact that through the intermediary of the Spetsotdel, Spetsizdel, and Spetschest, one of the sub-sections of the Artistic Section had already received information regarding the opposition which existed in the ranks of the employees in the art sector (all those suspected, criticisms of the government, etc.). The 2nd sub-section of the artistic section (contacts) in turn, the counterintelligence service with the same leadership, but, through another means, this sub-section has no contact with the Spetsotdel,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Spetssektor, and Spetschast, and conducts the maximum possible amount of operations in order to secure collaborators, and secret informants in the artistic ranks. All of these individuals, collaborators, and secret informants, have direct contact with one of the representatives who work in this sub-section, and, in their secret contacts with him, transmit to the officer of the MGB complete information on all of their colleagues, and friends, not only with regard to their work, but regarding their private lives, and, regarding the political thought of these individuals. The 3rd sub-section is concerned with the work of counterintelligence using the same methods as the 2nd sub-section. There is thus, only one difference: between the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th sub-sections, each sub-section utilizes groups of objects which are under its surveillance. For example, the 2nd sub-section conducts a service against all the theaters, museums, etc., located in the city of Moscow; the 3rd, the same for these places located in the city of Leningrad; the 4th, all the other large centers of artistic employment in other cities of the USSR, etc.

A similar method to that of the artistic section is adopted by the other sections of the 2nd department of the MGB regarding all types of organization, administration, bureaucratic entities, shops, factories, cinema industry, etc. For example: The Heavy Industry Section operates the surveillance service on the ministries which direct the metal industries, so that a sub-section, through the means of the Spetsotdel, Spetssektor, and Spetschast which are in these ministries, the Trust Department: monopolies, Combinat (groups of plants, factories, mines, etc.), operates a service in order to receive information regarding uncertain elements, and criticisms against the government, etc. Another sub-section in the same section operates a direct surveillance through the means of collaborators, and secret informants who are infiltrated among the personnel employed in this type of industry, such as employees of the same industry, from a custodian to the assistant minister. In these services, which are sub-sections, and sections of the 2nd department they have the practical possibility of keeping watch over the entire population of the USSR, and this surveillance in some complete operations means that, in order to conduct the necessary service against some individuals, the sub-section which is entrusted with conducting this service, needs to procure as collaborators, or secret informants, many people, including infiltration into the residence of some individuals who give rise to suspicion, and in this case, the sub-section seeks to secure as a secret informant a member of the family, or other lodger at the home, including wife, children, maid, etc. The 2nd department is responsible for the counterintelligence service in all types of civil life of the USSR, but, not for all types of transportation, nor is it responsible for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the personnel security of the members of the Politburo. All the operations of the 2nd department of the KGB of the USSR, and the 2nd departments of the other 15 KGB organizations of the other 15 republics have as their objective to guard against activities against the government in the territory of the USSR (each one of the KGB's in the territory of its republic) in general. In addition, each one of the sixteen 2nd departments enters into the more important activities in order to discover activities, and preparations against the government. All the information which is received by each one of the 2nd departments through the intermediary of its sections, sub-sections, collaborators, and secret informants is methodically collected, and reviewed, logically written up, and afterwards, with the signature of the chief of the 2nd department, in the form of a report, is transmitted to the 1st assistant to the minister, or, sometimes, to the minister himself. In this report, there is no explanation about how this information was received by the 2nd department, there are given only the pseudonyms of the collaborators, or secret informants, the data, and facts; therefore this report does not set forth the fact that the chief of the 2nd department secured this report through the means of provocations, falsifications, and lies. If this document cites an individual, or a group of individuals who think or speak against the government, or are making terrorist preparations, for sabotage, etc., 99.99% of the time the 1st assistant to the minister, or the minister himself, upon receiving such a report immediately signs an order for the imprisonment of those whose names appear in it; and after the signing of the order for imprisonment, this order, by means of the office of the minister, or of the office of the assistant to the minister, is sent to the Operations Section, along with the necessary street addresses, and cities. The Operations Section carries out the action which is pertinent, for the location, imprisonment, and resultant of the prisoners to the cells. In its operations the 2nd department of the KGB maintains at times contact with SECTION A, and SECTION B, for the transmission of the necessary radiograms. The 2nd department of the KGB has many close contacts with SECTION B, the 2nd department of the KGB, and also with the 3rd department of the KGB. The 2nd department, KGB of the USSR, has representatives among the personnel of the Soviet Embassies in all foreign countries. It is the duty of these representatives to guard against treason in the Soviet Embassies. The representatives of the 2nd department in the KGB, in the majority of cases, use a cover, and officially occupy a position in the Soviet Embassy, either as one of the secretaries of the Embassy, or one of the Councils. All the representatives of the 2nd department who work in the Soviet Embassies abroad are subordinate to the chief of the 2nd department of the KGB, or to one of his assistants. The representatives of the 2nd department of the KGB exercise no espionage function in foreign countries, his

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

city is to guard against the infiltration of local spies into the Soviet Embassy. Each representative has a personal code at his disposition, and the right to utilize the Embassy radio, and the diplomatic courier service without control.

Examining the details regarding the 2nd department of the MVD it is easy to learn that the 2nd department has the possibility to watch over, through the media of counterintelligence, each locality in the civil life of the USSR by the means of two parallel channels: one channel, through the networks of the Spetsotdel, Spetssektor, and Spetschast, and another channel, through the collaborators, and secret informants. Necessary explanation: In the USSR all the civilian organizations always have a Spetsotdel, Spetssektor, and Spetschast (Special Section, Sector, and Representative).

#### 2ND SECTION OF THE MVD (DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY AND REGION)

The 2nd section of the MVD exists in all the USSR of the USSR, and the other republics. In case the MVD is located in a large region which has as its principal city a large city with an enormous population, and a considerable population in the suburbs of the city, and within the region, with many industrial centers, the MVD has two 2nd sections: one of these is the 2nd section for the city, and the other, the 2nd section for the region. The 2nd section of the city is responsible for the surveillance, and counter-intelligence on the entire civilian population of this city, and works under the same system as that of the 2nd department of the MVD. Example: 2nd section of the city of the MVD of Moscow, and of the Moscow region; City of Leningrad, and Leningrad region; City of Gorki, and Gorki region; city of Sverdloski, and Sverdloski region; City of Odessa, and Odessa region; City of Lvov, and Lvov region, etc. This sub-section in cities of this type has under its surveillance, by the means of the subordinate sub-sections, two parallel channels in order to watch over the entire city: sub-sections charged with the relations with the Spetsotdel, Spetssektor, and Spetschast, and 3 or 4 other sub-sections which conduct surveillance by the means of informants, or secret collaborators upon the industrial establishments of the city, the houses, buildings, transportation of the city, amusement places, and other establishments. Through this control, the 2nd section of the city of the MVD guards only the city which is the capital of the region. On the other hand, the 2nd section of the region of the MVD, under these same conditions conducts the surveillance service on all the districts of the region which are outside of the boundaries of the principal city.

DISTRICT SECTION OF THE MVD (Raiothel of MVD). The district section of the MVD is responsible for the location of all elements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

against the government within the territory of the district. The district section of the KGB (R.O.) is constituted of the following sub-sections: operations sub-section, industrial sub-section (or agencies, in case there is no industry in the district), and communal sub-section (residential houses). The R.O. of the KGB works in the same manner as the 2nd department of the KGB, and each 2nd section of KGB, but, since the R.O. of the KGB is a KGB in miniature, it has another sub-section which is charged with the interrogation of prisoners which corresponds in the KGB to the 5th department, and, in the KGB to the 5th section.

Therefore, if we examine the organizational structure of the 2nd department of the KGB, and its branches, 2nd sections in the KGB's, and R.O.'s of the KGB it is easy to understand that in the same plant, or theater one may find collaborators, and secret informants from the following counterintelligence channels of the KGB: example a): Dynamo Plant (the largest plant in the USSR, which manufactures large electrical apparatus, dynamos, electric motors, etc.); a plant in which over 15,000 workers are employed, and located in the Proletarian District of the City of Moscow. The following counterintelligence channels exist in this plant: 1st) Spetsotdel of the Dynamo Plant, which in turn is subordinate to the Spetsotdel of the Ministry of Electrical Industry, and through the intermediary of this Spetsotdel it is related to the sub-section of the section of the 2nd department of the KGB of the USSR which conducts the counterintelligence service in the ministries of the Electrical Industries; 2nd) Sub-section of the section of the 2nd department of the KGB of the USSR, through the intermediary of its collaborators, and secret informants among the personnel who work in this plant; 3rd) 2nd section of the KGB of the city of Moscow, and Moscow region, who have collaborators, and secret informants among the personnel at the plant; 4th) One of the sections of the 2nd section of the city of the KGB of the city of Moscow, and the Moscow region, and which is directly linked with the Spetsotdel of the same plant; 5th) R.O. of the Proletarian District which through the intermediary of one of its sub-sections also has secret informants in the same plant, and which is also linked with the Spetsotdel. All these 5 channels work parallel to each other, and each one of the channels knows about the existence of the others but it does not know what are the paths along which they work. The Spetsotdel of the Plant, in turn, as we note, is linked with three different representatives of the KGB, does not conduct the operator service, but conducts the collaboration service, because it is at the same plant, and knows the details regarding life in the plant better than the others, and for this reason the Spetsotdel of the Plant furnishes to each one of the three representatives of the KGB the maximum possible amount of data.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

These five channels are really working on the same matter, but since each one does not know the path which the other is working on, there is a great deal of competition among them.

In its tradition maintained since 1917, the date when the Extraordinary Commission was born, the 2nd department and all of its branches has been the most characteristic demonstration of the totalitarian, and police system of the USSR. The principal methods of work by the 2nd departments, the 2nd sections, and the R.O. groups is to produce the maximum possible number of future prisoners, and for this reason they develop "enemies of the people", traitors, spies, enemies of the regime; they utilize in their system of work the maximum amount of provocations, and falsifications possible. In the ranks of the counterintelligence of the KGB the amount of education of the officer, or collaborator, or secret informant is of value only if this individual knows how to coldly sell out others, including his father, mother, wife, and in this event the career of the individual is assured; thus, for example, at the age of 35 years the rank of Lt. General was received by the present chief of the 2nd department of the KGB of the USSR: Lt. General KENYON.

23 -- METHODS EMPLOYED BY THE 2ND DEPARTMENT OF THE  
KGB AND THE 2ND SECTION OF THE USSR IN ORDER  
TO SECURE COLLABORATORS AND SECRET INFORMANTS

In its present tactics, the KGB secures collaborators, and secret informants utilizing the experience from the various methods of the Extraordinary Commission, the Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, and KGB during the last 32 years. About 50% of all the collaborators, and secret informants are persons who avoided the possibilities of being arrested, or of their relatives arrest, or those who made a payment in order to remain at liberty, after having been imprisoned, under conditions imposed upon them by the organizations of the KGB, that is, to enter the ranks as collaborators, and secret informants, and to sign a document promising to carry out this collaboration.

The other 50% are comprised in the majority of militants, and ideological patriots of the Communist program, and of the regime of the Soviet Union, with great interest in promoting their own career in any possible manner, and under these conditions one of the officers of the KGB, of the 2nd department of the KGB, or of the 2nd section of the KGB, or of the R.O. of the KGB, after having

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

talked with the individual obliges him to sign a document promising that he will become a collaborator, or secret informant of the KGB. In the 1st case, he promises to collaborate in exchange for his own freedom, or that of one of the members of his family; in the 2nd case, he will collaborate in exchange for promises of assistance in his career, and also, in exchange for material compensation (money, clothing, house, etc.).

24 - METHODS OF INFILTRATION OF COLLABORATORS AND  
SECRET INFORMANTS IN THE PROCESS OF INFORMATION  
TO THE KGB

- a) Secret informants: in the language of the KGB he is the one who is worth the least, and the obligation as an informant is to give complete information in the form of reports, regarding all the individuals of interest for the KGB, not only in his place of employment but also in his residence. In reality the functions of the secret informant are limited to observations on the circles of persons with whom he works, resides, or who are in his circles of friends. For this reason, the majority of the secret informants remain in the same office, factory, or plant, in the same city, and in the same residence, staying there permanently for many years. The economic conditions of the Soviet people on the one hand, and the lack of freedom in the changing of jobs, etc., on the other hand, aside from the fantastic difficulties in finding a vacancy in a place to live, naturally brings about a situation in which, about 90% of the civilian population is born, and lives during its entire life in the same place, and has a very slight opportunity to travel to other cities, including to nearby cities.
- b) Secret collaborator: has his training under the instructions of officers of the KGB, therefore being in a superior position to that of the secret informants. The secret collaborator may be classified as an "informant of a universal type," he does not have a permanent place, and circle of employment, and, under the instructions, and even the protection of the KGB, the secret collaborator has the possibility to: 1) Receive all the necessary, and complete documents which are necessary in the interest of the service, whether for a new name, new occupation, new nationality, etc.;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2) The necessary money, clothing, articles for gifts, the possibility to purchase all kinds of travel tickets, or to have permission without being bothered about losing time for theaters, galleries, dances, trains, planes, sanatoriums, hotels, hospitals, etc., 3) The possibility to change employment, occupation, the place of residence, to rent new houses; 4) To adopt the necessary disguises, etc.

The MVD in its counterintelligence channels (2nd department MVD, 2nd section UZMVD, and R.O. MVD) has the great majority of the reports, and information received by the means of secret collaborators, and for this reason the MVD spends large sums in the payment of its collaborators, and also, in order to provide the necessary protection to the collaborator, in order that he may in his career advance through all the channels of the civilian life of the USSR. On the other hand the MVD demands of each secret collaborator that he correctly execute the mission which he is assigned by a superior officer of the MVD; he must exert in each mission the maximum of initiative in order to infiltrate as rapidly as possible, and as intimately as possible among the persons of interest to the MVD; he must give a most complete report about each case, since the collaborator himself has in his position the minimum (sic) possibilities to enter into contact with suspected persons, therefore he has the obligation to perform this service personally, without the superior officer of the MVD being obliged to place another person in the same service. In the event the collaborator himself has no possibility of contacting the suspected persons personally, the superior MVD officer shall provide a possibility, even among the ranks of the collaborators, and secret informants, and provide the necessary protection for the encounter of the collaborator with the individual whom it is necessary to investigate, through the intermediary of a 3rd person (who may be an officer, a collaborator, or an informant). For example:

- a) The collaborator, through the intermediary of a colleague at his place of employment (theater, plant, factory, etc.) discovers that one of the friends of this other friend (colleague) has contacts with other individuals who are interesting cases to the MVD because it concerns individuals who are anti-Communists, anti-ideological individuals, etc. In this case, after the first report from the collaborator to the superior officer of the MVD, this officer will give an order to the collaborator to enter into close contact with these individuals, and provide material protection (money, permits, and passage for trips, and other expenses.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- b) The collaborator unexpectedly hears, at one of the places he frequents, conversations which make him conclude that something suspicious is going on among a group of individuals, and the only thing which he recalls is the place where the suspected individuals reside. In this case, after the report by this collaborator to the officer of the KGB, this individual examines the possibility of infiltrating a collaborator either in the same business office, or in the same building where the individual resides, and to seek in their files for other collaborators, or informants, by the means of which it will be possible to establish contact between the collaborators, and the suspected individual.
- c) The KGB receives a report from one of its collaborators, or informants regarding an individual against whom the KGB desires to conduct a certain operation, but the collaborator, or secret informant who makes this report for some reason does not lend himself for this service (differences of age, difference of types, of education, of class, etc.), in this case, where the KGB utilizes the author of the first report in order to through him establish contact with the individual, or by this intermediary, there shall be utilized a liaison with another collaborator who will continue effectively working against the individual, or, the KGB shall give the necessary instructions in order that the collaborator who must execute this mission shall personally enter into contact with the individual; for this purpose, he exhibits a photograph of the individual, or gives the address of his residence, or his place of employment of the individual, and his full name, it being the duty of the collaborator himself to weave a fantastic story in order to enter into contact with this individual.

All the collaborators, and secret informants have the obligation to maintain the maximum secrecy with regard to their connection with the KGB; such a secret must not be revealed even to the most intimate members of their own family. All the collaborators, and secret informants, in the event that their connection as a collaborator, or secret informant is discovered by other persons who have nothing to do with the KGB, lose the right to continue to collaborate with the KGB, they lose their position in civilian life, and, in the majority of cases, they are arrested and sent to concentration, or prison camps, having as the last chapter of their life, "liquidation" in order that they shall not reveal the secrets about collaboration, and the methods of work of the KGB, which are already

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

known. The collaborator, and secret informants do not meet the superior officer to whom they are subordinate in the buildings of the RIB, or in their own homes, or in the collaborator's place of employment. The rendezvous between the superior officer of the RIB, and the collaborator is conducted either in casematory apartments, or on the streets, cafes, at doormen's, parties, or in other places where there is not a lot of traffic. Each one of the two individuals who goes to the rendezvous has the obligation to swear that he is not being followed. If, parchance, he notes that he is being followed, he has the obligation not to go to the rendezvous point, and, nevertheless, to discover the various amount of details about those who are following him. All the reports which each collaborator, or secret informant makes are signed not with his real name, but with his operational pseudonym. The operational pseudonym is received by each collaborator, or secret informant on the same day that he signs the promise to collaborate with the RIB. In all the telephonic contacts which the collaborator, or secret informant has with the superior officer he must use only his pseudonym. In all the telephonic calls, and correspondence which the superior RIB officer conducts with his subordinates, collaborators, or secret informants, he does not have the right to use the operational pseudonym of the collaborator, or secret informant, and may only designate him by his real name, or, the name which he is using officially. Each officer must watch out to prevent the amateur of two or more collaborators or secret informants. Each officer is responsible for accounting all the reports, and all the information regarding each one of the collaborators, or secret informants assigned to him, in a special file, which has the name of "Private Matter," and also, he collects in this same file, all the other information which reaches him, through the intermediary of other agents, in which there exist the names of collaborators, and secret informants subordinate to him. This "Private Matter," for each one of the informants or secret collaborators subordinate to this official, he is obligated to maintain in the operational file of his sub-sector, section, or department. This "Private Matter," on the collaborators, or secret informants, while they continue to work in the ranks of the RIB, does not enter SECTION E, the Files Section. On the other hand, all the suspected persons who are pointed out in the reports from the collaborator, or secret informant, along with the most complete details about each one of them, during their period of service, or against them, the superior officer of the RIB has the obligation to copy as official reports, and to transmit through the intermediary of the Bureau of the respective department for SECTION F, the Files Section. Each officer has the obligation to watch over all the collaborators, and secret informants subordinate to him, through the intermediary of his other collaborators, and informants without demonstrating to one collaborator that he is watching another one. Each officer has an obligation to know the medium details about

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the private life of each one of his collaborators, and secret informants. For all the forms of payment to the collaborators, or secret informants such as money, goods, etc., each collaborator, or secret informant has the obligation to give a written receipt signed with his operational pseudonym. Complete information regarding each collaborator, or secret informant, may rightly be received (through the intermediary of the officer to whom this collaborator, or informant is subordinate) only by the superior officers in the same department of the MGB, or, in the same section of the MGB, or, the chief of the R.O. of the MGB. For example: collaborator "X" is subordinate to representative "Y" who works in the 2nd sub-section of the 5th section of the 2nd department of the MGB of the USSR; complete information regarding collaborator "X" may rightfully be received through the intermediary of the representative: by the chief of the 2nd sub-section, the chief of the 5th section, the assistant to the chief of the 2nd department, and, finally, the first assistant to the minister, or the minister himself, each one through the means of his subordinate. None of the other departments, and sections of the MGB have a right to secure information about the collaborator without the permission of the 1st assistant to the minister, or from the minister himself. Each department has its collaborators, or secret informants as a monopoly; in case another department or section initiates the procuring of collaborators, or secret informants who are already working for another section, immediately after this collaborator furnishes a report to his superior officer, who, by means of the hierarchical system shown above, shall forward a report to the minister, who shall then prohibit that section from procuring this individual since he already belongs to another section, or department. The Minister of the MGB of the USSR, V. N. MERKULOV, has, just as, until 1943 (up to the last division of the NKVD, into NKVD, and MVD), L. P. BERTIA had, at his disposition secret informants who are infiltrated into the highest circles of the government of the USSR, who are subordinate only to him, and who only have their rendezvous with him (the same thing which occurred at the time of Napoleon Bonaparte the First, when his chief of the secret police, FOUCHÉ, maintained secret informants who were infiltrated into the most intimate circles of the emperor).

The subordination of the 2nd department of the MGB, of the 2nd section of the MGB, and of the R.O. of the MGB is as follows:

- 2) The 2nd department of the MGB of the USSR is directly subordinate to the 1st assistant to the minister, and the 2nd departments of the MGB organizations of the other 15 republics are subordinate, in the majority of the republics, to the minister himself, and in some of them, also to the 1st assistant.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b) The city 2nd sections, and the regional 2nd sections of the USSR, are always subordinate to the chief of the USSR.

c) The R.O. of the KGB of all the districts which are in the cities, and the R.O. of the KGB of all the districts which are in the interior of the regions, are subordinate to the first assistant to the chief of the USSR.

The functions of the 2nd department, and of the 2nd sections are to secure, and complete comprising material on all the individuals who are suspected by the KGB, and afterwards, to prepare the necessary reports for the superior officers, in accordance with the hierarchical scale enumerated above. On the other hand, the R.O. of the KGB not only exercises this function, but in addition, it conducts the first interrogation in its sub-section on interrogations.

#### 25 - THIRD DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR

This department has the function of exercising counter-intelligence on all types of transportation (railroad transportation, merchant marine, river boat transportation, civil aviation).

The 3rd department of the KGB is also subordinate to the 1st assistant to the minister. The 3rd department of the KGB of the USSR has only the following ministries under its jurisdiction: KGB, Ministry of Railways, KGB, Ministry of the Maritime Merchant Fleet, KGB, Ministry of Inland Water Transport, KGB, Department of Civil Aviation. By virtue of the fact that these ministries are for the entire Soviet Union, therefore, not having branches in each one of the other 15 republics, the 3rd department of the KGB of the USSR also is the only one throughout the USSR at the disposition of the KGB of the USSR. The other 15 republics do not possess a 3rd department. In the life of the USSR all types of transportation constitute one of the most important matters, by virtue of its large territory, and for this reason the matter of counterintelligence on transportation is exercised by a large force subordinate to the KGB, that is to the 3rd department of the KGB of the USSR. The 3rd department of the KGB of the USSR is comprised of 4 large sections:

1) The Railway Section which has under its surveillance the entire personnel of the MINISTRY, KGB, and those subordinate to it, about 80 sections of the railways lines. Each one of the 80 sections is established at

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

the headquarters of the railway (in the modern USSR there are about 80 different railways).

- 2) The Maritime Merchant Marine Section which has under its surveillance the Ministry, USSR, and subordinate to this section, there are maritime transport sections in all the headquarters attached to the departments of each fleet of the maritime merchant marine (on the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, etc.).

- 3) Inland Water Transport Section which exercises its surveillance over the Ministry, USSR, and subordinate to this section there are the branch sections established in the headquarters of all the departments of the inland water transport departments (on the Volga River, the Volga River, the Don River, the Ob River, etc.).

- 4) The section which exercises surveillance over the Department of Civil Aviation, USSR, and there are subordinate to this section branches which are attached to the departments of civil aviation, in the various large airports of the USSR, in the principal capitals of all the republics, and other large cities (Leningrad, Kiev, Moscow, Tiflis, Tashkent, Orenburg, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, etc.).

In turn each one of the 4 sections is constituted of various sub-sections. One of the sub-sections has direct contacts with the Spectrobel of the Ministry, corresponding to the sections over which it maintains a surveillance, and the other sub-sections have divided among them the responsibility for all the branches, each one being responsible for a certain number of them. All the branch sections are independent in the place where they are established, and thus, in the republic, they are directly subordinate to the corresponding sub-section of the section of the 3rd department of the Ministry of the USSR. The branch sections in the interior are not subordinate to any local USSR, and they have the right to exercise the necessary collaboration with them, and also with the local organizations of the Communist Party, and with the Soviet regions. Each branch section is established near the administrative offices of the respective railroad, or fleet, each one of the branch sections in turn is comprised of 4, or 5 sub-sections. One of the sub-sections of the branch section is directly linked with the Spectrobel administration of the corresponding railway, or merchant fleet, etc. Other sub-sections are distributed in the various sectors of the railway in question (large stations), or in the various seas, or river ports in case it is a fleet. In turn of war each one of the sub-sections of the branch sections sends on each passenger train,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

or ship, and also on freight trains, 2, or 3 officers, forming an Operational Group, which exercises surveillance on the trains, or ships, in the territory in which this sub-section is responsible, and, along the frontier with another territory, it transmits this train, or ship to the operational group charged with the jurisdiction of another sector, or another territory of the railway, or of the merchant marine, whether maritime, or inland water transport. For example: the western railway which connects Moscow with the capital of White Russia has its administrative offices in the city of Minsk, and located there is a branch section of the MGB which exercises surveillance, and is responsible for this entire railway. One of the sub-sections of this branch section is located in the city which has a large railroad station, Orsha (6 railways running in various directions pass through this station). This sub-section is responsible for the entire movement of railroad transportation in the sector of this railroad between the city of Minsk, and Smolensk; another sub-section is established in the city of Smolensk, and it is responsible for the entire movement of railroad transportation between the city of Smolensk, and Moscow; another sub-section exercises vigilance over all the buildings, locomotive shops, offices, which are established at the Moscow railroad terminal. 2nd example: Department of Ports, and Ships (U.Sch.P.) of the Maritime Merchant Marine of the Black Sea, located in the city of Odessa, in the Ukrainian SSR. The branch section which is established near the headquarters of the Department of Ports, and Ships, in the city of Odessa is responsible for the surveillance on all the personnel which is employed in the administration of the Department of Ports, and Ships, and in addition, over the headquarters of the fleet of the Department of Ports, and Ships, between the Port of Odessa, and Novorossiisk, including all the small ports which are located in this sector. One of the sub-sections of the branch section of the MGB exercises the surveillance over the department of Ports, and Ships; another sub-section has its Operational Representatives, and Operational Groups in all the ports: Odessa, Sevastopol, Kerch, Novorossiisk, and others of lesser importance. Another sub-section has its collaborators, and secret informants infiltrated among the personnel of all the ships, etc.

#### METHODS OF WORK OF THE 3RD DEPARTMENT OF THE MGB-USSR

The 3rd department of the MGB of the USSR, and all its sections utilize the methods of procuring collaborators, and secret informants among the personnel who work in all types of transportation like those of the 2nd department in all the other types of civilian life in the USSR. In their work all the branch sections of the 3rd department seek cooperation: from the MGB, from the KGB, and from the R.O. of the MGB; transport troops (the MVD, Ministry of Railways,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

has its own department of special transport troops who exercise vigilance on the railways stations, railways, all the offices, etc.), the Transport Militia (the Transport Militia is the Special Police for transportation, subordinate to the MVD, and which is a part of the USSR department), the Interior troops of Department GVTU, of the MVD exercise vigilance on all railway points which are located along the frontiers of the USSR, and maintain vigilance over all the foreign ships which enter the ports of the USSR; the Spetsbolai, the Spetsnastor, the Spetschast, which are located in all the administrative offices of all types of transportation. In all the administrative offices of the maritime, and inland fleets, airports, and railway stations which are located near the frontiers of the USSR, and which regularly have a movement of foreigners, each one of the branch sections of the 3rd department of the MVD, in such places has a sub-section which is especially occupied with the organization of a general surveillance service on foreigners, but it does not enter into positive operations against foreigners; it only has the right to maintain a surveillance, because positive actions may only be carried out by the representative of the sub-sections of Section IM.O of the 2nd department of the MVD of the USSR.

The 3rd department of the MVD of the USSR has an important role in the operations of the 1st department in order to infiltrate spies from the latter as members of the personnel of ships, trains, and planes of the international lines, and also, in the various activities which the 1st department conducts to steal persons, and material in the various foreign countries, and transport them to the territory of the USSR. The 3rd department has very close contacts with SECTION K, Files Section SECTION A, Code Section SECTION B, Radio-Communications Section and with the 2nd department of the MVD. No employee of any administration, or department of a railway, or the maritime, or inland fleet, or civil aviation may travel outside of the frontiers of the USSR in his employment (train, ship, airplane) unless the local branch section of the 3rd department of the MVD issues him a permit. Each employee who receives such a permit is obliged to write, and sign a promise which is in printed form in every paragraph, specifying what he cannot do in foreign countries, involving not making contacts with foreigners without special permission of his superior, not to talk with a foreigner about the USSR (information, etc.), to not take talks alone among foreigners, to listen to, and to immediately report any good impressions which his colleagues may offer regarding foreigners, to report all kinds of contraband which is brought in by his colleagues, etc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 - FOURTH DEPARTMENT OF THE MGB

This department is entrusted with the matters of espionage, and sabotage against Germany. The 4th department of the MGB was organized in 1942 through a special order from STALIN. In the last war the 4th department fulfilled a role which was little less than that of the Red Army in the destruction of the armed forces, and the potential of Germany. At the present time, the personnel of this department, jointly with that of the 1st department utilizes its knowledge and experience acquired in the II World War in Germany, and in all the countries of Europe, the departments being entrusted with many important tasks in Eastern Europe, and especially in the part of Germany occupied by the Russians, in order to assist the USSR in the domination of these countries. The 4th department is directly subordinate to the minister of the MGB of the USSR. He has at his disposition the MGB of these republics: Ukraine, White Russia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Estonia, Karelo-Finnish. In the most critical period of the last war for Russia, that is, in 1942, the 4th department also had branches such as the 4th section in the USSR groups of the city of Moscow, and the Moscow region, of the city of Leningrad, and the Leningrad region, of the city of Stalingrad, and the Stalingrad region, etc. The organization of the 4th department is similar to all the other departments; it has sections, and subordinate to them, sub-sections. The function of each section of the 4th department is established in such a manner that each one works in a given sector. One section worked especially in order to infiltrate its agents into all the intelligence, and counter-intelligence organizations of Germany, and of its satellite countries (countries occupied by Germany, during the last war; another section is that on sabotage, and which is entrusted with the preparation of all types of sabotage on means of communication, transportation, industries, factories, etc., and this same section also exercises intelligence functions in all these places. Another section trains personnel to infiltrate among the traitors to the USSR who went over to the side of Germany during the II World War (Army of Lt. General VLASSOV, who, after the termination of the war took refuge in the territory occupied by the Allies), and which presently continues to conduct similar operations in order to infiltrate its agents in all the circles of life in Germany, and also sending agents posing as refugees into the zones of Western Germany. The 4th department utilizes among its agents about 30 to 40% Soviet citizens; from 10 to 20% of White Russian emigrants, and the other 10 to 50% is composed of German, or Austrian citizens, and those from other countries of Eastern Europe. The system of securing the personnel for the 4th department, and for the 4th sections is the same as that of the 1st department. However, the system of work of its officers, and of its agents is much more aggressive than that of the representatives of the 1st department. All the officers, and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

all the agents who are trained in the territory of the USSR in order to enter the ranks of the 4th department, with the aim of carrying out missions, are trained in the Special Schools, with great attention to military discipline. The operations conducted by the 4th department in the II World War reached from the front line of the enemy into its General Staff. The 4th department utilizes all types of individual operations, and also joint operations carried out by groups of spies, and saboteurs, and has in its equipment: armament, and munitions, and at times it even uses plans. All the personnel of the 4th department knows military matters better than those of the other departments. At the time of World War II, the 4th department of the MVD of eight republics, and also the 4th sections of some of the MVDs sent to Germany their own individual agents, and groups of spies, and saboteurs, in this manner, providing parallel channels of operations against the enemy without one channel knowing about the existence of the other. The 4th department has close contacts with SECTION A, SECTION B, 1st department of the MVD, with the R.W. (Intelligence Department) of the General Staff of the Red Army, with the GUPV of the MVD, with the Central General Staff of the Guerrilla Movement, which existed during the last war under the leadership of Lt. General PONOMAREVO, present minister of White Russia, and also with the General Staffs of the Guerrillas of the Ukraine, White Russia, Karelo-Finland, etc. The experience of the personnel of the 4th department is very great, and brought good results in the last war; in the future war, the personnel trained in the ranks of the 4th department may fulfill an important, and dangerous role against the countries which enter the war against the USSR. In the 4th department more than in the others, there exist types of mentalities of the USSR, which are very fanatical, and who know how to kill themselves in order to be able to execute the necessary tasks which have been entrusted to them. In the carrying out of its operations, the 4th department utilizes all types of provocations, falsifications, physical force, liquidation, etc., in order to discover the maximum amount of information regarding the tasks which have been entrusted to it, and to secure the maximum result in the acts of sabotage which it carries out. 7

27 - 5TH DEPARTMENT OF THE MVD

The 5th department of the MVD of the USSR, and the 5th department of the MVD of the other 15 republics, and also the 5th section of the MVD are entrusted with the functions of the interrogations of persons who are arrested (political prisoners). In the R.S. of the MVD the functions of interrogation are exercised by the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sub-section which also has the number 5. The 5th department of the MVD is subordinate to the 2nd assistant to the minister, the 5th section in the MVD is subordinate to the 1st, and the 2nd assistant chief of the MVD. The 5th department has the same structure as the other departments being constituted of sections, and of sub-sections. One of the sections of the 5th department conducts the interrogations of foreign prisoners, and of Soviet citizens who have contacts with foreigners; another section, on the prisoners who are members of the intellectual opposition (upper classes) including former members of the Government of the USSR, who for some reason have been arrested; another section conducts the interrogations of all types of persons suspected of being spies, saboteurs, etc., persons who engage in any activity against the USSR, finally, another section interrogates all individuals who engage in anti-Soviet agitation, criticism of the regime, etc.

PROCEDURE OF WORK OF THE 5TH DEPARTMENT

- a) After the 2nd department already has in its power sufficient compromising material against an individual, the chief of the 2nd department furnishes his report to the 1st assistant to the minister, or to the minister himself.
- b) In accordance with the report the chief of the 2nd department, the minister, or his 1st assistant issues an order for the imprisonment of the individual indicated in the report; this order, through the intermediary of the Office of the Minister, or through the office of the 1st assistant to the minister, is sent to the Operations Section; this section executes the steps necessary in order to apprehend the individual, making searches at his residence, and at his place of employment, in order to discover compromising articles which may be utilized in the interrogation.
- c) On the same day that the individual is arrested, the 5th department receives through the intermediary of the Operations Section, all the articles (books, documents, letters, etc.) which the Operations Section found during the searches which it made, and in the carrying out of the order for the imprisonment of the individual, and, on the other hand, it receives through the 2nd department, or the 3rd department, all the compromising material against the prisoner, which was found by this department, or which this same department forged.
- d) To utilize all the material received from the Operations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Section, and from the 2nd department, and also, to utilize all the method of provocation, false witnesses, and interrogations, along with all the physical methods.

The 5th department has an obligation to receive the signature of the prisoner on a statement which confirms everything which the 5th department desires. The methods of work by the 5th department are the worst, and the most fantastic in the world regarding interrogation, utilizing processes without the slightest consideration of humanity toward the prisoners. The 5th department has a program, which is, to make of each prisoner: "an element of the greatest danger to the State." The interest in executing the work in this manner is very great for the officers in this department, since every interrogation with the signature of the prisoner, making a "confession," provides an opportunity for the officers to advance as rapidly as possible in their career within this department, and, causes them to be rewarded with certain favors on the part of the government of the USSR. On the other hand, each interrogation without the signature of the prisoner signifies that the career of the officer entrusted with it is paralyzed; aside from this, he receives rebukes from his superior officers. In the ranks of the 5th department, 95% of the officers are cold, without character, without any ideology, and work as automatons under the instructions, and orders of their superiors. It means nothing to them to carry out physical tortures against individuals who, today prisoners, yesterday were being applauded in the meetings as members of the government!....

About 99% of the processes prepared by the 5th department, after having received the necessary signatures of the prisoners are secretly judged without the presence of the prisoner, by three men who comprise the Extraordinary Council. The following are its members: Minister of the MVD of the USSR, (or, in the case of the republics, the Ministry of the MVD of the corresponding republic), the Attorney General of the USSR, and the President of the Military Court of the Supreme Tribunal of the USSR. After these three members reach a decision on the case of the prisoner, (years of imprisonment, shooting, etc.) this decision is directed through the channels of the Attorney General of the USSR so that the necessary action shall be taken. In case the interrogation is made by the 5th section of the MVD, and after having concluded the process of interrogation, it is transmitted to the chief of the 5th section of the MVD, and it then gives its opinion regarding the case, transmitting it to the chief of the MVD, who will also express his opinion before transmitting it to the minister of the MVD, or his assistant. The process goes to the Extraordinary Council through the intermediary of the 2nd assistant, or, through the minister.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In the event that the first interrogation is made by the P.O. of the MGB, the prisoner is afterwards remitted to remain at the disposition of the 5th section of this region. The period of duration of an interrogation for political prisoners has no limitation, because in the case of political prisoners, not even the local prosecutor, or local judge has any power to control the measures taken by the officers of the MGB. Sometimes the process of interrogation lasts from 2 to 3 years. Only a maximum of 1% of the processes judged under the control of the MGB are ever given publicity.

In their work, the 5th department of the MGB, and the 5th section of the MGB, have few contacts with the 2nd, or 3rd departments, these being in order to receive the compromising material. They have many contacts with the Operations Section, with Section A, with Section B, and few contacts with the 5th departments of the various republics, this being due to the fact that there is great competition among them, and they do not like to assist each other in the execution of their work. After having concluded the interrogation by the 5th department, copies of data, and necessary details for the files goes through the intermediary of the office of the minister to SECTION K, the Files Section. During the entire time of the execution of the interrogation, the prisoner is completely isolated from external life, not having the right to receive, or to write letters, being able only to write letters to the officers of the MGB, or to members of the government of the USSR, and in the latter case, the letters do not reach the hands of those to whom they are addressed (the members of the government) and, instead, remain in the possession of the officers entrusted with the interrogation. The right to receive newspapers, magazines, etc., is denied to the prisoner. All the personal articles of the prisoner, such as watch, billfold, necktie, shoestrings, metal buttons on clothing, belt, and all the other items of a certain length which might be used by the prisoner to commit suicide, the other metallic objects being confiscated from the prisoner when he is arrested, and all his possessions, not only his own, but also of his family, which are of value, are confiscated until the solution of the case by the Extraordinary Commission. The majority of the possessions confiscated from the prisoners are distributed to the SPENTSI, Special Trade Group, which is under the jurisdiction of the MVD. The Special Trade Group is a special organization of the government established in order to especially serve the personnel of the MGB, and MVD, and has as its disposition food stores, clothing stores, tailor shops, restaurants, others for repairing shoes, secret stores with foreign articles, for the equipping of Soviet spies who must go outside of the territory of the USSR, and also for the counter-intelligence operations of the MGB, in operations against foreigners

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

who are in the territory of the USSR. These possessions of the prisoners which are received by the Special Trade Group in the great majority are distributed later among the officers of the MVD, and of the MGB as presents, or at ridiculous prices. All of the prisoners during the time of their interrogation, as well as after the decision given by the Extraordinary Council, remain in the prisons which are guarded by troops of the GUVV of the MVD. In this manner, the path followed by the prisoner is as follows:

- a) the 2nd, or 3rd department initiates the preparation of the investigations against the individuals who are suspected, making an earnest effort to find material which compromises them, in order that they may be arrested,
- b) The individual is arrested by the Operations Section which carries out the search at the places this individual is known to frequent until he is arrested.
- c) He is imprisoned, and guarded by troops of the GUVV of the MVD.
- d) He is imprisoned, and interrogated by the 5th department.
- e) The case against the prisoner is decided by the Extraordinary Council.
- f) The prisoner goes to prison, or to a concentration camp, under the vigilance of the troops of the GUVV of the MVD, or, he may be freed on the condition that he become a collaborator, or secret informant under the complete surveillance of the 2nd, or 3rd department.

#### 26 - SIXTH DEPARTMENT OF THE MVD

This is the department entrusted with the personal safety of the members of the Politburo. Being only at the disposition of the MGB of the USSR, the 6th department is subordinate to the minister of the MGB. It conducts the services of complete safety, and complete guard on all the members, and alternate members of the Politburo, and, in addition, other members of the Soviet government who occupy very important posts. The 6th department is comprised of various sections. One of them is composed of high-ranking officers, including Lt. Generals, Major Generals, Colonels, Majors, who conduct the service for the personal safety of each member of the Politburo, that is, to accompany each member of the Politburo in all of his movements, including in his home, and, even when he goes to the bathroom. These

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

officers are charged with testing in their own mouth all the food before a member of the Politburo is served. Another section conducts the service for the safety of the members of the Politburo, and guards the entrances to buildings where they work, rest homes which are maintained in the USSR, etc.; another section, which does not use a uniform conducts the vigilance service in all the places which must be traversed by members of the Politburo, "Governmental Course." All these services are on a twenty-four hour basis. The representatives of the section entrusted with the personal safety of the members of the Politburo have as the limit of their life the sojourn of the member of the Politburo whose safety they are charged with protecting, depending upon the attitude of STALIN, and, in case one of the members of the Politburo is arrested, or poisoned by order of STALIN, all the members of his personal guard are also arrested, and immediately liquidated, because they know many intimate secrets of the life of this member of the Politburo, especially the preparations for the liquidation of this member. By virtue of the service performed by such representatives, this section which protects the personal safety of the members of the Politburo, permits STALIN to have all the members of the Politburo under his control, demanding that they execute his orders without opposition. For this reason, in practice there exists great antipathy by the members of the Politburo toward the officers who are entrusted with guarding their personal safety, as they know that any word from them may be the motive for a compromising report on this officer will send a report to his superior in the MVD. All the cooperation which is needed by the 6th department it easily receives through an order of the minister. All the personnel of the section of the 6th department which is entrusted with the personal safety of the members of the Politburo live under material conditions in the same manner as the minister himself, his assistants, and chiefs of each department of the MVD, nothing is lacking for them, and among them, there always exists great fear about the life of the member of the Politburo whom he is charged with protecting, and about his own life, because they are responsible for the life of each member of the Politburo, they pay with their own life when an attempt is made against the life of the member of the Politburo.

#### 29 - PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT - U.S.S.R.

The Personnel Department is subordinate to the assistant to the minister for personnel matters, and he himself is the chief of the Personnel Department (UK). There are various sections of the Personnel Department: Section on Personnel Records, Section on

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Personnel Assignment, Section on Personnel Training, Section on Personnel Promotion, etc.

### 30 - DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION (A.M.E.U)

The monograph states that the Department of Economic Administration is under the Minister for Administrative Affairs, who is the chief of this Department. The various sections on supplies, weapons, etc., are then listed.

### 31 - MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS - MVD

Its present Minister is General of the Army **SIEMENI KUMLOV**. He is formally subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and, in practice, subordinate, by the means of Minister **KUMLOV**, to the Deputy President of the Council, **L. P. BOKA**.

The MVD is comprised of two principal types of departments: troop departments, and departments with administrative functions. It has the obligation to conduct surveillance, and exercise security in all the important organizations of the USSR, on all dangerous elements, on the frontiers of the USSR, etc., and to direct the construction of all the most secret organizations of the USSR.

Principal troop departments: **OMV**: Principal Department of Frontier Troops (Green, and platinum caps, with green background); **OMVU**: Principal Department of Internal Troops (Red, and platinum caps with red background); **OMPD**: Principal Department of Firemen (Red and platinum caps with red background); **OMPTO**: Principal Department of Local Anti-Air Raid Defense (Red and platinum caps with red background); **OMPM** (Principal Department of Worker-Peasant Militia (Blue, and platinum caps with blue background).

Principal Administrative Departments: **GUAS**: Principal Department of the Concentration Camps (Red, and platinum caps, with red background); **GU**: Principal Department of the Prisons; **GU**: Principal Department of Construction (Special Secret Construction); **GUOSV**: Principal Highway Construction Department; **GU**: Principal Siles Department; **GU**: Principal Health Department; **GU**: Principal Personnel Department; **A.M.E.U**: Principal Department of Economic Administration; **GU**: Principal Political Department (Political Matters); **PARTKOM**: Party Committee; Code Section, Communications Section, Aviation Detachment of the MVD.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The MVD is established under principles of strong military discipline. The first five departments of troops are composed of soldiers, sergeants, and all classes of officers up to the rank of Lieutenant Generals, who are the heads of the departments. All the administrative construction departments are comprised of officers, and non-commissioned officers (non-commissioned officers only perform technical services), and specialists in the particular affairs of the department. The total personnel at its disposition is around a million, or a million two hundred thousand enlisted men, and officers, not only in the MVD of the USSR, but in all the MVD organizations of all the republics. The MVD is organized in about the same manner as the KGB.

Attached to the minister, there is his office; the 1st assistant to the minister, who also has his office, directs the departments GUPD, GUPVO, and GUPML; the 2nd assistant to the minister directs the administrative, and construction departments, with the exception of departments GUK, A.M.U., and GUV; the 3rd assistant to the minister directs only the GUK, and he is the head of the GUK; the 4th assistant to the minister directs the A.M.U.; and the minister himself directs the Code Section, the Communications Section, the Aviation Detachment, GPU, GUPV, and GUVV. In all the other 15 republics there exists the Ministry of the MVD. Each one of the MVD organizations in the other 15 republics are miniatures, and branches of the MVD of the USSR, and, in the abbreviation for each one of the MVD's of each republic, the 1st letter R (Principal) precedes the name which represents the departments. In each province, or territory the MVD of the republic has its UMVD (UMVD of Moscow, and Moscow Region, MVD Department of the City of Moscow, and of the Moscow Region). In turn each MVD has in each district of the city, or district of the interior its R.O. of the MVD (District Section of the MVD).

#### Structure of the Departments of the MVD:

GUPV. The GUPV is comprised of the following sections: section on Personnel (OP); ~~POLITODDEL~~ (Political Section); GUK, Personnel Training Section; GUP, Section for Training for Combat for Frontier Troops in Event of an Invasion; O.O., Operations Section (which in general prepares the plans for all the matters taught in the GUP); O.S., Communications Section; GUPD, Section on the Technique of Supplying Material; R.O., Intelligence Section, and Accounting Section (Intelligence). All the Troops of the GUPV which are stationed along the frontiers of the USSR, in the territory of the USSR, are subordinate to the GUPV of the MVD of the USSR. The organization of the troops of the GUPV is done in the following manner: There are control and (secret) observation posts along the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

frontiers. The observation posts are constituted by two, or three soldiers stationed along the frontier, several kilometers apart; they are all subordinate to the various ZASTAVA, which may be literally translated as the headquarters of a company to which they belong. The control posts, KPP, are located along the railways, highways, at the points where ships cross the frontiers, etc., they are posts which exercise the supervision over all those who cross the frontier openly. Both the ZASTAVA, as well as the KPP are subordinate to the Frontier Detachment, P.O., that is Pogranotriest. Various groups of the Pogranotriest are subordinate to the District Detachment (PP). In turn the various District Detachments which are in the territory of the RSFSR are subordinate to the GUUV. Necessary explanation: Each ZASTAVA, Frontier Detachment, and District Detachment has its general staff. In each one of the other 15 republics all the district detachments which are in the territory of this republic are subordinate to the UFF, Department of Frontier Troops of this republic. The UFF is, in turn, subordinate to the Minister of the MVD of this republic, and has the maximum, and best of relations with the GUUV of the USSR.

GUUV OF THE MVD OF THE USSR: It has the same sections as the GUUV, and the only thing which it does not have is an R.O., Intelligence Section. The GUUV has many divisions of GUUV troops under its orders. Each division is constituted of 3 or 4 regiments; each regiment is constituted of 3 or 4 battalions, and each battalion is constituted of from 3 to 5 companies, and each company is composed of 3 or 4 platoons, and each platoon is made up of 3 squads, and each squad is composed of from 13 to 15 soldiers. The troop divisions of the GUUV are employed in the various services in the territory of the RSFSR (for example: guard at the Kremlin, concentration camps, Central Prison of the RSB, military plants, bridges, ports, secret constructions work, etc.) they are directly subordinate to the GUUV. Similarly in each one of the other 15 republics they are subordinate to the GUUV of the MVD of the republic, and they have close contacts with the GUUV of the MVD of the USSR.

GUPO OF MVD: The GUPO is composed of the same sections as the GUUV. It has in each region, or province of the territory of the republic an OBGUPO, Department of Firearm Corps of the Region. The OBGUPO in each city has a COGUPO, Department of Firearm Corps of the City. The COGUPO in the territory of each district of a city has a RAIGUPO, department of Corps of Firearm of the District. The RAIGUPO in each rural district within the region is subordinate directly to the OBGUPO. Each RAIGUPO has at its disposition two or more Corps of Firearm.

GUPTO: This Department is constituted of the same sections as the GUPO, and the GUUV, and, has in addition the sections OP.M.2,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chemical Warfare Defense Section; OSO, Air Raid Alarm Section; OCKE, Collective Defense Measures Section; OSIZ, Section on Individual Defense Measures; OM, Camouflage Section; OCH, Light Camouflage Section. The GUMVO of the MVD of the USSR, and the MUMVO of the MVD of each one of the 15 republics have in the territories of all the districts, and territories which possibly are located near the frontiers, and which have a possibility of being attacked by enemy aviation, a section of the MVO attached to the local MVD (this local section of the MVD is subordinate to the general staffs of the MVO of the cities). Each general staff of the MVO of the cities (it varies according to the size of the city) has, at its disposition, from one battalion up to one division of troops of the MVO. Under the general staff of the MVO of the city, in the larger cities there are subordinate to the general staffs of the MVO of the district of the city, and each general staff of the MVO of the district has at its disposition, one, or two battalions of the MVO. To the general staff of the MVO of the district in the large cities, there are subordinate the general staffs of the MVO of the police districts which are located in the territory of this region. In turn, each general staff of the MVO of the police districts, in this case have at their orders from one company, up to one battalion of troops of the MVO. Each battalion of troops of the MVO is composed of one company entrusted with defense against chemical warfare, one company for engineer repairing, one medical aid company, one company of firemen, and one platoon for communications, and information, signals, and alarm. Parallel to this, in the large regions, and regarding the question of the objects which are in the interior districts of the region, the MVO Section of the MVD of this region, has at its orders the General Staff of the MVO of the Region (in the same manner as that General Staff of the MVO of the region), and for this reason, the General Staff of the MVO of the region is subordinate to the general staff of the MVO of the region of this region. GUMVO of the MVD of the USSR, the MUMVO of the MVD of the other republics, section of the MVO of the USSR, the General Staff of the MVO of the city, of the region, and of the district, and of the police district always have in their work great cooperation, and contacts with the local Worker-Peasant Militia, department of local corps of firemen, regional, and local Soviets, OROKH, Regional Committee, OUPKOH, City Committee, OAIKOH, District Committee of the local Communist Party, with the P.O. of the MVD, and the P.O. of the local MVD, etc.

GUMKH: of the MVD of the USSR is comprised of the following sections: OCH, Criminal Section, OVD, Traffic Section on Transports in the Cities, and on the Highways; OGAJ, State Automobile Inspection Section; OTH, Section on Transport Militia (Railway Militia); OVME, Section on Maritime Militia; P.O. Passport Section; VUD, Military

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Registration Section; OBP, Training Section for Battalions furnished to the Frontier Troops; OK, Personnel Section; Political Section; Personnel Training Section; Operations Section; Accounting Section (supervision); OSTO, Section on the Technic of Supplying Material, etc. The GUMM of the MVD of the USSR, and the URM of the MVD in the other 15 republics have the following structure: in each region, or province there are: GUMM, regional department of worker-peasant militia, and to it there are subordinate: GUMM, or GOMM, Department of the city of the worker-peasant militia, or, city section of the worker-peasant militia, of all the cities which are in the territory of this region, and also, R.O. RM, district section of the worker-peasant militia in the internal districts of the region, and R.O. of the RM, in the city districts (in this case they are subordinate to the GUMM, or GOMM of this city). In each region of the territory of all the republics of the USSR, the R.O. of the RM have two names: according to official instructions it is the R.O. of the RM, and according to what it is called in practice by the population, it is the R.O. of the MVD.

The RO of the RM, RMSPD, General Staff of the MVD of the district, are the only three representatives which the MVD has in the territories of the districts. All these five departments, that is: GUV, GUVV, GUP, GUPVO, and GUMM, are troop departments of the MVD. Each one of the 5 departments have at their disposition, personnel trained along military lines (especially infantry matters, and anti-air raid defense, and also cavalry, maritime patrol in launches) and each one of the five departments has among its troops, soldiers, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd sergeants, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd lieutenants, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, major general, lieutenant general. The departments of the GUV, GUP, GUPVO, and GUMM, are departments which function separately and independently during time of peace, and of war. On the other hand, the GUVV department, not having a single given, and specialized service to execute, is therefore, among the most varied, as we have already explained, the commander of each unit has autonomy over his command, but, receives orders, and instructions from the authority of the corresponding local group, to which his unit must be entrusted with the surveillance service. This department in this manner, furnishes its troops in accordance with requests from the following departments: GULAG, for vigilance over prisoners in the concentration camps, and in the transportation of prisoners to the aforesaid camps; for the GUM department for guarding prisoners in the prisons, and for firing squad executions; for the GUS, for guarding construction projects; for GUSOCHOR, for guarding highway construction work; for GAV for guarding the State Files; for GSV for guarding the Polyclinics, hospitals, sanatoriums, etc., for MVD personnel, and also, in response to requests from the MVD to guard the Kremlin, and all the government buildings, including rest houses for members of the Politburo,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

etc.; to guard the buildings of the MVD, and also the ministry of the MVD, to guard the principal viaducts, and railway bridges, and also the Ministry of MVT; to guard the chief ports of the maritime merchant fleet, and also the Ministry of MVT, to guard the chief ports of the Inland Merchant Fleet, and other ministries, especially the Military Industry Ministry, which has at its disposition numerous plants (all the plants, and factories, and "combines") which manufacture secret military products, and which always have a number for their name, for example: 22nd plant in the Kievskiy District of Moscow, ~~SSSUNOVA~~ Plant, which manufactures airplanes.

GUAG: Principal Department of Concentration Camps:

This department has the following sections: OLON, Section on Concentration Camps, Special Functions; OUL, Section on Concentration Camps for Men; OUL, Section on Concentration Camps for Women; OUL, Section on Joint Concentration Camps; OUL, Section on Concentration Camps for Criminals, OUL, Section on the Technic of Supplying of Material; OUL, Section on the Registration of Prisoners; OUL, Personnel Section; AO, Administrative Section; Political Section; and Accounting Section (Supervision). The GUAG in the MVD of the USSR, and the ULAG in the MVD of all the other 15 republics conducts the services of administration, and supervision of the life of the prisoners in the concentration camps. It requests from the GUVV department in the MVD of the USSR, or UUV in the MVD of the other 15 republics the necessary contingents of internal troops in order to guard against the escape of prisoners from the concentration camps. In the regions, or territories which have concentration camps in their area, they have an OLAG, Section on Concentration Camps which is subordinate to the MVD of this region, or province.

GTU: Principal department of Prisons: The GTU in the MVD of the USSR, and the TU in the MVD of the other 15 republics are comprised of the following sections: GST, Section on Special Prisons; GTU, Section on Prisons for Criminals; GTU, Section for the Supplying of Technical Material; GTU, Personnel Section; AO, Administrative Section, Political Section, and Accounting Section (Supervision). The GTU department in the MVD of the USSR, and TU in the MVD of the other 15 republics conduct the services of direction, and administration of all the prisons in the USSR. In each region, or province, there is, attached to the MVD, the TU, Section on Prisons, which directs the administration of the prisons which are in the territory of this region, or province. The GTU department of the MVD like the GUAG department in its majority has about 95% of its personnel composed of MVD officers, and the other 5% are composed of junior grade of lieutenants and sergeants. All the prisoners who are in the prisons of the GTU are guarded by troops of the GUVV in the majority

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of the prisons, and in the small prisons in the interior they are guarded by personnel from the worker-peasant militia, personnel from the GUMM department.

GUS of the MVD of the USSR: A single department, only at the disposition of the MVD of the USSR: It is comprised only of officers of the MVD, 60 to 70% of whom have taken training at the engineering, and construction institutes for the various types of construction, and especially for fortifications on land and sea frontiers, and also the construction of military industrial plants, canals, bridges, tunnels, viaducts, etc. It is comprised of various sections on construction of stipulated matters, and with administrative sections, administrative sections on technical supply, personnel section, accounting section (supervision), etc.

GUSOCHODR: Principal Department for Highway Constructions: It is a single department, which is at the disposition of the MVD of the USSR. It is comprised solely of officers, in the majority, specialists in highway construction. It has the same sections as the department of the GUS, and the human material utilized by the GUSOCHODR, like the GUS, in its construction work, is comprised of prisoners from the various concentration camps. As an example of the construction work done by this department there may be cited, the following: The "Moscow-Volga" Canal, the "Belomoro-Baltic" Canal, called "STALIN," the White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal, the Moscow-Tashk, Moscow-Kiev super-highway, and also, the construction of many plants which prepare secret material, fortification lines along the frontiers on the East, West, and South of the USSR.

GAU: Principal Archives Department: The GAU of the MVD of the USSR, and the AU of the other 15 republics are comprised of about 50% officers of the MVD, 50% civilians. It is charged with guarding, collecting, and maintaining all the types of important archives of the State, and of the Republic. For the training of civilian personnel of the GAU there is in Moscow, on 25th of October Street, in the territory of the Bjerdinski district, about 200 meters distance from the Kremlin, and about 300 meters from the central building of the MVD, and MMS of the USSR, a special institute: GAI, Institute of State Archives. All the personnel which enters this institute has its life minutely investigated until the occasion of its admission into the institute, and with the cooperation of the 2nd department of the MGB of the USSR (general counterintelligence). All the students, upon the completion of the course, automatically receive employment in one of the archives of the MVD of the USSR, or in the AU of the MVD of the other 15 republics. All the personnel enter the services in the MVD archives as civilians. After from 2 to 5 years of work, during which the necessary military preparations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

are made in the republican schools, or Vischeia (Higher) of the MVD of the USSR, they are examined and receive the rank of officer of the MVD. The buildings which contain the archives of the USSR, or of the other 15 republics are also guarded by troops of the GUVV, or GUV. In the service of the GAV of the MVD of the USSR, and of the AV of the MVD of the other 15 republics about 90% of the employees are women.

GSM: Principal Health Department: The GSM of the MVD of the USSR, and SM of MVD of the other 15 republics are comprised of about 90% of medical military personnel from all the posts, from orderly to the major-general of the medical corps. The remaining 10% of the personnel is comprised of civilian medical personnel, and other employees. It is the duty of the GSM of the MVD of the USSR and the SM of the MVD of the other 15 republics to provide the most complete medical service, and also, a complete service of medical instruction to all the personnel of the MVD, and GUV, in all the complicated activities of these ministries. There are at the disposition of the GSM, the following:

- a) Various hospitals in each one of the large cities, and as a minimum, a large polyclinic in each region, or province; these being for the local personnel of the MVD, and GUV.
- b) Various sanatoriums, and rest homes in the best places of the USSR, including the Caucasus, Crimea, etc., also possessing its medical health posts, and medical instruction centers in various localities, such as, for example: in the buildings of the MGB, of the MVD, of the prisons, in the concentration camps, in all the places for special construction, in all the training schools for the personnel of the MVD, the GUV, in all the MVD troops, and sometimes in the various groups of spies, and saboteurs, or detachments of spies, and saboteurs who leave the USSR during the time of war for action in foreign countries. The GSM is subdivided into the following sections: Personnel, Political, Training of Personnel, Administrative Section, Supplying of Technical Material, Accounting (Intelligence).

GUK: Principal Personnel Department: The GUK of the MVD of the USSR, and the UK of the MVD of the other 15 republics direct the registration of the entire personnel of the MVD. The GUK is comprised of officers of the MVD. The GUK has the following sections: GPK, Personnel Assignment Section; GUK, Personnel Registration Section; GPK, Personnel Training Section; G.Reg.S., Personnel Promotion Section; Accounting Section (Supervision).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The GUK directs, and controls all the personnel departments of the other principal departments of the MVD of the USSR. At the disposition of the GUK we find the SPECIAL SCHOOL of the MVD of the USSR, which prepares the directing personnel for all the departments of the MVD of the USSR. There are also the Republican Schools which train the personnel, with a lower level of specialized education for the various departments, and troops of the MVD. Similar Republican Schools exist at the disposition of each of the Personnel Departments of the other 15 republics. Similar to the Republican Schools, but with a program specialized to their functions (not dealing with general, and universal matters like in the schools of the GUK, and UK), a school also exists under the OK of the GUPV of the MVD of the USSR. In this school they only study the disciplines which are necessary for the frontier troops. The same thing occurs in the schools which are subordinate to the OK of the GUPV in all the MVD's of the other 15 republics. There are Republican Schools in which they study the necessary matters for the internal troops subordinate to the OK of the GUPV of the MVD of the USSR, and the OK of the GUPV of the MVD of the other 15 republics. We also find specialized schools on matters regarding firemen, and subordinate to the OK of the GUPD of the MVD, USSR, and the OK of the GUPD of the MVD of the other 15 republics. There are also schools for the study of the disciplines of anti-air raid defense, subordinate to the OK of the GUPVO of the MVD, USSR, and to the OK of the GUPVO of the MVD of the other 15 republics. Special schools train the personnel in matters which are necessary to the worker-peasant militia, and they are subordinate to the OK of the GUMM of the MVD, USSR, and to the OK of the GUMM of the MVD of the other 15 republics. All the programs of these schools are only approved after being examined by the GUK of the GUK of the MVD, USSR, and granted permission to be used. It is sufficient for this that they have the signatures of: the 1st assistant, and of the 3rd assistant to the Minister of the MVD, of the USSR.

#### A. RE. U. - Principal Economic Administrative Department

Comprised of about 60 to 70% of officers, of lieutenants, junior grade, and sergeants, and the remaining 30 to 40% of civilians. It is sub-divided into the following sections: Uniform; Armament; Accounting (Supervision); Transports; Food Supplies; Special Stores; Buildings for Housing for Personnel of MVD, and also for the MVD, Supply of Technical Material; "CHISTOTA," Special Trade. All these sections only deal with the personnel of the MVD, but the Housing, and Special Trade Sections, aside from rendering service to the MVD personnel, also provide this service for the MVD personnel. This Section on Housing directs various housing centers completely, in their administrative part, taking care of everything which is related to the housing. Only officers of the MVD, or of the MVD may reside

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in these houses. The Special Trade Section is a special organization of the government of the USSR with the aim of serving the personnel of the MVD, and of the NKD, and it is comprised of shops with food products, clothing shops, tailoring shops, shops for the making of shoes, etc., including what was already mentioned in the part relative to the 5th department of the NKD.

GPU - Principal Department of Political Matters:

It has only officers. It has the following sections: OK, Personnel; OKK, Personnel Training; OKP, Personnel Assignment; O. Reg. S., Personnel Promotions; FO, Accounting (Supervision); OAP, Agitation, and Propaganda; OPU, Party Studies. The GPU of the USSR, and the GU of the MVD of the other 15 republics direct the training of all the troop personnel of the MVD of political matters. The GPU, at the disposition of its OKP Section, has political schools, political instructors, and political courses. These schools and courses prepare competent officers, from all the MVD troops, to assume the posts of assistant commanders on political matters in all types of troops from battalions up to divisions. The OAP Section, Section on Agitation, and Propaganda, furnishes all the training for all the types of political education in the ranks of the personnel of the MVD, including the supplying of materials, and books for Communist propagands, lessons on political matters, discussions on political questions, demonstrations from political films, etc. The GPU directly supervises all the POLITICAL SECTIONS of all the principal departments of the MVD.

PARTKOM: The PARTKOM in the MVD of the USSR, and in each one of the 15 republics, and also in each one of the UVD of each region, and province, is constituted through the election by the members of the party who work in this MVD, or this department of the MVD, or UVD. Everything is done in a similar manner in each Partkom.

Refer to the organization of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(0) of the USSR.

CODE SECTION: It is charged with ciphering, and deciphering all the matters concerning the MVD of the USSR, and it has similar sections in each one of the MVD organizations in the other 15 republics. In a similar manner we find sub-sections in each one of the UVD organizations.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS SECTION: Executes the service of transmission, and reception of messages pertaining to the service of the MVD of the USSR. Similar sections exist in each MVD of the other 15 republics; in a similar manner in each UVD we find a sub-section

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on Radio Communications.

MVD AVIATION DETACHMENT: There is a large aviation detachment at the disposition of the MVD of the USSR. These detachments possess transport and cargo planes, and also planes for the landing of parachute troops. It has its own airport, which is located in the suburbs of Moscow, and which is named "PODLEPKI." The aviation functions of the MVD are quite varied: It makes trips with the minister of the MVD, or with his assistants, with the heads of the principal departments, it transports important prisoners, it transports MVD troops to combat positions with armed enemies in the nations of Eastern Europe, it transports German construction men, and scientists to the USSR, it transports members of governments friendly (especially Chinese Communists, Republic of Mongolia, Communists from Eastern Europe, etc.), it transports spies, and saboteurs from the MVD for the operations which become necessary, it also hauls officers of the MVD, accompanies the planes of Politburo members in the territory of the USSR, etc.

SUBORDINATION OF MVD OF USSR in the Ascending Hierarchy Scale:

The SO of the MVD exists in each city, town, or rural district, either in a city or in the interior, and, this SO of the MVD, is commonly called by the populace, the SO of the MVD. Each one of the SO of the MVD has subordinate to it a minimum of two police districts; in the large cities in which each district has a large population, we find up to four police districts. All the SO of the MVD which are in the cities are subordinate to the GOVERNOR (in the large cities), and to the GOVERNOR (in the small cities). All the SO of the MVD, GOVERNOR, in the large cities, and GOVERNOR of the small cities, and also all the SO of the MVD of the rural districts are subordinate to the GOVERNOR of the region, or province. The head of the GOVERNOR in turn is subordinate to the MVD of the region, or province. All the frontier districts work in cooperation with the MVD of the region, of the province. The MVD in its work also receives the cooperation of the GOVERNOR, of the MVD Section, of the GOVERNOR Section, and of the SO Section. Necessary explanation: All of these sections have an obligation to render 100% cooperation with the head of the MVD, and to carry out his orders, in so far as these orders do not conflict with the instructions received from their own departments. The MVD, and especially its head, and his assistants exercise the functions of coordination of all the various specialized representatives who are located on the territory of this region, or province. All the MVD organizations which are stationed in the territory of this republic are subordinate to the 1st assistant of the minister of the MVD of this republic. In turn

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

all the ministers of all the 15 republics are formally, and officially subordinate to the Council of Minister of the republic, and especially to the first minister of the republic, and to the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic. In reality, practically all the Ministers of the MVD of all the 15 republics (in a secret, and unofficial manner) are subordinate to the Minister of the MVD of the USSR, **GENRIKH KHRYZHOV**, who in turn is subordinate to the Deputy President, **L.P. BERIA**.

The MVD does not possess its own counterintelligence organization. All the personnel of the MVD is under the complete surveillance of the 2nd department of the MGB. However, among the high officers of the MVD, the majority of the personnel for many years, worked on matters of counterintelligence, or political intelligence. This was in the period when there existed the Extraordinary Commission, the Extraordinary Pan-Russian Commission, **OGPU**, **NKVD**, **IMGB**, (until the latest separation of the **NKVD** into **MEVD**, and **IMGB** in the april of 1943). The MVD has no right to control, investigate, nor even to intervene in the affairs of the MGB, while the MGB has absolute freedom to enter, investigate, and control any matter of the MVD, including the right to arrest officers, soldiers, and civilians from the personnel staff of the MVD. Therefore, the MVD, or former **NKVD**, since 1943 has been under the complete domination of the MGB of the USSR.

### 32 - MINISTRY OF ARMED FORCES (M.V.S.)

(Intelligence, and Counterintelligence of the M.V.S.)

The Ministry of Armed Forces of the USSR is under the direction of the Minister, Marshal of the USSR, **VASSILIEVSKI**. Its Chief of the General Staff of the MVS of the USSR is Marshal of the USSR, **SOZLOVSKI**. The principal composition of the MVS is the following: The Chief of the General Staff is directly subordinate to the Minister of the MVS; the Minister of the MVS, is always formally, and officially subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in practice however, and in reality, until the month of April of this year, during the entire existence of the USSR, the Minister of Armed Forces of the USSR was always directly subordinate to **STALIN**. It is known to all that during the period of the last war, between 1941 and 1947(etc), **STALIN** himself occupied the post of Minister of Armed Forces of the USSR. From 1947 until March of 1949 this post was occupied by Marshal of the USSR (a very experienced, and longtime

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 15) R.U. - Intelligence Department
- 16) G.U.Kr. - Principal Counterintelligence Department  
(SHERSON)
- 17) G.P.U. - Principal Political Department
- 18) G.U.K. - Principal Personnel Department
- 19) G.I.U. - Principal Supervision Department
- 20) A. I. U - Department of Economic Administration

Observations: The last five of these Departments are officially subordinate to the Minister of the IVD. Of these five, number 16, the G.U.Kr., in practice is under BERIA, and number 17, the G.P.U., in practice is under the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (U), POTANITCHEV.

#### R.U. - INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT

The monograph states that the R.U. is comprised of the following sections: ODI, Official Diplomatic Intelligence Section (there are subordinate to this section all the Military Attaches who are assigned to the Soviet Embassies in foreign countries); Secret Intelligence Section (which utilizes secret agents in foreign countries on a parallel channel to the 1st section); Military Intelligence Section (which works by making use of the real forces on the front lines, and on the front lines of the enemy); Air Intelligence Section; Naval Intelligence Section; Personnel Section; and Personnel Training Section.

In describing the development of the activities of the Official Diplomatic Intelligence Section, reference is made to the case which occurred in Canada in September, 1945, when a code clerk, by the name of GOUZENKO disclosed certain of the espionage activities of the Russian Military Attache in Canada, Colonel RABTIN.

The monograph then discusses the other sections of the Intelligence Department of the IVD, and notes in conclusion that although officially the various IVD of the 15 republics are independently organized, in reality they are directly linked to the IVD of the USSR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~